Green bond market and sentiment: is there a switching behaviour?

We examine the impact of Twitter sentiment on the returns of four selected bond indices via the selection of relevant threshold variables, such as the S&P 500 Index, the VIX, and the MSCI World Index. If overreaction or underreaction to significant changes in the market occur regularly (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), it is assumed that Twitter users respond with different intensities in the case of rising, falling or rather indeterminable markets. We fail to find evidence that the S&P 500 Index and VIX are relevant in supporting the switching behaviour. However, the MSCI World Index, to a certain extent, causes this relationship to diverge from the linear one. These claims become stronger when lagged and cubic sentiment variables have been included in the panel smooth transition regression (PSTR)S

Future directions in international financial integration research. A crowdsourced perspective

This paper is the result of a crowdsourced effort to surface perspectives on the present and future direction of international finance. The authors are researchers in financial economics who attended the INFINITI 2017 conference in the University of Valencia in June 2017 and who participated in the crowdsourcing via the Overleaf platform. This paper highlights the actual state of scientific knowledge in a multitude of fields in finance and proposes different directions for future research

Revitalisation of the Japanese economy: a coporate governance perspective

This study examines Japanese restructuring agendas from a corporate governance perspective. The initial analysis of bank-based and market-based systems sets the cornerstone for system convergence, followed by the discussion on bad-debt problems, managerial group entrenchments, unclear monitoring relationships and recent mergers and acquisitions waves. Following La Porta et al. (1998) legal system comparison methodology we conclude that Japan has a good legal framework, but norms, deeply embedded in business practices, obstruct the enforcement. Finally, the comparison across markets, legal and accounting systems provides the general scheme for the functioning of any Japanese company, be it located in Japan or elsewhere

Revitalisation of the Japanese economy: a corporate governance perspective

This study examines Japanese restructuring agendas from a corporate governance perspective. The initial analysis of bank-based and market-based systems sets the cornerstone for system convergence, followed by the discussion on bad-debt problems, managerial group entrenchments, unclear monitoring relationships and recent mergers and acquisitions waves. Following La Porta et al. (1998) legal system comparison methodology we conclude that Japan has a good legal framework, but norms, deeply embedded in business practices, obstruct the enforcement. Finally, the comparison across markets, legal and accounting systems provides the general scheme for the functioning of any Japanese company, be it located in Japan or elsewhere.Japanese economy; corporate governance; bank-based systems; market-based systems; convergence; fiduciary capitalism; monitoring; minority shareholders; Japan; Japanese restructuring; legal framework.

Rethinking Europe after the Economic Crisis; Lessons for the European Core and Periphery

It is generally accepted, nowadays, that reliable financial information is a prerequisite of a robust market economy and efficient public sector. This position has been strengthened by the recent financial crisis, where financial reporting has not been done up to the expected standard. In this chapter we consider the problem of `accounting for growth?. Accounting for growth is a term that has been launched in accounting theory, and generally is rather quite opposite to the notion of growth accounting championed by neo-classical economists. `Accounting for growth? looks at the institutional framework in a particular defined jurisdiction, that regulates accounting, corporate reporting and ? auditing

Essays on American depositary receipts, global depositary receipts and corporate governance in selected transitional, developing and developed countries.

This project examined three essays by Claessens Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Claessens Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002).Doctor of Philosophy (NBS

Book Review: A Guide to the World Bank by Stephen McGroarty

A Guide to the World Bank by Stephen McGroarty. The World Bank, 2007. 247pp. ISBN: 0-82136-694-7book review

Legal environment, firm-level corporate governance and expropriation of minority shareholders

Claessens et al. (2000, Journal of Financial Economics 58(1–2), 81–112) show that corporate control is substantially enhanced by using pyramid structures and cross-holdings by firms in nine East Asian countries. Claessens et al. (1999, SSRN Working Paper; 2002, Journal of Finance 57(2), 2741–2771) provide empirical evidence regarding expropriation arising from the separation of cash flow from voting rights in Asian firms. Their analysis suggests a high degree of expropriation in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. We re-examine the problem of expropriation in Asian firms reported by earlier research. We explore firm-level governance-control structure interactions, and control-legal environment interaction for a set of Asian firms for which we are able to obtain relevant data for all the required variables. The major contribution of this paper is that it jointly examines ownership-control structure, firm level governance and country-level legal protection available to external suppliers of capital. Using post-crisis data, we find a strong country effect in governance. In general, high control firms in countries with weak legal protection have lower firm-level governance scores in general. On the other hand, high control firms, in countries which have a stronger legal protection environment, signal their intention to not expropriate minority shareholders' wealth by voluntarily adopting measures to strengthen their discipline and responsibility scores. Contrary to earlier findings, we do not find a relationship between control-ownership wedge and firm value. Furthermore, we do not find any relation between firm-level governance and firm value as measured by Tobin's Q