The actor’s insight: Actors have comparable interoception but better metacognition than nonactors

Both accurately sensing our own bodily signals and knowing whether we have accurately sensed them may contribute to a successful emotional life, but there is little evidence on whether these physiological perceptual and metacognitive abilities systematically differ between people. Here, we examined whether actors, who receive substantial training in the production, awareness, and control of emotion, and nonactor controls differed in interoceptive ability (the perception of internal bodily signals) and/or metacognition about interoceptive accuracy (awareness of that perception), and explored potential sources of individual differences in and consequences of these abilities including correlational relationships with state and trait anxiety, proxies for acting ability, and the amount of acting training. Participants performed a heartbeat detection task in which they judged whether tones were played synchronously or delayed relative to their heartbeats, and then rated their metacognitive confidence in that judgment. Cardiac interoceptive accuracy and metacognitive awareness of interoceptive accuracy were independent, and while actors' and controls' interoceptive accuracy was not significantly different, actors had consistently superior metacognitive awareness of interoception. Exploratory analyses additionally suggest that this metacognitive ability may be correlated with measures of acting ability, but not the duration of acting training. Interoceptive accuracy and metacognitive insight into that accuracy appear to be separate abilities, and while actors may be no more accurate in reading their bodies, their metacognitive insight means they know better when they're accurate and when they're not. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved)

Decision value computation in DLPFC and VMPFC adjusts to the available decision time

It is increasingly clear that simple decisions are made by computing decision values for the options under consideration, and then comparing these values to make a choice. Computational models of this process suggest that it involves the accumulation of information over time, but little is known about the temporal course of valuation in the brain. To examine this, we manipulated the available decision time and observed the consequences in the brain and behavioral correlates of choice. Participants were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging while they chose to eat or not eat basic food items, in two conditions differing in the amount of time provided for choice. After identifying valuation-related regions with unbiased whole-brain general linear models, we analyzed two regions of interest: ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). Finite impulse response models of the upsampled estimated neural activity from those regions allowed us to examine the onset, duration and termination of decision value signals, and to compare across regions. We found evidence for the immediate onset of value computation in both regions, but an extended duration with longer decision time. However, this was not accompanied by behavioral changes in either the accuracy or determinants of choice. Finally, there was modest evidence that DLPFC computation correlated with, but lagged behind, VMPFC computation, suggesting the sharing of information across these regions. These findings have important implications for models of decision value computation and choice

The Psychological and Neural Basis of Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a central element of prospect theory, the dominant theory of decision making under uncertainty for the past four decades, and refers to the overweighting of potential losses relative to equivalent gains, a critical determinant of risky decision making. Recent advances in affective and decision neuroscience have shed new light on the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Here, integrating disparate literatures from the level of neurotransmitters to subjective reports of emotion, we propose a novel neural and computational framework that links norepinephrine to loss aversion and identifies a distinct role for dopamine in risk taking for rewards. We also propose that loss aversion specifically relates to anticipated emotions and aspects of the immediate experience of realized gains and losses but not their long-term emotional consequences, highlighting an underappreciated temporal structure. Finally, we discuss challenges to loss aversion and the relevance of loss aversion to understanding psychiatric disorders. Refining models of loss aversion will have broad consequences for the science of decision making and for how we understand individual variation in economic preferences and psychological well-being across both healthy and psychiatric populations

Determinants of Propranolol’s Selective Effect on Loss Aversion

Research on emotion and decision making has suggested that arousal mediates risky decisions, but several distinct and often confounded processes drive such choices. We used econometric modeling to separate and quantify the unique contributions of loss aversion, risk attitudes, and choice consistency to risky decision making. We administered the beta-blocker propranolol in a double-blind, placebo-controlled within-subjects study, targeting the neurohormonal basis of physiological arousal. Matching our intervention’s pharmacological specificity with a quantitative model delineating decision-making components allowed us to identify the causal relationships between arousal and decision making that do and do not exist. Propranolol selectively reduced loss aversion in a baseline- and dose-dependent manner (i.e., as a function of initial loss aversion and body mass index), and did not affect risk attitudes or choice consistency. These findings provide evidence for a specific, modulatory, and causal relationship between precise components of emotion and risky decision making

Reply to Krueger: Good point, wrong paper

Psycholog

The development of emotion regulation: an fMRI study of cognitive reappraisal in children, adolescents and young adults

The ability to use cognitive reappraisal to regulate emotions is an adaptive skill in adulthood, but little is known about its development. Because reappraisal is thought to be supported by linearly developing prefrontal regions, one prediction is that reappraisal ability develops linearly. However, recent investigations into socio-emotional development suggest that there are non-linear patterns that uniquely affect adolescents. We compared older children (10–13), adolescents (14–17) and young adults (18–22) on a task that distinguishes negative emotional reactivity from reappraisal ability. Behaviorally, we observed no age differences in self-reported emotional reactivity, but linear and quadratic relationships between reappraisal ability and age. Neurally, we observed linear age-related increases in activation in the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, previously identified in adult reappraisal. We observed a quadratic pattern of activation with age in regions associated with social cognitive processes like mental state attribution (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, anterior temporal cortex). In these regions, we observed relatively lower reactivity-related activation in adolescents, but higher reappraisal-related activation. This suggests that (i) engagement of the cognitive control components of reappraisal increases linearly with age and (ii) adolescents may not normally recruit regions associated with mental state attribution, but (iii) this can be reversed with reappraisal instructions.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant BCS-0224342

