Sanctions, Benefits, and Rights: Three Faces of Accountability

As countries throughout the world democratize and decentralize, citizen participation in public life should increase. In this paper, I suggest that democratic participation in local government is enhanced when citizens can reply affirmatively to at least three questions about their ability to hold local officials accountable for their actions: Can citizens use the vote effectively to reward and punish the general or specific performance of local public officials and/or the parties they represent? Can citizens generate response to their collective needs from local governments? Can citizens be ensured of fair and equitable treatment from public agencies at local levels? The findings of a study of 30 randomly selected municipalities in Mexico indicate that, over the course of a decade and a half, voters were able to enforce alternation in power and the circulation of elites, but not necessarily to transmit unambiguous messages to public officials or parties about performance concerns. More definitively, citizens were able to build successfully on prior political experiences to extract benefits from local governments. At the same time, the ability to demand good performance of local government as a right of citizenship lagged behind other forms of accountability

A genome-wide association study identifies risk alleles in plasminogen and P4HA2 associated with giant cell arteritis

Giant cell arteritis (GCA) is the most common form of vasculitis in individuals older than 50 years in Western countries. To shed light onto the genetic background influencing susceptibility for GCA, we performed a genome-wide association screening in a well-powered study cohort. After imputation, 1,844,133 genetic variants were analysed in 2,134 cases and 9,125 unaffected controls from ten independent populations of European ancestry. Our data confirmed HLA class II as the strongest associated region (independent signals: rs9268905, P = 1.94E-54, per-allele OR = 1.79; and rs9275592, P = 1.14E-40, OR = 2.08). Additionally, PLG and P4HA2 were identified as GCA risk genes at the genome-wide level of significance (rs4252134, P = 1.23E-10, OR = 1.28; and rs128738, P = 4.60E-09, OR = 1.32, respectively). Interestingly, we observed that the association peaks overlapped with different regulatory elements related to cell types and tissues involved in the pathophysiology of GCA. PLG and P4HA2 are involved in vascular remodelling and angiogenesis, suggesting a high relevance of these processes for the pathogenic mechanisms underlying this type of vasculitis

Flexible industrial work in the European periphery: factory regimes and changing working class cultures in the Spanish steel industry

This article explores how two steel industry firms operating in northern Spain have adapted to neoliberalism and globalization. Despite their geographical proximity, the comparison between their different trajectories, production, and ownership profiles highlights how their distinct factory regimes, while becoming entangled in global market dynamics, have allowed the emergence of contrasting definitions of workers’ identities, labor politics, and livelihood strategies, raising questions concerning (1) processes of distribution of privileges, skills, and knowledge among the workforce, and (2) the shaping of social relations, values, and meanings that result in the formation of particular factory regimes. The unequal position of steelmaking in regional economies, and the effects of economic policies that framed social relations in each firm, evince important differences between them, including contrasting expressions of resistance, discipline, and sociality on the shop floor. Our comparison considers how particular factory regimes bring forward different prospects as these firms face further industrial transformation, restructuring, and an increasingly uncertain future

26th Annual Computational Neuroscience Meeting (CNS*2017): Part 3 - Meeting Abstracts - Antwerp, Belgium. 15–20 July 2017

This work was produced as part of the activities of FAPESP Research,\ud Disseminations and Innovation Center for Neuromathematics (grant\ud 2013/07699-0, S. Paulo Research Foundation). NLK is supported by a\ud FAPESP postdoctoral fellowship (grant 2016/03855-5). ACR is partially\ud supported by a CNPq fellowship (grant 306251/2014-0)

Nenhum País de Esquerdistas? Continuidade Clientelista e as Eleições de 2006 no Nordeste Brasileiro

Building upon recent studies of the electoral effects of social policyand President Lula da Silva’s coattails in the 2006 Brazilian elections, thisarticle explains the performance of leftist and conservative candidates inelections for governor during that cycle in the Northeast region. The studyassesses three systemic factors: the conditional cash transfer program, BolsaFamília, economic growth, and Lula’s coattails on support for right-wingincumbents and left-wing oppositions in the states of Bahia, Maranhão, andCeará. Based on the analysis of an original municipal-level dataset and asurvey of partisan elites, the findings underscore the importance of urbanbasedparty building strategies across the three states and patterns of elitealliances specific to each state. Alliances made in the capitals coupled withdivided conservative establishments, facilitated leftist victories in the examinedstates. At the same time, variations in alliance patterns and leftist partydevelopment across the three states reveal that conservative clientele networksremain vibrant bases of right-wing support, especially in the interior,and despite either social policy or Lula’s coattails.Com referência aos estudos recentes dos efeitos eleitorais de política social e o apoio por Presidente Lula da Silva nas eleições brasileiras de 2006, este artigo explica o desempenho de candidatos esquerdistas e conservadores nas eleições para governador durante aquele ciclo na região Nordeste. O estudo avalia três fatores sistêmicos: o programa de transferência direta de renda com condicionalidades, a Bolsa Família, crescimento econômico, e o efeito Lula em suporte de candidatos direitistas e oposições esquerdistas nos estados de Bahia, Maranhão, e Ceará. Baseado na análise de uma base de dados original de casos municipais e uma pesquisa de lideranças partidárias, os resultados sublinham a importância de estratégias partidárias mobilizatórias nos centros urbanos nos três estados e as alianças de elites de cada estado. Alianças feitas por oposições esquerdistas nas capitais em estados com elites conservadores divididos facilitaram vitórias esquerdistas nos estados examinados. Ao mesmo tempo, as variações em modelos de aliança e desenvolvimento dos partidos da esquerda nos três estados revelam que as redes de clientelismo conservadoras permanecem bases vibrantes do suporte direitista, especialmente no interior, e apesar da política social ou apesar do apoio por Lula

