How fair is an equitable distribution?

Envy is a rather complex and irrational emotion. In general, it is very difficult to obtain a measure of this feeling, but in an economical context envy becomes an observable which can be measured. When various individuals compare their possessions, envy arises due to the inequality of their different allocations of commodities and different preferences. In this paper we show that an equitable distribution of goods does not guarantee a state of fairness between agents and in general that envy cannot be controlled by tuning the distribution of goods.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figures, LaTEX; typos added; minor changes in plots; two new plots added; references added; minor changes in the acknowledgment

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

Strong laws of large numbers for sub-linear expectations

We investigate three kinds of strong laws of large numbers for capacities with a new notion of independently and identically distributed (IID) random variables for sub-linear expectations initiated by Peng. It turns out that these theorems are natural and fairly neat extensions of the classical Kolmogorov's strong law of large numbers to the case where probability measures are no longer additive. An important feature of these strong laws of large numbers is to provide a frequentist perspective on capacities.Comment: 10 page

Matching structure and bargaining outcomes in buyer–seller networks

We examine the relationship between the matching structure of a bipartite (buyer-seller) network and the (expected) shares of the unit surplus that each connected pair in this network can create. We show that in different bargaining environments, these shares are closely related to the Gallai-Edmonds Structure Theorem. This theorem characterizes the structure of maximum matchings in an undirected graph. We show that the relationship between the (expected) shares and the tructure Theorem is not an artefact of a particular bargaining mechanism or trade centralization. However, this relationship does not necessarily generalize to non-bipartite networks or to networks with heterogeneous link values

Associations of hemoglobin A1c with cognition reduced for long diabetes duration

IntroductionAssociations of some risk factors with poor cognition, identified prior to age 75, are reduced or reversed in very old age. The Protected Survivor Model predicts this interaction due to enhanced survival of those with extended risk factor duration. In a younger sample, this study examines the association of cognition with the mean hemoglobin A1c risk factor over the time at risk, according to its duration.MethodsThe interaction of mean hemoglobin A1c (averageâ =â 9.8%), evaluated over duration (averageâ =â 116.8â months), was examined for overall cognition and three cognitive domains in a sample of 150 â youngâ oldâ veterans (mean ageâ =â 70) with type 2 diabetes.ResultsThe predicted interactions were significant for overall cognition and attention, but not executive functions/language and memory.DiscussionFindings extend the Protected Survivor Model to a â youngâ oldâ sample, from the very old. This model suggests focusing on individuals with good cognition despite prolonged high risk when seeking protective factors.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/152553/1/trc2jtrci201911009.pd

Semilattices, Canonical Embeddings and Representing Measures

We provide conditions under which a modular function defined on a semilattice $X$ and with values in a commutative group is homomorphic to a modular function on a lattice $L$ for any embedding $X\hookrightarrow L$

Sequential two-player games with ambiguity

Author's pre-printIf players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.ESRC senior research fellowship scheme, H5242750259

Elicitation of Preferences under Ambiguity

This paper is about behaviour under ambiguity ‒ that is, a situation in which probabilities either do not exist or are not known. Our objective is to find the most empirically valid of the increasingly large number of theories attempting to explain such behaviour. We use experimentally-generated data to compare and contrast the theories. The incentivised experimental task we employed was that of allocation: in a series of problems we gave the subjects an amount of money and asked them to allocate the money over three accounts, the payoffs to them being contingent on a ‘state of the world’ with the occurrence of the states being ambiguous. We reproduced ambiguity in the laboratory using a Bingo Blower. We fitted the most popular and apparently empirically valid preference functionals [Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) and α­-MEU], as well as Mean-Variance (MV) and a heuristic rule, Safety First (SF). We found that SEU fits better than MV and SF and only slightly worse than MEU and α­-MEU

Idempotent convexity and algebras for the capacity monad and its submonads

Idempotent analogues of convexity are introduced. It is proved that the category of algebras for the capacity monad in the category of compacta is isomorphic to the category of $(\max,\min)$-idempotent biconvex compacta and their biaffine maps. It is also shown that the category of algebras for the monad of sup-measures ($(\max,\min)$-idempotent measures) is isomorphic to the category of $(\max,\min)$-idempotent convex compacta and their affine maps

A Test of Rank-Dependent Utility in the Context of Ambiguity

Experimental investigations of non-expected utility have primarily concentrated on decision under risk (probability triangles). The literature suggests, however, that ambiguity is one of the main causes for deviations from expected utility (EU). This article investigates the descriptive performance of rank-dependent utility (RDU) in the context of choice under ambiguity. We use the axiomatic difference between RDU and EU to critically test RDU against EU. Surprisingly, the RDU model does not provide any descriptive improvement over EU. Our data suggest other framing factors that do provide descriptive improvements over EU