Race and reputation: perceived racial group trustworthiness influences the neural correlates of trust decisions

Decisions to trust people with whom we have no personal history can be based on their social reputation-a product of what we can observe about them (their appearance, social group membership, etc.)-and our own beliefs. The striatum and amygdala have been identified as regions of the brain involved in trust decisions and trustworthiness estimation, respectively. However, it is unknown whether social reputation based on group membership modulates the involvement of these regions during trust decisions. To investigate this, we examined blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) activity while participants completed a series of single-shot trust game interactions with real partners of varying races. At the time of choice, baseline BOLD responses in the striatum correlated with individuals' trust bias-that is, the overall disparity in decisions to trust Black versus White partners. BOLD signal in the striatum was higher when deciding to trust partners from the race group that the individual participant considered less trustworthy overall. In contrast, activation of the amygdala showed greater BOLD responses to Black versus White partners that scaled with the amount invested. These results suggest that the amygdala may represent emotionally relevant social group information as a subset of the general detection function it serves, whereas the striatum is involved in representing race-based reputations that shape trust decisions

Classification of patient-safety incidents in primary care

Primary care lags behind secondary care in the reporting of, and learning from, incidents that put patient safety at risk. In primary care, there is no universally agreed approach to classifying the severity of harm arising from such patient-safety incidents. This lack of an agreed approach limits learning that could lead to the prevention of injury to patients. In a review of research on patient safety in primary care, we identified 21 existing approaches to the classification of harm severity. Using the World Health Organization's (WHO's) International Classification for Patient Safety as a reference, we undertook a framework analysis of these approaches. We then developed a new system for the classification of harm severity. To assess and classify harm, most existing approaches use measures of symptom duration (11/21), symptom severity (11/21) and/or the level of intervention required to manage the harm (14/21). However, few of these approaches account for the deleterious effects of hospitalization or the psychological stress that may be experienced by patients and/or their relatives. The new classification system we developed builds on WHO's International Classification for Patient Safety and takes account not only of hospitalization and psychological stress but also of so-called near misses and uncertain outcomes. The constructs we have outlined have the potential to be applied internationally, across primary-care settings, to improve both the detection and prevention of incidents that cause the most severe harm to patients

The Psychological and Neural Basis of Loss Aversion

Loss aversion is a central element of prospect theory, the dominant theory of decision making under uncertainty for the past four decades, and refers to the overweighting of potential losses relative to equivalent gains, a critical determinant of risky decision making. Recent advances in affective and decision neuroscience have shed new light on the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underlying loss aversion. Here, integrating disparate literatures from the level of neurotransmitters to subjective reports of emotion, we propose a novel neural and computational framework that links norepinephrine to loss aversion and identifies a distinct role for dopamine in risk taking for rewards. We also propose that loss aversion specifically relates to anticipated emotions and aspects of the immediate experience of realized gains and losses but not their long-term emotional consequences, highlighting an underappreciated temporal structure. Finally, we discuss challenges to loss aversion and the relevance of loss aversion to understanding psychiatric disorders. Refining models of loss aversion will have broad consequences for the science of decision making and for how we understand individual variation in economic preferences and psychological well-being across both healthy and psychiatric populations

Multiple timescales of temporal context in risky choice: Behavioral identification and relationships to physiological arousal.

Context-dependence is fundamental to risky monetary decision-making. A growing body of evidence suggests that temporal context, or recent events, alters risk-taking at a minimum of three timescales: immediate (e.g. trial-by-trial), neighborhood (e.g. a group of consecutive trials), and global (e.g. task-level). To examine context effects, we created a novel monetary choice set with intentional temporal structure in which option values shifted between multiple levels of value magnitude ("contexts") several times over the course of the task. This structure allowed us to examine whether effects of each timescale were simultaneously present in risky choice behavior and the potential mechanistic role of arousal, an established correlate of risk-taking, in context-dependency. We found that risk-taking was sensitive to immediate, neighborhood, and global timescales: risk-taking decreased following large (vs. small) outcome amounts, increased following large positive (but not negative) shifts in context, and increased when cumulative earnings exceeded expectations. We quantified arousal with skin conductance responses, which were related to the global timescale, increasing with cumulative earnings, suggesting that physiological arousal captures a task-level assessment of performance. Our results both replicate and extend prior research by demonstrating that risky decision-making is consistently dynamic at multiple timescales and that the role of arousal in risk-taking extends to some, but not all timescales of context-dependence