Cellular and Synaptic Architecture of Multisensory Integration in the Mouse Neocortex

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Sensory Processing Across Conscious and Nonconscious Brain States: From Single Neurons to Distributed Networks for Inferential Representation

Neuronal activity is markedly different across brain states: it varies from desynchronized activity during wakefulness to the synchronous alternation between active and silent states characteristic of deep sleep. Surprisingly, limited attention has been paid to investigating how brain states affect sensory processing. While it was long assumed that the brain was mostly disconnected from external stimuli during sleep, an increasing number of studies indicates that sensory stimuli continue to be processed across all brain states—albeit differently. In this review article, we first discuss what constitutes a brain state. We argue that—next to global, behavioral states such as wakefulness and sleep—there is a concomitant need to distinguish bouts of oscillatory dynamics with specific global/local activity patterns and lasting for a few hundreds of milliseconds, as these can lead to the same sensory stimulus being either perceived or not. We define these short-lasting bouts as micro-states. We proceed to characterize how sensory-evoked neural responses vary between conscious and nonconscious states. We focus on two complementary aspects: neuronal ensembles and inter-areal communication. First, we review which features of ensemble activity are conducive to perception, and how these features vary across brain states. Properties such as heterogeneity, sparsity and synchronicity in neuronal ensembles will especially be considered as essential correlates of conscious processing. Second, we discuss how inter-areal communication varies across brain states and how this may affect brain operations and sensory processing. Finally, we discuss predictive coding (PC) and the concept of multi-level representations as a key framework for understanding conscious sensory processing. In this framework the brain implements conscious representations as inferences about world states across multiple representational levels. In this representational hierarchy, low-level inference may be carried out nonconsciously, whereas high levels integrate across different sensory modalities and larger spatial scales, correlating with conscious processing. This inferential framework is used to interpret several cellular and population-level findings in the context of brain states, and we briefly compare its implications to two other theories of consciousness. In conclusion, this review article, provides foundations to guide future studies aiming to uncover the mechanisms of sensory processing and perception across brain states

Consciousness Regained: Disentangling Mechanisms, Brain Systems, and Behavioral Responses

How consciousness (experience) arises from and relates to material brain processes (the "mind-body problem") has been pondered by thinkers for centuries, and is regarded as among the deepest unsolved problems in science, with wide-ranging theoretical, clinical, and ethical implications. Until the last few decades, this was largely seen as a philosophical topic, but not widely accepted in mainstream neuroscience. Since the 1980s, however, novel methods and theoretical advances have yielded remarkable results, opening up the field for scientific and clinical progress. Since a seminal paper by Crick and Koch (1998) claimed that a science of consciousness should first search for its neural correlates (NCC), a variety of correlates have been suggested, including both content-specific NCCs, determining particular phenomenal components within an experience, and the full NCC, the neural substrates supporting entire conscious experiences. In this review, we present recent progress on theoretical, experimental, and clinical issues. Specifically, we (1) review methodological advances that are important for dissociating conscious experience from related enabling and executive functions, (2) suggest how critically reconsidering the role of the frontal cortex may further delineate NCCs, (3) advocate the need for general, objective, brain-based measures of the capacity for consciousness that are independent of sensory processing and executive functions, and (4) show how animal studies can reveal population and network phenomena of relevance for understanding mechanisms of consciousness.European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation ProgrammeHermann and Lilly Schilling FoundationGerman Research FoundationCenter for Nanoscale Microscopy and Molecular Physiology of the BrainNational Institutes of Health/National Institute of Neurological Disorders and StrokeSao Paulo Research FoundationJames S. McDonnell Foundation Scholar AwardEU Grant H2020-FETOPENCanadian Institute for Advanced ResearchAzrieli Program in Brain, Mind and ConsciousnessFLAG-ERA JTC project CANONNorwegian Research CouncilNetherlands Organization for Scientific ResearchUniv Oslo, Inst Basal Med Sci, Div Physiol, Dept Mol Med, POB 1103 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, NorwayUniv Wisconsin, Dept Neurol, Madison, WI 53705 USAUniv Wisconsin, Dept Psychiat, Madison, WI 53719 USAUniv Fed Sao Paulo, Inst Sci & Technol, BR-12231280 Sao Jose Dos Campos, SP, BrazilUniv Milan, Dept Biomed & Clin Sci Luigi Sacco, I-20157 Milan, ItalyFdn Don Carlo Gnocchi ONLUS, Ist Ricovero & Cura Carattere Sci, I-20162 Milan, ItalyUniv Amsterdam, Swammerdam Inst Life Sci, Cognit & Syst Neurosci Grp, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniv Amsterdam, Res Prior Program Brain & Cognit, NL-1098 XH Amsterdam, NetherlandsUniv Med Goettingen, Dept Cognit Neurol, D-37075 Gottingen, GermanyLeibniz Inst Primate Res, German Primate Ctr, D-37077 Gottingen, GermanyLeibniz Sci Campus Primate Cognit, D-37077 Gottingen, GermanyUniv Fed Sao Paulo, Inst Sci & Technol, BR-12231280 Sao Jose Dos Campos, SP, BrazilEuropean Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme: 720270German Research Foundation: WI 4046/1-1National Institutes of Health/National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke: 1R03NS096379FAPESP: 2016/08263-9EU Grant H2020-FETOPEN: RIA 686764Web of Scienc

