Dying to go to court: demanding a legal remedy to end-of-life uncertainty

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The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide

The Supreme Court and Assisted Suicide: A Commentary on R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v. Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v. DPP [2014] UKSC 3

The Blanket Ban on Assisted Suicide: Between Moral Paternalism and Utilitarian Justice

The article analyses the ramifications of the Supreme Court’s 2014 Nicklinson judgment. It argues that the majority approach to a declaration of incompatibility as judicial incursion into legislative territory does not rest convincingly on the distribution of power envisaged by the Human Rights Act. Contrasting the domestic courts’ wider prerogatives to develop human rights with the self-restraint of the Strasbourg Court, driven by the margin of appreciation, the author contends that the judgment fails to protect the right to personal autonomy. Unlike the Strasbourg Court, reserved in matters pertaining to the sensitive field of bioethics, where no European consensus can legitimise progressive judgments, domestic courts have more leeway to signal to the legislature that the manner in which discretion was exercised does not strike a fair balance between competing interests. A development in this direction would find support in the general Strasbourg approach to blanket bans in other controversial areas

Lord Sumption and the Values of Life, Liberty, and Security:Before and Since the COVID-19 Outbreak

Lord Sumption, a former Justice of the Supreme Court, has been a prominent critic of coronavirus restrictions regulations in the UK. Since the start of the pandemic, he has consistently questioned both the policy aims and the regulatory methods of the Westminster government. He has also challenged rationales that hold that all lives are of equal value. In this paper, I explore and question Lord Sumption’s views on morality, politics and law, querying the coherence of his broad philosophy and his arguments regarding coronavirus regulations with his judicial decision in the assisted-dying case of R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice. In Nicklinson, Lord Sumption argued for restrictions on liberty given the priority of the sanctity of life principle and the protection of others who may be vulnerable, as well as for deference to policy-making institutions in instances of values-based disagreement. The apparent inconsistencies in his positions, I argue, are not clearly reconcilable, and invite critical analysis of his impacts on health law and policy

ASSISTED DYING: JUDICIAL WRONG TURNS IN THE RIGHTS-BASED REVIEW OF THE SUICIDE ACT 1961 AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Assisted dying is legally and ethically controversial. This thesis will argue that the Suicide Act 1961, which prohibits assisted dying, is inadequate for its stated purpose of protecting vulnerable individuals. This is partially because the Suicide Act is incoherent in its treatment of different categories of individuals who wish to end their life. This thesis begins by examining the current standard of human rights protection surrounding assistance to die, to argue that the domestic judgments which uphold the prohibition of assisted dying lack coherence. Then, Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 8 (right to private and family life) are applied to assisted dying to novelly demonstrate that some disabled individuals must be exceptionally allowed to be assisted to die on account of their different experience of the law. As a result, it is indefensible to prohibit assistance to die where it removes the choice to do so for those who are unable to end their life without assistance. The increasing duty of protection under Article 14 is therefore argued to undermine political arguments against judicial intervention in matters of assisted dying, especially including those which debate the constitutional separation of governmental powers. This thesis then makes the ethical case for allowing individuals to be assisted to die, if they so choose. In doing so, Gewirth’s Principle of Generic Consistency is defended and applied as the supreme principle of morality. By extension, this thesis demonstrates possible avenues for reform by suggesting an incremental approach to statutory amendment, in spite of the rejection of previously introduced Assisted Dying Bills

The value of life in English law: revered but not sacred?

Terms such as sanctity and inviolability have failed to provide a legally coherent or ethically sound principle upon which to determine the scope of the intrinsic value of life against extrinsic, quality-of-life considerations in a medical context. In their recent work, Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost introduce a new term, reverence for life, which they suggest may be more appropriate when attempting to navigate the murky waters of the meaning of life and the value that should be attached to it. They suggest that reverence should be utilised as an alternative that better reflects the nuances and the realities of the dilemma. This paper explores the existing difficulties before considering how the principle of reverence might provide a principled compromise over when the presumption in favour of preserving life should be rebutted

A Right to ‘Dying Well’ with Dementia? Capacity, ‘Choice’ and Relationality.

A right to 'dying well' with dementia? Capacity, 'choice' and relationalit

Risk of Suicide Is Insufficient Warrant for Coercive Treatment for Mental Illness

Mental health laws in many jurisdictions currently permit coercive treatment for persons with mental illness who are thought to be at risk of harm to themselves or others. These laws are often used to provide involuntary treatment to persons who are thought to be at risk of suicide. In this article we argue that legislated coercive psychiatric treatment should not be triggered by an assessment of the likelihood of harm, including a likelihood of suicide, but should be available only where a person is found to lack capacity to make their own decisions about their own health risks, after appropriate support has been given. We suggest that current opposition this approach may find its origin in factors including uncertainties about the idea of vulnerability and its relationship to capacity as well as tendency to minimise the real costs of psychiatric treatment and coercion against the aim of suicide prevention. Given the limits of suicide risk assessment, we argue that a public policy that allows involuntary preventative detention of competent persons thought to be at risk of suicide, places too great a burden on all persons living with mental illness to be justified. We suggest that we are better placed to serve the interests and respect the human rights of people with mental illness if we respect and support the right of persons to make decisions, rather than focussing on perceived vulnerabilities and calculations of suicide risk

The CPS, policy-making and assisted dying: towards a ‘freedom’ approach

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A Conscience-Based Human Right to be ‘Doctor Death’

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Sweet & Maxwell via http://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/Catalogue/ProductDetails.aspx?recordid=469It is argued that a limited number of doctors may rely on article 9 ECHR to claim that they have a conscience-based right to assist the suicide of their legally competent adult patients who, for reasons of disability, are unable without assistance to put into action a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to kill themselves. In Carter v Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court rejected the proposition that an absolute ban on assisted dying was necessary to protect vulnerable individuals from the risks of requesting assisted dying for undue reasons. In Nicklinson, the UK Supreme Court did not substantively address that question and it is possible that it may soon have to address that question again. It is argued that in future litigation the UK Supreme Court should accept that an absolute ban disproportionately interferes with a doctor’s conscience-based right to provide assistance in suicide. The argument relies on Carter and on the fact that a permissive legal regime is already in existence in the UK under administrative law principles.The piece was written before obtaining the AHRC DTP scholarship. However, major revisions to the paper were made after the receipt of the AHRC scholarship