Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.Fil: Niella, Tamara. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Stier, Nicolas. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

An Experimental Investigation of Colonel Blotto Games

"This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a 'guerilla warfare' strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a 'stochastic complete coverage' strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields." (author's abstract)"Dieser Artikel untersucht das Verhalten von Individuen in einem 'constant-sum Colonel Blotto'-Spiel zwischen zwei Spielern, bei dem die Spieler mit unterschiedlichen Ressourcen ausgestattet sind und die erwartete Anzahl gewonnener Schlachtfelder maximieren. Die experimentellen Ergebnisse bestätigen alle wichtigen theoretischen Vorhersagen. Im Durchgang, in dem wie in einer Auktion der Sieg in einem Schlachtfeld deterministisch ist, wenden die Spieler, die sich im Nachteil befinden, eine 'Guerillataktik' an, und verteilen ihre Ressourcen stochastisch auf eine Teilmenge der Schlachtfelder. Spieler mit einem Vorteil verwenden eine Strategie der 'stochastischen vollständigen Abdeckung', indem sie zufällig eine positive Ressourcenmenge auf allen Schlachtfeldern positionieren. Im Durchgang, in dem sich der Gewinn eines Schlachtfeldes probabilistisch wie in einer Lotterie bestimmt, teilen beide Spieler ihre Ressourcen gleichmäßig auf alle Schlachtfelder auf." (Autorenreferat

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Beyond chance? The persistence of performance in online poker

A major issue in the widespread controversy about the legality of poker and the appropriate taxation of winnings is whether poker should be considered a game of skill or a game of chance. To inform this debate we present an analysis into the role of skill in the performance of online poker players, using a large database with hundreds of millions of player-hand observations from real money ring games at three different stakes levels. We find that players whose earlier profitability was in the top (bottom) deciles perform better (worse) and are substantially more likely to end up in the top (bottom) performance deciles of the following time period. Regression analyses of performance on historical performance and other skill-related proxies provide further evidence for persistence and predictability. Simulations point out that skill dominates chance when performance is measured over 1,500 or more hands of play

The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome

Understanding fear of opportunism in global prize-based science contests: Evidence for gender and age differences

Global prize-based science contests have great potential for tapping into diverse knowledge on a global scale and overcoming important scientific challenges. A necessary step for knowledge to be utilized in these contests is for that knowledge to be disclosed. Knowledge disclosure, however, is paradoxical in nature: in order for the value of knowledge to be assessed, inventors must disclose their knowledge, but then the person who receives that knowledge does so at no cost and may use it opportunistically. This risk of potential opportunistic behavior in turn makes the inventor fearful of disclosing knowledge, and this is a major psychological barrier to knowledge disclosure. In this project, we investigated this fear of opportunism in global prize-based science contests by surveying 630 contest participants in the InnoCentive online platform for science contests. We found that participants in these science contests experience fear of opportunism to varying degrees, and that women and older participants have significantly less fear of disclosing their scientific knowledge. Our findings highlight the importance of taking differences in such fears into account when designing global prize-based contests so that the potential of the contests for reaching solutions to important and challenging problems can be used more effectively

Nonrenewable Resources, Strategic Behavior and the Hotelling Rule: An Experiment

This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible causes for the failure of the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are large enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component of their production decision, shifting production to the present and focusing more on strategic behavior. We experimentally vary stock size in a nonrenewable resource duopoly setting and find that producers with large stocks indeed pay significantly less attention to variables related to dynamic optimization,leading to a failure of the Hotelling rule

Multiple order-up-to policy for mitigating bullwhip effect in supply chain network

This paper proposes a multiple order-up-to policy based inventory replenishment scheme to mitigate the bullwhip effect in a multi-stage supply chain scenario, where various transportation modes are available between the supply chain (SC) participants. The proposed policy is similar to the fixed order-up-to policy approach where replenishment decision “how much to order” is made periodically on the basis of the predecided order-up-to inventory level. In the proposed policy, optimal multiple order-up-to levels are assigned to each SC participants, which provides decision making reference point for deciding the transportation related order quantity. Subsequently, a mathematical model is established to define optimal multiple order-up-to levels for each SC participants that aims to maximize overall profit from the SC network. In parallel, the model ensures the control over supply chain pipeline inventory, high satisfaction of customer demand and enables timely utilization of available transportation modes. Findings from the various numerical datasets including stochastic customer demand and lead times validate that—the proposed optimal multiple order-up-to policy based inventory replenishment scheme can be a viable alternative for mitigating the bullwhip effect and well-coordinated SC. Moreover, determining the multiple order-up-to levels is a NP hard combinatorial optimization problem. It is found that the implementation of new emerging optimization algorithm named bacterial foraging algorithm (BFA) has presented superior optimization performances. The robustness and applicability of the BFA algorithm are further validated statistically by employing the percentage heuristic gap and two-way ANOVA analysis