Mapping of seleniferous vegetation and associated soils in the Lower Wasatch Formation, Power River Basin, Wyoming

There are no author-identified significant results in this report

Freedom justice: Inequality in equivalent liberty and its efficient minimization

The most general and central principle of social and economic optimality and justice is shown to be equal freedom. The standard and central case is that of freedom valued for the choice it permits. Allocations abiding by this principle are characterized, with the main structures of constraints and possibilities and the main alternatives as regards the corresponding entitlements and accountabilities. When such first best equal freedom is not possible or cannot be efficient or in the core, second-best freedom egalitarian principles are defined, notably in the category of freedom maximins. These solutions rest on the properties of freedom comparisons and of freedom-ordered allocations.

Optimal Taxation in Search Equilibrium with Home Production

The paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium search model where goods are produced exclusively in the market and services are produced both in the market and within the households. We use the model to examine how unemployment and welfare are affected by labor taxes in general and sectoral tax differentiation in particular. We find that a tax cut on services reduces unemployment whereas a tax cut on goods has no effect. A reform involving tax differentiation, with lower taxes on services, is welfare improving. Numerical calibrations of the model suggest that the welfare gains from tax differentiation are large if the government absorbs a substantial fraction of GDP.taxation, home production, search, unemployment

In-Work Benefits and Unemployment

In-work benefits are becoming an increasingly relevant labour market policy, gradually expanding in scope and geographical coverage. This paper investigates the equilibrium impact of in-work benefits and contrasts it with the traditional partial equilibrium analysis. We find under which conditions accounting for equilibrium wage adjustments amplifies the impact of in-work benefits on search intensity, participation, employment, and unemployment, compared to a framework in which wages are fixed. We also account for the financing of these benefits and determine the level of benefits necessary to achieve efficiency in a labour market characterized by search externalities.search, in-work benefits, labour force participation, wage adjustment

Wages, Unemployment, and the Underground Economy

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargaining. Different goods are produced in the formal sector and the informal sector, and workers search for jobs in both sectors. We analyse the impact of higher punishment rates and a higher audit rate on labor market performance, and we find that a higher punishment rate (i) reduces the size of the informal sector and increases the size of the formal sector, (ii) decreases real producer wages in both sectors, and (iii) reduces the unemployment rate. The effect of a higher audit rate is less clear. We find that a higher audit rate (i) reduces the size of the informal sector relative to the size of the formal sector, and (ii) has an ambiguous impact on unemployment and real wages.Tax evasion; underground economy; matching; bargaining; unemployment

Environmental Tax Reform in a Small Open Economy with Structural Unemployment

The paper examines the effects of an environmental tax reform in a model of a small open economy with decentralised wage bargaining and monopolistically competitive firms. The economy includes a tradable sector as well as a non-tradable sector and features unemployment in general equilibrium. Firms in both sectors use labour and an imported polluting factor of production (”energy”). A tax on energy, recycled to reduce the payroll tax, will in general affect equilibrium unemployment in this economy. The effect works through a reallocation of employment from the tradable to the non-tradable sector. Total employment increases if workers in the tradable sector receive a wage premium relative to workers in the non-tradable sector. The sectoral relative wage is determined by the relative bargaining power of the unions and by parameters of preferences and technology. Parameterised versions of the model suggest that the tax reform has small effects on employment and that it typically reduces real GDP.Environmental tax reform; wage bargaining; equilibrium unemployment

Moral, the Informal Sector, and Unemployment

While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general equilibrium model featuring matching frictions, and heterogeneous workers in terms of moral. This facilitates an analysis of how wage setting and unemployment is affected by punishment policies, which is ignored in the previous literature.Tax evasion; wage bargains; matching; moral; unemployment

International Spillover Effects of Sectoral Tax Differentiation in Unionized Economies

The European Union has recently proposed sectoral tax differentiation as a policy to fight unemployment. The member countries are allowed to reduce the VAT rates on goods and services that are particularly labor intensive and price elastic. The paper provides a theoretical analysis of the effects of such tax reforms, with particular emphasis on the international repercussions of the policies. To that end we develop a two-country and two-sector model with monopolistic competition in the goods market and wage bargaining in the labor market. Policy externalities operate through the endogenously determined terms of trade. We examine how national and supranational commodity tax policies affect sectoral and total employment and characterize optimal commodity taxes with and without international policy cooperation. Some rough estimates of the welfare gains from policy coordination are also presented, using a calibrated version of the model.Economic integration, imperfect competition, wage determination, policy cooperation