No Country for Leftists? Clientelist Continuity and the 2006 Vote in the Brazilian Northeast Nenhum País de Esquerdistas? Continuidade Clientelista e as Eleições de 2006 no Nordeste Brasileiro

Building upon recent studies of the electoral effects of social policyand President Lula da Silva’s coattails in the 2006 Brazilian elections, thisarticle explains the performance of leftist and conservative candidates inelections for governor during that cycle in the Northeast region. The studyassesses three systemic factors: the conditional cash transfer program, BolsaFamília, economic growth, and Lula’s coattails on support for right-wingincumbents and left-wing oppositions in the states of Bahia, Maranhão, andCeará. Based on the analysis of an original municipal-level dataset and asurvey of partisan elites, the findings underscore the importance of urbanbasedparty building strategies across the three states and patterns of elitealliances specific to each state. Alliances made in the capitals coupled withdivided conservative establishments, facilitated leftist victories in the examinedstates. At the same time, variations in alliance patterns and leftist partydevelopment across the three states reveal that conservative clientele networksremain vibrant bases of right-wing support, especially in the interior,and despite either social policy or Lula’s coattails. Com referência aos estudos recentes dos efeitos eleitorais de política social e o apoio por Presidente Lula da Silva nas eleições brasileiras de 2006, este artigo explica o desempenho de candidatos esquerdistas e conservadores nas eleições para governador durante aquele ciclo na região Nordeste. O estudo avalia três fatores sistêmicos: o programa de transferência direta de renda com condicionalidades, a Bolsa Família, crescimento econômico, e o efeito Lula em suporte de candidatos direitistas e oposições esquerdistas nos estados de Bahia, Maranhão, e Ceará. Baseado na análise de uma base de dados original de casos municipais e uma pesquisa de lideranças partidárias, os resultados sublinham a importância de estratégias partidárias mobilizatórias nos centros urbanos nos três estados e as alianças de elites de cada estado. Alianças feitas por oposições esquerdistas nas capitais em estados com elites conservadores divididos facilitaram vitórias esquerdistas nos estados examinados. Ao mesmo tempo, as variações em modelos de aliança e desenvolvimento dos partidos da esquerda nos três estados revelam que as redes de clientelismo conservadoras permanecem bases vibrantes do suporte direitista, especialmente no interior, e apesar da política social ou apesar do apoio por Lula

No country for leftists? Clientelist continuity and the 2006 vote in the Brazilian northeast

Building upon recent studies of the electoral effects of social policy and President Lula da Silva's coattails in the 2006 Brazilian elections, this article explains the performance of leftist and conservative candidates in elections for governor during that cycle in the Northeast region. The study assesses three systemic factors: the conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Família, economic growth, and Lula's coattails on support for right-wing incumbents and left-wing oppositions in the states of Bahia, Maranhão, and Ceará. Based on the analysis of an original municipal-level dataset and a survey of partisan elites, the findings underscore the importance of urbanbased party building strategies across the three states and patterns of elite alliances specific to each state. Alliances made in the capitals coupled with divided conservative establishments, facilitated leftist victories in the examined states. At the same time, variations in alliance patterns and leftist party development across the three states reveal that conservative clientele networks remain vibrant bases of right-wing support, especially in the interior, and despite either social policy or Lula's coattails.Com referência aos estudos recentes dos efeitos eleitorais de política social e o apoio por Presidente Lula da Silva nas eleições brasileiras de 2006, este artigo explica o desempenho de candidatos esquerdistas e conservadores nas eleições para governador durante aquele ciclo na região Nordeste. O estudo avalia três fatores sistêmicos: o programa de transferência direta de renda com condicionalidades, a Bolsa Família, crescimento econômico, e o efeito Lula em suporte de candidatos direitistas e oposições esquerdistas nos estados de Bahia, Maranhão, e Ceará. Baseado na análise de uma base de dados original de casos municipais e uma pesquisa de lideranças partidárias, os resultados sublinham a importância de estratégias partidárias mobilizatórias nos centros urbanos nos três estados e as alianças de elites de cada estado. Alianças feitas por oposições esquerdistas nas capitais em estados com elites conservadores divididos facilitaram vitórias esquerdistas nos estados examinados. Ao mesmo tempo, as variações em modelos de aliança e desenvolvimento dos partidos da esquerda nos três estados revelam que as redes de clientelismo conservadoras permanecem bases vibrantes do suporte direitista, especialmente no interior, e apesar da política social ou apesar do apoio por Lula