A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences

During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy

A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences

During history, an aggressive country seeks to force non-aggressive countries to made many concessions based on military force. In our paper we discuss the situation that one aggressive country is dissatisfied with its current position and try to obtain more concessions from a rival country. To analyze this situation we use a game theory dynamic model in complete and incomplete information. We analyze the countries behavior depending especially on aggressive or non-aggressive strategies and also on battle power. In this context we found conditions to obtain separating and pooling equilibriums for dynamic games in incomplete information. Main result shows that countries behavior depends especially on war costs and on country military power. There are many applications of these types of models, like in Israel - Palestinian war, recent Russian- Georgian conflict or US defense policy

Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations

Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study-case for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs

Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations

Our paper considers a “negotiation game” between two players which combines the features of two-players alternating offers bargaining and repeated games. Generally, the negotiation game in general admits a large number of equilibriums but some of which involve delay and inefficiency. Thus, complexity and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for cooperation and efficiency in repeated games. The Folk Theorem of repeated games is a very used result that shows if players are enough patience then it is possible to obtain a cooperative equilibrium of the infinite repeated game. We proof a new folk theorem for finitely repeated games and also we find new conditions (under stage number and minimum discount factor value) such that players cooperate at least one period in cooperative-punishment repeated games. Finally we present a study-case for Cournot oligopoly situation for n enterprises behavior under finitely and infinitely repeated negotiations. We found for this situation discount factor depends only on players number, not on different player’s payoffs

Risk aversion influence on insurance market

Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses

Risk aversion influence on insurance market

Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses

Employment in Romania: evidence from a panel data analysis

The labour market in Romania is facing some imbalances arising from the negative demographic trends, legislative instability, poor correlation between the educational programs with the labour market, low labour productivity. The European Union labour market strategy aims at achieving 75% employment rate by 2020, for Romania the objective being 70% (Europe 2020). Although Romania has enjoyed robust economic growth for the most part of the 2000s, the labour market was experiencing large and increasing shortages of labour and skills, which coexisted with low participation rates, as well as excess supply of labour in declining sectors (mainly agriculture). The negative growth rate of the Romanian population, which has started in the early 1990s has already reduced the population. On top of this, there is the migration of the work force - most of the migrants are still included in the labour market statistics, as inactive, but are absent from the Romania’s labour market and might be partly responsible for the slow progress of employment rate in Romania. In this context, we aim to examine the employment rate in Romania, considering a panel data analysis over the period 1996-2009. The explanatory variables are the net migration rate, the mortality and birth rates, the unemployment rate, the real earnings, the secondary and tertiary education graduates

Employment in Romania: evidence from a panel data analysis

The labour market in Romania is facing some imbalances arising from the negative demographic trends, legislative instability, poor correlation between the educational programs with the labour market, low labour productivity. The European Union labour market strategy aims at achieving 75% employment rate by 2020, for Romania the objective being 70% (Europe 2020). Although Romania has enjoyed robust economic growth for the most part of the 2000s, the labour market was experiencing large and increasing shortages of labour and skills, which coexisted with low participation rates, as well as excess supply of labour in declining sectors (mainly agriculture). The negative growth rate of the Romanian population, which has started in the early 1990s has already reduced the population. On top of this, there is the migration of the work force - most of the migrants are still included in the labour market statistics, as inactive, but are absent from the Romania’s labour market and might be partly responsible for the slow progress of employment rate in Romania. In this context, we aim to examine the employment rate in Romania, considering a panel data analysis over the period 1996-2009. The explanatory variables are the net migration rate, the mortality and birth rates, the unemployment rate, the real earnings, the secondary and tertiary education graduates

Search for 22^{22}Na in novae supported by a novel method for measuring femtosecond nuclear lifetimes

Classical novae are thermonuclear explosions in stellar binary systems, and important sources of $^{26}$Al and $^{22}$Na. While gamma rays from the decay of the former radioisotope have been observed throughout the Galaxy, $^{22}$Na remains untraceable. The half-life of $^{22}$Na (2.6 yr) would allow the observation of its 1.275 MeV gamma-ray line from a cosmic source. However, the prediction of such an observation requires good knowledge of the nuclear reactions involved in the production and destruction of this nucleus. The $^{22}$Na($p,\gamma$)$^{23}$Mg reaction remains the only source of large uncertainty about the amount of $^{22}$Na ejected. Its rate is dominated by a single resonance on the short-lived state at 7785.0(7) keV in $^{23}$Mg. In the present work, a combined analysis of particle-particle correlations and velocity-difference profiles is proposed to measure femtosecond nuclear lifetimes. The application of this novel method to the study of the $^{23}$Mg states, combining magnetic and highly-segmented tracking gamma-ray spectrometers, places strong limits on the amount of $^{22}$Na produced in novae, explains its non-observation to date in gamma rays (flux < 2.5x$10^{-4}$ ph/(cm$^2$s)), and constrains its detectability with future space-borne observatories.Comment: 18 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Study of the B−→Λc+Λˉc−K−B^{-} \to \Lambda_{c}^{+} \bar{\Lambda}_{c}^{-} K^{-} decay

The decay $B^{-} \to \Lambda_{c}^{+} \bar{\Lambda}_{c}^{-} K^{-}$ is studied in proton-proton collisions at a center-of-mass energy of $\sqrt{s}=13$ TeV using data corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 5 $\mathrm{fb}^{-1}$ collected by the LHCb experiment. In the $\Lambda_{c}^+ K^{-}$ system, the $\Xi_{c}(2930)^{0}$ state observed at the BaBar and Belle experiments is resolved into two narrower states, $\Xi_{c}(2923)^{0}$ and $\Xi_{c}(2939)^{0}$, whose masses and widths are measured to be $$m(\Xi_{c}(2923)^{0}) = 2924.5 \pm 0.4 \pm 1.1 \,\mathrm{MeV}, \\ m(\Xi_{c}(2939)^{0}) = 2938.5 \pm 0.9 \pm 2.3 \,\mathrm{MeV}, \\ \Gamma(\Xi_{c}(2923)^{0}) = \phantom{000}4.8 \pm 0.9 \pm 1.5 \,\mathrm{MeV},\\ \Gamma(\Xi_{c}(2939)^{0}) = \phantom{00}11.0 \pm 1.9 \pm 7.5 \,\mathrm{MeV},$$ where the first uncertainties are statistical and the second systematic. The results are consistent with a previous LHCb measurement using a prompt $\Lambda_{c}^{+} K^{-}$ sample. Evidence of a new $\Xi_{c}(2880)^{0}$ state is found with a local significance of $3.8\,\sigma$, whose mass and width are measured to be $2881.8 \pm 3.1 \pm 8.5\,\mathrm{MeV}$ and $12.4 \pm 5.3 \pm 5.8 \,\mathrm{MeV}$, respectively. In addition, evidence of a new decay mode $\Xi_{c}(2790)^{0} \to \Lambda_{c}^{+} K^{-}$ is found with a significance of $3.7\,\sigma$. The relative branching fraction of $B^{-} \to \Lambda_{c}^{+} \bar{\Lambda}_{c}^{-} K^{-}$ with respect to the $B^{-} \to D^{+} D^{-} K^{-}$ decay is measured to be $2.36 \pm 0.11 \pm 0.22 \pm 0.25$, where the first uncertainty is statistical, the second systematic and the third originates from the branching fractions of charm hadron decays.Comment: All figures and tables, along with any supplementary material and additional information, are available at https://cern.ch/lhcbproject/Publications/p/LHCb-PAPER-2022-028.html (LHCb public pages