Spectral parameters modulation and source localization of blink-related alpha and low-beta oscillations differentiate minimally conscious state from vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome

Recently, the cortical source of blink-related delta oscillations (delta BROs) in resting healthy subjects has been localized in the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus (PCC/PCu), one of the main core-hubs of the default-mode network. This has been interpreted as the electrophysiological signature of the automatic monitoring of the surrounding environment while subjects are immersed in self-reflecting mental activities. Although delta BROs were directly correlated to the degree of consciousness impairment in patients with disorders of consciousness, they failed to differentiate vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (VS/UWS) from minimally conscious state (MCS). In the present study, we have extended the analysis of BROs to frequency bands other than delta in the attempt to find a biological marker that could support the differential diagnosis between VS/UWS and MCS. Four patients with VS/UWS, 5 patients with MCS, and 12 healthy matched controls (CTRL) underwent standard 19-channels EEG recordings during resting conditions. Three-second-lasting EEG epochs centred on each blink instance were submitted to time-frequency analyses in order to extract the normalized Blink-Related Synchronization/Desynchronization (nBRS/BRD) of three bands of interest (low-alpha, high-alpha and low-beta) in the time-window of 50-550 ms after the blink-peak and to estimate the corresponding cortical sources of electrical activity. VS/UWS nBRS/BRD levels of all three bands were lower than those related to both CTRL and MCS, thus enabling the differential diagnosis between MCS and VS/UWS. Furthermore, MCS showed an intermediate signal intensity on PCC/PCu between CTRL and VS/UWS and a higher signal intensity on the left temporo-parieto-occipital junction and inferior occipito-temporal regions when compared to VS/UWS. This peculiar pattern of activation leads us to hypothesize that resting MCS patients have a bottom-up driven activation of the task positive network and thus are tendentially prone to respond to environmental stimuli, even though in an almost unintentional way

States of vigilance and brain connectivity: Analysis of a model of the thalamocortical system

Sleep is the most familiar alteration of consciousness. A recent paper showed that during non-REM sleep there is a breakdown of cortical connectivity, which might be involved in the fading of consciousness. By employing a large scale model of the thalamocortical system we investigated the differences in brain connectivity at a microscopic scale between wakefulness and sleep. Our work consisted of three phases: setting the model parameters in order to get realistic waking and sleep, comparing our simulations to real data and, finally, analyzing our data with an information theoretical approach. Our results show that: during wakefulness i) single conscious states last 100-150 ms, ii) minicolumns are more effective than neurons and columns in transferring information, iii) groups of nearby minicolumns have a high degree of connectivity, iv) during sleep there is a breakdown of connectivity between minicolumns, due to both the oscillatory pattern of activity (slow wave activity) and a stereotyped way of firing

Preserved Excitatory-Inhibitory Balance of Cortical Synaptic Inputs following Deprived Eye Stimulation after a Saturating Period of Monocular Deprivation in Rats

Monocular deprivation (MD) during development leads to a dramatic loss of responsiveness through the deprived eye in primary visual cortical neurons, and to degraded spatial vision (amblyopia) in all species tested so far, including rodents. Such loss of responsiveness is accompanied since the beginning by a decreased excitatory drive from the thalamo-cortical inputs. However, in the thalamorecipient layer 4, inhibitory interneurons are initially unaffected by MD and their synapses onto pyramidal cells potentiate. It remains controversial whether ocular dominance plasticity similarly or differentially affects the excitatory and inhibitory synaptic conductances driven by visual stimulation of the deprived eye and impinging onto visual cortical pyramids, after a saturating period of MD. To address this issue, we isolated visually-driven excitatory and inhibitory conductances by in vivo whole-cell recordings from layer 4 regular-spiking neurons in the primary visual cortex (V1) of juvenile rats. We found that a saturating period of MD comparably reduced visually-driven excitatory and inhibitory conductances driven by visual stimulation of the deprived eye. Also, the excitatory and inhibitory conductances underlying the synaptic responses driven by the ipsilateral, left open eye were similarly potentiated compared to controls. Multiunit recordings in layer 4 followed by spike sorting indicated that the suprathreshold loss of responsiveness and the MD-driven ocular preference shifts were similar for narrow spiking, putative inhibitory neurons and broad spiking, putative excitatory neurons. Thus, by the time the plastic response has reached a plateau, inhibitory circuits adjust to preserve the normal balance between excitation and inhibition in the cortical network of the main thalamorecipient layer

A neuromorphic architecture for object recognition and motion anticipation using burst-STDP.

In this work we investigate the possibilities offered by a minimal framework of artificial spiking neurons to be deployed in silico. Here we introduce a hierarchical network architecture of spiking neurons which learns to recognize moving objects in a visual environment and determine the correct motor output for each object. These tasks are learned through both supervised and unsupervised spike timing dependent plasticity (STDP). STDP is responsible for the strengthening (or weakening) of synapses in relation to pre- and post-synaptic spike times and has been described as a Hebbian paradigm taking place both in vitro and in vivo. We utilize a variation of STDP learning, called burst-STDP, which is based on the notion that, since spikes are expensive in terms of energy consumption, then strong bursting activity carries more information than single (sparse) spikes. Furthermore, this learning algorithm takes advantage of homeostatic renormalization, which has been hypothesized to promote memory consolidation during NREM sleep. Using this learning rule, we design a spiking neural network architecture capable of object recognition, motion detection, attention towards important objects, and motor control outputs. We demonstrate the abilities of our design in a simple environment with distractor objects, multiple objects moving concurrently, and in the presence of noise. Most importantly, we show how this neural network is capable of performing these tasks using a simple leaky-integrate-and-fire (LIF) neuron model with binary synapses, making it fully compatible with state-of-the-art digital neuromorphic hardware designs. As such, the building blocks and learning rules presented in this paper appear promising for scalable fully neuromorphic systems to be implemented in hardware chips

Sensory Processing Across Conscious and Nonconscious Brain States: From Single Neurons to Distributed Networks for Inferential Representation

Neuronal activity is markedly different across brain states: it varies from desynchronized activity during wakefulness to the synchronous alternation between active and silent states characteristic of deep sleep. Surprisingly, limited attention has been paid to investigating how brain states affect sensory processing. While it was long assumed that the brain was mostly disconnected from external stimuli during sleep, an increasing number of studies indicates that sensory stimuli continue to be processed across all brain states—albeit differently. In this review article, we first discuss what constitutes a brain state. We argue that—next to global, behavioral states such as wakefulness and sleep—there is a concomitant need to distinguish bouts of oscillatory dynamics with specific global/local activity patterns and lasting for a few hundreds of milliseconds, as these can lead to the same sensory stimulus being either perceived or not. We define these short-lasting bouts as micro-states. We proceed to characterize how sensory-evoked neural responses vary between conscious and nonconscious states. We focus on two complementary aspects: neuronal ensembles and inter-areal communication. First, we review which features of ensemble activity are conducive to perception, and how these features vary across brain states. Properties such as heterogeneity, sparsity and synchronicity in neuronal ensembles will especially be considered as essential correlates of conscious processing. Second, we discuss how inter-areal communication varies across brain states and how this may affect brain operations and sensory processing. Finally, we discuss predictive coding (PC) and the concept of multi-level representations as a key framework for understanding conscious sensory processing. In this framework the brain implements conscious representations as inferences about world states across multiple representational levels. In this representational hierarchy, low-level inference may be carried out nonconsciously, whereas high levels integrate across different sensory modalities and larger spatial scales, correlating with conscious processing. This inferential framework is used to interpret several cellular and population-level findings in the context of brain states, and we briefly compare its implications to two other theories of consciousness. In conclusion, this review article, provides foundations to guide future studies aiming to uncover the mechanisms of sensory processing and perception across brain states