Predicting the Deforestation–Trend Under Different Carbon–Prices

Background: Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. Results, Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200mil ha or around 5% of today’s forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today’s forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for the standing biomass paid every 5 years will bring deforestation down by 50$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12$/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. Conclusions, Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will generate budgetary revenues by the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this dilemma. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax.Deforestation, Carbon Prices

Cap Management for LULUCF Options: An economic mechanism design to preserve the environmental and social integrity of forest related LULUCF activities under the Kyoto Protocol

In this paper we identify four main problems that arise from a quantitative cap on land use, land-use change and forestry activities discussed at OP 6. These problems relate to environmental integrity and economic efficiency. First, in stark contrast to the wording of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol the proposed provisions for land use, land use change and forestry activities are only about carbon accounting and are devoid of sustainability criteria. This deficiency would make climate actions inconsistent with other international agreements and policy processes. Second, due to lower costs of sequestration activities a quantitative cap produces possibilities for arbitrage in the greenhouse gas market. Third, in a situation of oversupply a fair allocation of highly profitable sequestration projects is unlikely. Fourth, negotiators are overwhelmed by the complexity of the land use, land-use change and forestry issue. The currently proposed mechanisms, such as adaptation levies or discounted crediting of flexibilities, do not provide adequate solutions. In order to solve these problems we propose a tender auction mechanism that could already be applied today for forest sinks. We distinguish between two information components in this economic mechanism. First, a qualifier component in the form of certification for sustainable forest management practices, which is already in use by market actors worldwide. Second, a competitive trait in the form of carbon sequestration intensities per greenhouse gas emission credit. Under such a regime, negotiators simply need to determine a quantitative cap (as they already started to negotiate at COP 6), while an efficient market mechanism guarantees integrity with respect to sustainability and economic efficiency criteria. The complexity of the issues surrounding land use, land use change and forestry activities is transferred to a decentralized decision making process. The proposed mechanism can also serve as a template for clean development mechanism projects and other international flexible mechanisms or subsidy programs

Tanzende Rosse

Ausgehend von der Grundlage der Forschungen zur barocken Festkultur unter dem Gesichtspunkt der kulturellen Manifestation autoritärer Machtstrukturen des höfischen Absolutismus versucht diese Arbeit im Folgenden ein ganz spezielles kulturelles Phänomen – das barocke Rossballett - zu beleuchten und dessen repräsentativen Charakter herauszustreichen. Basierend auf den empirischen Arbeiten des Wolfenbütteler Arbeitskreises zur Barockforschung sowie den weiterführenden und vertiefenden Forschungen Roy Strongs und Helen Watanabe – O´Kellys sowie Andrea Sommer- Mathis´ und unter Rückbezug auf historische Festschriften und Beschreibungen versucht diese Arbeit ein möglichst facettenreiches Bild einer sehr speziellen künstlerischen Ausdrucksform im Dienste der Machtdemonstration und Legitimation einer hierarchischen Sozialordnung an den drei großen und kulturell tonangebenden Machtzentralen Europas im 17. und 18. Jhdt. zu zeichnen

National socioeconomic surveys in forestry : Guidance and survey modules for measuring the multiple roles of forests in household welfare and livelihoods

Adequate information on the socioeconomic contributions of forests to household welfare, livelihoods and poverty reduction is key to national sustainable development in the post-2015 agenda. While awareness is growing regarding the multiple roles of forests in these aspects of sustainable development, the lack of systematic data in many countries limits an evidence-based demonstration of this. Lacking reliable information, forests and forestry are not always adequately considered in the development of national policies. This sourcebook is intended to help improve data collection on aspects of forests relating to household welfare and livelihoods. It offers practical guidance and measurement tools that can be included in existing social or socioeconomic surveys undertaken by a country’s national statistical office, or in independent national surveys

Predicting the deforestation-trend under different carbon-prices

BACKGROUND: Global carbon stocks in forest biomass are decreasing by 1.1 Gt of carbon annually, owing to continued deforestation and forest degradation. Deforestation emissions are partly offset by forest expansion and increases in growing stock primarily in the extra-tropical north. Innovative financial mechanisms would be required to help reducing deforestation. Using a spatially explicit integrated biophysical and socio-economic land use model we estimated the impact of carbon price incentive schemes and payment modalities on deforestation. One payment modality is adding costs for carbon emission, the other is to pay incentives for keeping the forest carbon stock intact. RESULTS: Baseline scenario calculations show that close to 200 mil ha or around 5% of todays forest area will be lost between 2006 and 2025, resulting in a release of additional 17.5 GtC. Today's forest cover will shrink by around 500 million hectares, which is 1/8 of the current forest cover, within the next 100 years. The accumulated carbon release during the next 100 years amounts to 45 GtC, which is 15% of the total carbon stored in forests today. Incentives of 6 US$/tC for vulnerable standing biomass payed every 5 year will bring deforestation down by 50$/year. On the other hand a carbon tax of 12 $/tC harvested forest biomass will also cut deforestation by half. The tax income will, if enforced, decrease from 6 billion US$ in 2005 to 4.3 billion US$in 2025 and 0.7 billion US$ in 2100 due to decreasing deforestation speed. CONCLUSION: Avoiding deforestation requires financial mechanisms that make retention of forests economically competitive with the currently often preferred option to seek profits from other land uses. Incentive payments need to be at a very high level to be effective against deforestation. Taxes on the other hand will extract budgetary revenues from the regions which are already poor. A combination of incentives and taxes could turn out to be a viable solution for this problem. Increasing the value of forest land and thereby make it less easily prone to deforestation would act as a strong incentive to increase productivity of agricultural and fuelwood production, which could be supported by revenues generated by the deforestation tax

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation: A Systematic Approach

As up to 20 percent of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions result from deforestation, the reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD) is a major theme of the ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC. This briefing looks at the fundamental issues and the challenges involved in current proposals to implement a trading scheme for REDD credits