An Observation Concerning Porte’s Rule in Modal Logic

It is well known that no consistent normal modal logic contains (as theorems) both ◊A and ◊¬A (for any formula A). Here we observe that this claim can be strengthened to the following: for any formula A, either no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊A, or else no consistent normal modal logic contains ◊¬A

Tolerancia y los límites

The present note investigates the connection between nonreflexive and nontransitive logics from a bounds-theoretic perspective. What will emerge is one way in which, if we focus on the ways in which strict and tolerant acts constrain one another, nonreflexive and nontransitive notions of consequence can be seen as simply reflecting different aspects of the same underlying reality.La presente nota investiga la conexión entre lógicas no reflexivas y lógicas no transitivas desde la perspectiva de la teoría de los límites. Lo que emerge de esta investigación es que, si nos concentramos en la forma en que los actos estrictos y tolerantes se condicionan unos a otros, las nociones de consecuencia no reflexivas y no transitivas pueden verse como nociones que reflejan distintos aspectos de la misma realidad subyacente

Contractions of noncontractive consequence relations

Some theorists have developed formal approaches to truth that depend on counterexamples to the structural rules of contraction. Here, we study such approaches, with an eye to helping them respond to a certain kind of objection. We define a contractive relative of each noncontractive relation, for use in responding to the objection in question, and we explore one example: the contractive relative of multiplicative-additive affine logic with transparent truth, or MAALT

Partial Confirmation of a Conjecture on the Boxdot Translation in Modal Logic

The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjecture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly restricted) special case of the conjecture

An Argument for the Ontological Innocence of Mereology

In Parts of Classes David Lewis argued that mereology is ‘ontologically innocent’, mereological notions not incurring additional ontological commitments. Unfortunately, though, Lewis’s argument for this is not fully spelled out. Here we use some formal results concerning translations between formal languages to argue for the ontological innocence of mereology directly

Partial Confirmation of a Conjecture on the Boxdot Translation in Modal Logic

The purpose of the present note is to advertise an interesting conjecture concerning a well-known translation in modal logic, by confirming a (highly restricted) special case of the conjecture

Williamson on counterpossibles

This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), grant number 681404.A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches between Meaning and Users’ Understanding

Privacy policies are verbose, difficult to understand, take too long to read, and may be the least-read items on most websites even as users express growing concerns about information collection practices. For all their faults, though, privacy policies remain the single most important source of information for users to attempt to learn how companies collect, use, and share data. Likewise, these policies form the basis for the self-regulatory notice and choice framework that is designed and promoted as a replacement for regulation. The underlying value and legitimacy of notice and choice depends, however, on the ability of users to understand privacy policies. This paper investigates the differences in interpretation among expert, knowledgeable, and typical users and explores whether those groups can understand the practices described in privacy policies at a level sufficient to support rational decision-making. The paper seeks to fill an important gap in the understanding of privacy policies through primary research on user interpretation and to inform the development of technologies combining natural language processing, machine learning and crowdsourcing for policy interpretation and summarization. For this research, we recruited a group of law and public policy graduate students at Fordham University, Carnegie Mellon University, and the University of Pittsburgh (“knowledgeable users”) and presented these law and policy researchers with a set of privacy policies from companies in the e-commerce and news & entertainment industries. We asked them nine basic questions about the policies’ statements regarding data collection, data use, and retention. We then presented the same set of policies to a group of privacy experts and to a group of non-expert users. The findings show areas of common understanding across all groups for certain data collection and deletion practices, but also demonstrate very important discrepancies in the interpretation of privacy policy language, particularly with respect to data sharing. The discordant interpretations arose both within groups and between the experts and the two other groups. The presence of these significant discrepancies has critical implications. First, the common understandings of some attributes of described data practices mean that semi-automated extraction of meaning from website privacy policies may be able to assist typical users and improve the effectiveness of notice by conveying the true meaning to users. However, the disagreements among experts and disagreement between experts and the other groups reflect that ambiguous wording in typical privacy policies undermines the ability of privacy policies to effectively convey notice of data practices to the general public. The results of this research will, consequently, have significant policy implications for the construction of the notice and choice framework and for the US reliance on this approach. The gap in interpretation indicates that privacy policies may be misleading the general public and that those policies could be considered legally unfair and deceptive. And, where websites are not effectively conveying privacy policies to consumers in a way that a “reasonable person” could, in fact, understand the policies, “notice and choice” fails as a framework. Such a failure has broad international implications since websites extend their reach beyond the United States