Bilateralismo y probabilismo

The aim of this paper is to provide a philosophical interpretation of bilateralism in terms of probabilism. In particular, to interpret the main concepts of bilateralism –acceptance, rejection and incoherence– in terms of the probabilistic notions of degree of belief and coherence. According to bilateralism, the meaning of logical connectives is determined by the acceptance and rejection conditions of the sentences in which they are involved, where acceptance and rejection cannot be reduced to one another. I will focus on a variant of bilateralism that understands logical consequence as the statement that it is incoherent to accept all the premises of a valid argument while rejecting all its conclusions. On the other hand, probabilism states that it is possible to interpret our degrees of belief in terms of probabilities. The aim of this work is then to interpret the concept of incoherence in terms of probability functions and determine when it is coherent to accept or to reject a proposition according to some threshold defined in terms of degrees of belief. To achieve this goal, we need both an interpretation of the concept of incoherence coined by the bilateralists as well as an interpretation of acceptance and rejection. I will show that a good interpretation of coherence in probabilistic terms can already be found in the literature. Then, I will give an interpretation of acceptance and rejection in terms of degrees of belief. In particular, I will show that it is possible to interpret these concepts in accordance with Locke’s thesis, the thesis that states that there is some threshold r such that if you believe some sentence in degree equal or higher than r you should accept it, without falling into epistemic paradoxes.El objetivo de este trabajo es dar una interpretación filosófica del bilateralismo en términos del probabilismo. Para eso interpretaré los conceptos principales del bilateralismo –aceptación, rechazo e incoherencia– en términos de las nociones probabilísticas de creencia justificada y coherencia. Según la tesis bilateralista, el significado de las conectivas está determinado por las condiciones de aceptación y rechazo de las oraciones en las que aparecen, donde aceptación y rechazo son actitudes irreductibles la una a la otra. En particular, me voy a centrar en una variante del bilateralismo que entiende la noción de consecuencia lógica como la idea de que es incoherente aceptar todas las premisas de un argumento válido y rechazar todas sus conclusiones. Por otro lado, el probabilismo sostiene que es posible interpretar nuestros grados de creencias en términos de probabilidades. El objetivo de este trabajo es interpretar el concepto de incoherencia en términos de funciones de probabilidad y determinar cuándo es coherente aceptar o rechazar una proposición en función de algún umbral definido para grados de creencias.Para lograrlo serán necesarios dos pasos: el primero es interpretar el concepto de incoherencia bilateralista y el segundo los conceptos de aceptación y rechazo. Primero voy a mostrar que la literatura ya ha dado una buena lectura de la noción de incoherencia y luego voy a dar una interpretación de aceptación y rechazo en términos de grados de creencia. En particular, voy a mostrar que es posible interpretarlos de acuerdo con la tesis de Locke, la tesis que sostiene que existe un umbral r tal que si una cree una proposición en grado mayor o igual a r entonces debe aceptarla, sin caer en paradojas epistémicas

Pure Refined Variable Inclusion Logics

In this article, we explore the semantic characterization of the (right) pure refined variable inclusion companion of all logics, which is a further refinement of the nowadays well-studied pure right variable inclusion logics. In particular, we will focus on giving a characterization of these fragments via a single logical matrix, when possible, and via a class of finite matrices, otherwise. In order to achieve this, we will rely on extending the semantics of the logics whose companions we will be discussing with infectious values in direct and in more subtle ways. This further establishes the connection between infectious logics and variable inclusion logics

