National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 78/January 2015

This study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of law-compliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards

National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges

At the request of the LIBE committee, this study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of lawcompliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards

National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal Data in EU Member States and their Compatibility with EU Law

In the wake of the disclosures surrounding PRISM and other US surveillance programmes, this study makes an assessment of the large-scale surveillance practices by a selection of EU member states: the UK, Sweden, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Given the large-scale nature of surveillance practices at stake, which represent a reconfiguration of traditional intelligence gathering, the study contends that an analysis of European surveillance programmes cannot be reduced to a question of balance between data protection versus national security, but has to be framed in terms of collective freedoms and democracy. It finds that four of the five EU member states selected for in-depth examination are engaging in some form of large-scale interception and surveillance of communication data, and identifies parallels and discrepancies between these programmes and the NSA-run operations. The study argues that these surveillance programmes do not stand outside the realm of EU intervention but can be engaged from an EU law perspective via (i) an understanding of national security in a democratic rule of law framework where fundamental human rights standards and judicial oversight constitute key standards; (ii) the risks presented to the internal security of the Union as a whole as well as the privacy of EU citizens as data owners, and (iii) the potential spillover into the activities and responsibilities of EU agencies. The study then presents a set of policy recommendations to the European Parliament

The EU and its Counter-Terrorism Policies after the Paris Attacks. Liberty and Security in Europe No. 84, 27 November 2015

This paper examines the EU’s counter-terrorism policies responding to the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015. It argues that these events call for a re-think of the current information-sharing and preventive-justice model guiding the EU’s counter-terrorism tools, along with security agencies such as Europol and Eurojust. Priority should be given to independently evaluating ‘what has worked’ and ‘what has not’ when it comes to police and criminal justice cooperation in the Union. Current EU counter-terrorism policies face two challenges: one is related to their efficiency and other concerns their legality. ‘More data’ without the necessary human resources, more effective cross-border operational cooperation and more trust between the law enforcement authorities of EU member states is not an efficient policy response. Large-scale surveillance and preventive justice techniques are also incompatible with the legal and judicial standards developed by the Court of Justice of the EU. The EU can bring further added value first, by boosting traditional policing and criminal justice cooperation to fight terrorism; second, by re-directing EU agencies’ competences towards more coordination and support in cross-border operational cooperation and joint investigations, subject to greater accountability checks (Europol and Eurojust +); and third, by improving the use of policy measures following a criminal justice-led cooperation model focused on improving cross-border joint investigations and the use of information that meets the quality standards of ‘evidence’ in criminal judicial proceedings. Any EU and national counter-terrorism policies must not undermine democratic rule of law, fundamental rights or the EU’s founding constitutional principles, such as the free movement of persons and the Schengen system. Otherwise, these policies will defeat their purpose by generating more insecurity, instability, mistrust and legal uncertainty for all

Automatic Alerts for Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus Surveillance and Control: Role of a Hospital Information System

Background: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is an escalating problem in hospitals worldwide. The hospital reservoir for MRSA includes recognized and unrecognized colonized or infected patients, as well as previously colonized or infected patients readmitted to the hospital. Early and appropriate infection control measures (ICM) are key elements to reduce MRSA transmission and to control the hospital reservoir. Objective: To describe the role of an expert system applied to the control of MRSA at a large medical center (1,600 beds) with high endemic rates. Methods: The University Hospital of Geneva has an extended hospital information system (HIS), DIOGENE, structured with an open distributed architecture. It includes administrative, medical, nursing, and laboratory applications with their relational databases. Among available patient databases, clinical microbiology laboratory and admission-discharge-transfer (ADT) databases are used to generate computer alerts. A laboratory alert (lab alert) is printed daily in the Infection Control Program (ICP) offices, listing all patients with cultures positive for MRSA detected within the preceding 24 hours. Patients might be either newly detected patients colonized or infected with MRSA, or previously recognized MRSA patients having surveillance cultures. The ICP nurses subsequently go to the ward or call the ward personnel to implement ICM. A second alert, the "readmission alert,” detects readmission to the hospital of any patient previously colonized or infected with MRSA by periodic queries (q 1 min) to the ADT database. The readmission alert is printed in the ICP offices, but also forwarded with added guidelines to the emergency room. Results: During the first 12 months of application (July 1994 to June 1995), the lab alert detected an average of 4.6 isolates per day, corresponding to 314 hospital admissions (248 patients); the use of this alert saved time for the ICP nurses by improving work organization. There were 438 readmission alerts (1.2 alerts per day) over the study period; of 347 patients screened immediately upon readmission, 114 (33%) were positive for MRSA carriage. Delayed recognition of readmitted MRSA carriers decreased significantly after the implementation of this alert; the proportion of MRSA patients recognized at the time of admission to the hospital increased from 13% in 1993 to 40% in 1995 (P<.001). Conclusions: Hospital information system-based alerts can play an important role in the surveillance and early prevention of MRSA transmission, and it can help to recognize patterns of colonization and transmissio

