Leibniz’ Welten. Das Verhältnis zwischen der bestmöglichen Welt und dem Monadenreich

U ovom radu tvrdim da u Leibnizovoj metafizici možemo koristiti pojam svijet na dva načina. U jednu ruku, tako što se referiramo na visoko kompleksne božanske misli, odnosno na idealnu domenu, a u drugu ruku, za referiranje na mrežu živih supstancija s pripadnim percepcijama i stremljenjima, odnosno na supstancijalnu domenu. Najprije, pojasnit ću idealnu domenu u Leibnizovoj metafizici, koja se sastoji od tri kombinatorne razine o temeljnim entitetima, tj. od jednostavnih ideja u Božjem umu: kompleksne ideje, potpuni individualni pojmovi i mogući svjetovi. Drugi dio bavi se individualnim supstancijama, odnosno monadama. U trećem, konačnom dijelu raspravljam o različitim načinima na koje se može misliti o vezi između idealnog i monadnog svijeta.In this paper, I claim that in Leibniz’s metaphysics, we can use the notion of world in a twofold sense. On the one hand, to refer to highly complex divine thoughts, i.e. the ideal realm, and on the other hand, to refer to a network of living substances with their perceptions and appetitions, i.e. the substantial realm. Firstly, I will clarify the ideal realm in Leibniz’s metaphysics, which consists of three combinatorial levels about the fundamental entities, namely the simple ideas in God’s mind: complex ideas, complete individual notions and possible worlds. The second part is about the individual substances, i.e. the monads. In the third section, finally, I will discuss different ways to think about the connection between the ideal and the monad world.Mon travail entend éclairer le phénomène de double application du concept de monde qui traverse la philosophie leibnizienne. Ce concept peut en effet désigner à la fois les pensées divines hautement complexes (le domaine idéel dans la métaphysique de Leibniz) et le domaine des êtres vivants, c’est à dire des substances individuelles et des monades. Je vais d’abord développer le domaine idéel qui se laisse structurer en trois dimensions formées par combinassions : les idées simples, les idées complexes, les notions complètes et enfin les mondes possibles. Puis je mettrai le focus sur les monades et leurs perceptions et appétitions. Il faudra dans un dernier temps mettre en lumière les connexions qu’entretiennent le domaine des idées et celui des monades.In diesem Beitrag unterstelle ich der Leibniz’schen Philosophie eine zweifache Verwendung des Welt-Begriffes. Auf der einen Seite kann der Begriff Welt auf hochkomplexe göttliche Gedanken, also den ideellen Bereich in Leibniz’ Metaphysik, bezogen werden. Auf der anderen Seite kann als Welt der Bereich des lebendigen Seienden, also der individuellen Substanzen und Monaden, bezeichnet werden. Zunächst werde ich den ideellen Bereich, welcher bei Leibniz aus drei durch Kombinationen gebildeten Bereichen besteht, erläutern: Dies sind zunächst die einfachen Ideen, dann die komplexen Ideen, die vollständigen Begriffe und schließlich die möglichen Welten. Anschließend wird der Fokus auf die Monaden und ihre Perzeptionen und Appetitionen gerichtet, bevor in einem letzten Schritt die Verknüpfung beider Bereiche – des ideellen und des monadischen – ausgeleuchtet werden soll

Alles kann, nichts muss?!

Can God do what He wants or does God want what is in accordance with His very own nature? Is God bound by necessary principles or is necessary what God decrees? Such questions about the relationship between modalities and concepts of God are part of innumerable debates and reach far into the history of philosophy and theology. This study first examines the modal metaphysics of G.W. Leibniz's, D. Lewis' and A. Plantinga's metaphysics together with their very different ontological frameworks. Subsequently, the different forms of theism within contemporary debates within Analytic Philosophy are analyzed: classical and personal theism and panentheism. The heart of this study will be the analysis of the consistencies and inconsistencies that appear when, for metaphysical and ontological reasons, one wants to connect the different forms of theism with the modal theories of Lewis, Leibniz, or Plantinga.Kann Gott tun, was er will oder will Gott, was seinem Wesen entspricht? Ist Gott an notwendige Prinzipien gebunden oder ist notwendig, was Gott dekretiert? Derartige Fragen nach dem Verhältnis von Modalitäten und Gotteskonzepten sind Bestandteil unzähliger Debatten und reichen weit in die Philosophie- und Theologiegeschichte zurück. Die vorliegende Studie untersucht zunächst die Modalmetaphysiken G.W. Leibniz’, D. Lewis’ und A. Plantingas samt ihren sehr unterschiedlichen ontologischen Voraussetzungen. Im Anschluss werden die in der gegenwärtigen analytisch-religionsphilosophischen Debatte dominanten Formen des Theismus analysiert: der klassische und personale Theismus und der Panentheismus. Das Kernstück dieser Studie bildet die Analyse von Konsistenzen und Inkonsistenzen, die zutage treten, will man aus metaphysisch-ontologischen Gründen diese unterschiedlichen Formen des Theismus mit den Modaltheorien Lewis’, Leibniz’ oder Plantingas verbinden

Alles kann, nichts muss?!

Can God do what He wants or does God want what is in accordance with His very own nature? Is God bound by necessary principles or is necessary what God decrees? Such questions about the relationship between modalities and concepts of God are part of innumerable debates and reach far into the history of philosophy and theology. This study first examines the modal metaphysics of G.W. Leibniz's, D. Lewis' and A. Plantinga's metaphysics together with their very different ontological frameworks. Subsequently, the different forms of theism within contemporary debates within Analytic Philosophy are analyzed: classical and personal theism and panentheism. The heart of this study will be the analysis of the consistencies and inconsistencies that appear when, for metaphysical and ontological reasons, one wants to connect the different forms of theism with the modal theories of Lewis, Leibniz, or Plantinga

Constraining long-term denudation and faulting history in intraplate regions by multisystem thermochronology: An example of the Sudetic Marginal Fault (Bohemian Massif, central Europe)

The Rychlebské hory Mountain region in the Sudetes (NE Bohemian Massif) provides a natural laboratory for studies of postorogenic landscape evolution. This work reveals both the exhumation history of the region and the paleoactivity along the Sudetic Marginal Fault (SMF) using zircon (U-Th)/He (ZHe), apatite fission track (AFT), and apatite (U-Th)/He (AHe) dating of crystalline basement and postorogenic sedimentary samples. Most significantly, and in direct contradiction of traditional paleogeographic reconstructions, this work has found evidence of a large Cretaceous sea and regional burial (to >6.5 km) of the Carboniferous-Permian basement in the Late Cretaceous (~95–80 Ma). During the burial by sediments of the Bohemian Cretaceous Basin System, the SMF acted as a normal fault as documented by offset ZHe ages across the fault. At 85–70 Ma, the basin was inverted, Cretaceous strata eroded, and basement blocks were exhumed to the near surface at a rate of ~300 m/Ma as evidenced by Late Cretaceous–Paleocene AFT ages and thermal modeling results. There is no appreciable difference in AFT and AHe ages across the fault, suggesting that the SMF acted as a reverse fault during exhumation. In the late Eocene–Oligocene, the basement was locally heated to <70°C by magmatic activity related to opening of the Eger rift system. Neogene or younger thermal activity was not recorded in the thermochronological data, confirming that late Cenozoic uplift and erosion of the basement blocks was limited to less than ∼1.5 km in the study area