Constantes lógicas y la armonía de las reglas de inferencia

All through the literatura, the question about what is a logical constant has recieved many answers, from model-theoretic aproaches (Tarski; 1966), (Sher; 1991), (Bonnay; 2007) to answers that focus in the inferential practice as meaning (Dummett; 1991), (Prawitz; 1965), (Lorenzen; 1955). Detractors of the second tradition presented many ineludible incovenients, in particular, the logical constant named ‘tonk’ (Prior; 1960). Inferentialist tryed many solutions, in particular they presented the concept of ‘harmony’. The goal of this paper is to show that the different criteria of ‘harmony’ used in the proof-theoretic semantics to determine what is and what is not a logical constant fail to be necessary or sufficient.  I will show the philosophical reasons that make this concept appear and then i will describe the different ways in wich the literatura understads the concept of ‘harmony’. Then I will show that they subgenerate or overgenerate connectives with some counterexamples. Finaly, I will explain some philosophical reasons that should delimitate where to go towards a satisfactory definition of ‘harmony’.A lo largo de la literatura la pregunta por qué es una constante lógica ha recibido distintas respuestas desde los acercamientos de la teoría de modelos (Tarski; 1966), (Sher; 1991), (Gómez Torrente; 2003), (Bonnay; 2007) hasta las respuestas que centran el significado en las reglas de uso (Dummett; 1991), (Prawitz; 1965). Frente a la segunda corriente filosófica se han presentado algunos inconvenientes ineludibles, en particular la constante ‘tonk’ (Prior; 1960 ) frente a la que los defensores del inferencialismo en lógica han presentado varias soluciones, en particular la armonía. El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar que los distintos criterios de ‘armonía’ que se utilizan en semántica de la prueba para establecer qué es una constante lógica no cumplen con su objetivo ya que no son necesario o suficientes. Presentaré las razones filosóficas por las que surge el concepto de ‘armonía’ y luego describiré las distintas formas en las que la literatura suele entender el concepto de ‘armonía’. Luego mostraré que o bien sobregeneran o bien subgeneran conectivas en base a una serie de contraejemplos. Finalmente, desarrollaré algunas razones filosóficas que deberían delimitar por dónde continuar la búsqueda de una definición satisfactoria del concepto de ‘armonía’

Metainferential Paraconsistency

In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al (2018), we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferentialversion of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid. However, our contribution consists in modifying the definition of meta-Explosion by extending the standard framework and introducing a negation for inferences and metainferences. From this new perspective, Tarskian paraconsistent logics such asLP will not result to be metainferentially paraconsistent, in contrast to, for instance, non-transitive logics like ST. Finally, we will end up by defining a logic which is metainferentially paraconsistent in every level, and discussing whether this logic is uniform through translations.Fil: Da Re, Bruno. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaFil: Rubin, Mariela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaFil: Teijeiro, Paula. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin

Metainferential Paraconsistency

In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al. [2018], we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferential version of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid. However, our contribution consists in modifying the definition of meta-Explosion by extending the standard framework and introducing a negation for inferences and metainferences. From this new perspective, Tarskian paraconsistent logics such as LP will not turn out to be metainferentially paraconsistent, in contrast to, for instance, non-transitive logics like ST. Finally, we will end up by defining a logic which is metainferentially paraconsistent at every level, and discussing whether this logic is uniform through translations

Miradas femeninas en pantalla: el caso Jessica Jones

Nuestro trabajo busca analizar el caso de la serie Jessica Jones (2015-) como un producto televisivo de consumo masivo en el que las representaciones femeninas y los tópicos que se presentan rompen con las formas prototípicas de representar a las mujeres en pantalla y de abordar las problemáticas de la experiencia de las mujeres. Para ello presentamos, en primer lugar, un acotado marco teórico que nos permita dilucidar en qué contexto general se inscribe la producción de esta serie en particular y, en segundo lugar, analizamos algunos de los aspectos principales en los que la serie presenta representaciones y miradas femeninas novedosas dentro de lo que es la industria del cómic y su traslado a la pantalla grande y chica

Inferential Constants

A metainference is usually understood as a pair consisting of a collection of inferences, called premises, and a single inference, called conclusion. In the last few years, much attention has been paid to the study of metainferences—and, in particular, to the question of what are the valid metainferences of a given logic. So far, however, this study has been done in quite a poor language. Our usual sequent calculi have no way to represent, e.g. negations, disjunctions or conjunctions of inferences. In this paper we tackle this expressive issue. We assume some background sentential language as given and define what we call an inferential language, that is, a language whose atomic formulas are inferences. We provide a model-theoretic characterization of validity for this language—relative to some given characterization of validity for the background sentential language—and also a proof-theoretic analysis of validity. We argue that our novel language has fruitful philosophical applications. Lastly, we generalize some of our definitions and results to arbitrary metainferential levels

Metainferential Paraconsistency

In this article, our aim is to take a step towards a full understanding of the notion of paraconsistency in the context of metainferential logics. Following the work initiated by Barrio et al (2018), we will consider a metainferential logic to be paraconsistent whenever the metainferentialversion of Explosion (or meta-Explosion) is invalid. However, our contribution consists in modifying the definition of meta-Explosion by extending the standard framework and introducing a negation for inferences and metainferences. From this new perspective, Tarskian paraconsistent logics such asLP will not result to be metainferentially paraconsistent, in contrast to, for instance, non-transitive logics like ST. Finally, we will end up by defining a logic which is metainferentially paraconsistent in every level, and discussing whether this logic is uniform through translations.Fil: Da Re, Bruno. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaFil: Rubin, Mariela. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; ArgentinaFil: Teijeiro, Paula. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas. - Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico. Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas; Argentin