The EU Counter-Terrorism Policy Responses to the Attacks in Paris: Towards an EU Security and Liberty Agenda. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 81/February 2015

This paper examines the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the attacks in Paris in January 2015, which will be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. It argues that a majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. The paper finds that EU counterterrorism responses raise two fundamental challenges: A first challenge is posed to the freedom of movement, Schengen and EU citizenship. Priority is being given to the expanded use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU citizens, which stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle. A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for the adoption of measures such as the EU Passenger Name Record challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the EU on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model that is firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence communities. Instead, it would pursue better and more accurate use of data meeting the quality standards of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings

Experience with short-period, small gap undulators at the SwissFEL aramis beamline

The SwissFEL Aramis beamline provides hard X-ray FEL radiation down to 1 Angström with 5.8 GeV and short period, 15mm, in-vacuum undulators (U15). To reach the maximum designed K-value of 1.8 the U15s have to be operated with vacuum gaps down to 3.0 mm. The thirteen-undulator modules are 4m long and each of them is equipped with a pair of permanent magnet quadrupoles at the two ends, aligned magnetically to the undulator axis. Optical systems and dedicated photon diagnostics are used to check the alignment and improve the K-value calibration. In this talk the main steps of the undulator commissioning will be recalled and a systematic comparison between the magnetic results and the electron and photon based measurements will be reported to highlight achievements and open issues.peer-reviewe

Brain Struct Funct

Opioid receptors are G protein-coupled receptors (GPCRs) that modulate brain function at all levels of neural integration, including autonomic, sensory, emotional and cognitive processing. Mu (MOR) and delta (DOR) opioid receptors functionally interact in vivo, but whether interactions occur at circuitry, cellular or molecular levels remains unsolved. To challenge the hypothesis of MOR/DOR heteromerization in the brain, we generated redMOR/greenDOR double knock-in mice and report dual receptor mapping throughout the nervous system. Data are organized as an interactive database offering an opioid receptor atlas with concomitant MOR/DOR visualization at subcellular resolution, accessible online. We also provide co-immunoprecipitation-based evidence for receptor heteromerization in these mice. In the forebrain, MOR and DOR are mainly detected in separate neurons, suggesting system-level interactions in high-order processing. In contrast, neuronal co-localization is detected in subcortical networks essential for survival involved in eating and sexual behaviors or perception and response to aversive stimuli. In addition, potential MOR/DOR intracellular interactions within the nociceptive pathway offer novel therapeutic perspectives

Impact of the M184V/I Mutation on the Efficacy of Abacavir/Lamivudine/Dolutegravir Therapy in HIV Treatment-Experienced Patients.

Objective The impact of the M184V/I mutation on the virological failure (VF) rate in HIV-positive patients with suppressed viremia switching to an abacavir/lamivudine/dolutegravir regimen has been poorly evaluated. Method This is an observational study from 5 European HIV cohorts among treatment-experienced adults with ≤50 copies/mL of HIV-1 RNA who switched to abacavir/lamivudine/dolutegravir. Primary outcome was the time to first VF (2 consecutive HIV-1 RNA >50 copies/mL or single HIV-1 RNA >50 copies/mL accompanied by change in antiretroviral therapy [ART]). We also analyzed a composite outcome considering the presence of VF and/or virological blips. We report also the results of an inverse probability weighting analysis on a restricted population with a prior history of VF on any ART regimen to calculate statistics standardized to the disparate sampling population. Results We included 1626 patients (median follow-up, 288.5 days; interquartile range, 154-441). Patients with a genotypically documented M184V/I mutation (n = 137) had a lower CD4 nadir and a longer history of antiviral treatment. The incidence of VF was 29.8 cases (11.2-79.4) per 1000 person-years in those with a previously documented M184V/I, and 13.6 cases (8.4-21.8) in patients without documented M184V/I. Propensity score weighting in a restricted population (n = 580) showed that M184V/I was not associated with VF or the composite endpoint (hazard ratio [HR], 1.27; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.35-4.59 and HR 1.66; 95% CI, 0.81-3.43, respectively). Conclusions In ART-experienced patients switching to an abacavir/lamivudine/dolutegravir treatment, we observed few VFs and found no evidence for an impact of previously-acquired M184V/I mutation on this outcome. Additional analyses are required to demonstrate whether these findings will remain robust during a longer follow-up