Analysis of the velocity field of granular hopper flow

We report the analysis of radial characteristics of the flow of granular material through a conical hopper. The discharge is simulated for various orifice sizes and hopper opening angles. Velocity profiles are measured along two radial lines from the hopper cone vertex: along the main axis of the cone and along its wall. An approximate power law dependence on the distance from the orifice is observed for both profiles, although differences between them can be noted. In order to quantify these differences, we propose a Local Mass Flow index that is a promising tool in the direction of a more reliable classification of the flow regimes in hoppers

The absoption refrigerator as a thermal transformer

The absorption refrigerator can be considered a thermal transformer, i.e. a device that is analogous to the electric transformer. The analogy is based on a correspondence between the extensive quantities entropy and electric charge and that of the intensive variables temperature and electric potential

The influence of statistical properties of Fourier coefficients on random surfaces

Many examples of natural systems can be described by random Gaussian surfaces. Much can be learned by analyzing the Fourier expansion of the surfaces, from which it is possible to determine the corresponding Hurst exponent and consequently establish the presence of scale invariance. We show that this symmetry is not affected by the distribution of the modulus of the Fourier coefficients. Furthermore, we investigate the role of the Fourier phases of random surfaces. In particular, we show how the surface is affected by a non-uniform distribution of phases

Riemann solvers and undercompressive shocks of convex FPU chains

We consider FPU-type atomic chains with general convex potentials. The naive continuum limit in the hyperbolic space-time scaling is the p-system of mass and momentum conservation. We systematically compare Riemann solutions to the p-system with numerical solutions to discrete Riemann problems in FPU chains, and argue that the latter can be described by modified p-system Riemann solvers. We allow the flux to have a turning point, and observe a third type of elementary wave (conservative shocks) in the atomistic simulations. These waves are heteroclinic travelling waves and correspond to non-classical, undercompressive shocks of the p-system. We analyse such shocks for fluxes with one or more turning points. Depending on the convexity properties of the flux we propose FPU-Riemann solvers. Our numerical simulations confirm that Lax-shocks are replaced by so called dispersive shocks. For convex-concave flux we provide numerical evidence that convex FPU chains follow the p-system in generating conservative shocks that are supersonic. For concave-convex flux, however, the conservative shocks of the p-system are subsonic and do not appear in FPU-Riemann solutions

Short- and long-run goals in ultimatum bargaining: impatience predicts spite-based behavior

The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to study human bargaining behavior and fairness norms. In this game, two players have to agree on how to split a sum of money. The proposer makes an offer, which the responder can accept or reject. If the responder rejects, neither player gets anything. The prevailing view is that, beyond self-interest, the desire to equalize both players’ payoffs (i.e., fairness) is the crucial motivation in the UG. Based on this view, previous research suggests that fairness is a short-run oriented motive that conflicts with the long-run goal of self-interest. However, competitive spite, which reflects an antisocial (not norm-based) desire to minimize others’ payoffs, can also account for the behavior observed in the UG, and has been linked to short-run, present-oriented aspirations as well. In this paper, we explore the relationship between individuals’ intertemporal preferences and their behavior in a citywide dual-role UG experiment (N = 713). We find that impatience (short-run orientation) predicts the rejection of low, “unfair” offers as responder and the proposal of low, “unfair” offers as proposer, which is consistent with spitefulness but inconsistent with fairness motivations. This behavior systematically reduces the payoffs of those who interact with impatient individuals. Thus, impatient individuals appear to be keen to minimize their partners’ share of the pie, even at the risk of destroying it. These findings indicate that competitively reducing other’s payoffs, rather than fairness (or self-interest), is the short-run goal in ultimatum bargaining

Accurate Evolutions of Orbiting Binary Black Holes

We present a detailed analysis of binary black hole evolutions in the last orbit and demonstrate consistent and convergent results for the trajectories of the individual bodies. The gauge choice can significantly affect the overall accuracy of the evolution. It is possible to reconcile certain gauge-dependent discrepancies by examining the convergence limit. We illustrate these results using an initial data set recently evolved by Brügmann et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 211101 (2004)]. For our highest resolution and most accurate gauge, we estimate the duration of this data set's last orbit to be approximately 59MADM

Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems