12 research outputs found
Leibniz, Acosmism, and Incompossibility
Leibniz claims that God acts in the best possible way, and that this includes creating exactly one world. But worlds are aggregates, and aggregates have a low degree of reality or metaphysical perfection, perhaps none at all. This is Leibnizâs tendency toward acosmism, or the view that there this no such thing as creation-as-a-whole. Many interpreters reconcile Leibnizâs acosmist tendency with the high value of worlds by proposing that God sums the value of each substance created, so that the best world is just the world with the most substances. I call this way of determining the value of a world the Additive Theory of Value (ATV), and argue that it leads to the current and insoluble form of the problem of incompossibility. To avoid the problem, I read âpossible worldsâ in âGod chooses the best of all possible worldsâ as referring to Godâs ideas of worlds. These ideas, though built up from essences, are themselves unities and so well suited to be the value bearers that Leibnizâs theodicy requires. They have their own value, thanks to their unity, and that unity is not preserved when more essences are added
Vitalism in Early Modern Medical and Philosophical Thought
Vitalism is a notoriously deceptive term. It is very often defined as the view, in biology, in early modern medicine and differently, in early modern philosophy, that living beings differ from the rest of the physical universe due to their possessing an additional âlife-forceâ, âvital principleâ, âentelechyâ, enormon or Ă©lan vital. Such definitions most often have an explicit pejorative dimension: vitalism is a primitive or archaic view, that has somehow survived the emergence of modern science (the latter being defined in many different ways, from demystified Cartesian reductionism to experimental medicine, biochemistry or genetics: Cimino and Duchesneau eds. 1997, Normandin and Wolfe eds. 2013). Such dismissive definitions of vitalism are meant to dispense with argument or analysis.
Curiously, the term has gained some popularity in English-language scholarship on early modern philosophy in the past few decades, where it is used without any pejorative dimension, to refer to a kind of âactive matterâ view, in which matter is not reducible to the (mechanistic) properties of size, shape and motion, possessing instead some internal dynamism or activity (see e.g. James 1999, Boyle 2018, Borcherding forthcoming). The latter meaning is close to what the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth termed âhylozoismâ, namely the attribution of life, agency or mind to matter, and he implicitly targeted several figures I shall mention here, notably Margaret Cavendish and Francis Glisson, for holding this view. However, one point I shall make in this entry is that when vitalism first appears by name, and as a self-designation, in the Montpellier School (associated with the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Montpellier, in the second half of the eighteenth century; thus vitalisme appears first, followed shortly thereafter by Vitalismus in German, with âvitalismâ appearing in English publications only in the early nineteenth century: Toepfer 2011), it is quite different from both the more âsupernaturalâ view described above â chiefly espoused by its rather obsessive opponents â and from the more neutral, but also de-biologized philosophical view (that of e.g. Cavendish or Conway who are, broadly speaking naturalists). Rather than appealing to a metaphysics of vital force, or of self-organizing matter, this version of vitalism, which I shall refer to as âmedical vitalismâ, seems to be more of a âsystemicâ theory: an attempt to grasp and describe top-level (âorganizationalâ, âorganismicâ, âholisticâ) features of living systems (Wolfe 2017, 2019).
In this entry I seek to introduce some periodization in our thinking about early modern (and Enlightenment) vitalism, emphasizing the difference between the seventeenth-century context and that of the following generations â culminating in the ideas of the Montpellier School. This periodization should also function as a kind of taxonomy or at least distinction between some basic types of vitalism. As I discuss in closing, these distinctions can cut across the texts and figures we are dealing with, differently: metaphysical vs. non-metaphysical vitalism, philosophical vs. medical vitalism, medical vs. âembryologicalâ vitalism, and so on. A difference I can only mention but not explore in detail is that the more medically grounded, âorganismicâ vitalism is significantly post-Cartesian while the more biological/embryological vitalism is, inasmuch as it is a dynamic, self-organizing matter theory, an extension of Renaissance ideas (chymiatry, Galenism and in general theories of medical spirits).
I examine successively vitalismâs Renaissance prehistory, its proliferation as âvital matter theoryâ in seventeenth-century England (in authors such as Cavendish, Conway and Glisson, with brief considerations on Harvey and van Helmont), and its mature expression in eighteenth-century Montpellier (notably with Bordeu and MĂ©nuret de Chambaud)
All the Forms of Matter. Leibniz, Regis and the Worldâs Infinity
International audienc
The organism as reality or as fiction: Buffon and beyond
In this paper, we reflect on the connection between the notions of organism and organisation, with a specific interest in how this bears upon the issue of the reality of the organism (or in contrast the status of these notions as constructs, whether heuristic or otherwise scientifically useful). We do this by presenting the case of Buffon, who developed complex views about the relation between the notions of âorganisedâ and âorganicâ matter. We argue that, contrary to what some interpreters have suggested, these notions are not orthogonal in his thought. Also, we argue that Buffon has a view in which organisation is not just ubiquitous, but basic and fundamental in nature, and hence also fully natural. We suggest that he can hold this view because of his anti-mathematicism. Buffonâs case is interesting, in our view, because he can regard organisation, and organisms, as perfectly natural, and can admit their reality without invoking problematic supernaturalist views, and because he allows organisation and the organismal to come in kinds and degrees. Thus, his view tries to do justice to two cautionary notes for the debate on the reality of the organism: the need for a commitment to a broadly naturalist perspective, and the need to acknowledge the interesting features of organisms through which we make sense of them
Life, Mechanization of
Encyclopaedia entry on the mechanisation of life in early modern natural philosophy. Provides a conceptual and partial historical overview