Some remarks on a relational concept of mind

This paper inquires whether psychology should be internalist or externalist, that is, whether it should consider mind as an entity in itself, or rather as a relation with the environment. Some influential theoretical arguments for internalist psychology are critically reviewed and it is concluded that there is no compelling reason for internalist psychological taxonomies. Next, some proposals for a functional or relational type of explanation in psychology are explored, and it is argued that they provide a workable alternative for internalist explanations. Finally, Gibson's ecological psychology is adduced to show the empirical feasibility of a psychology that explicitly includes environmental considerations in psychological taxonomies. © 1997, Sage Publications. All rights reserved

Dr. Jack Walther -- Cowboy, Veterinarian, AVMA President

Dr. Jack Walther served as AVMA President in 2003-2004. His contributions to the Western Veterinary Conference and veterinary medicine in general are noted

Functions and causes: reply to Meijering

In this reply, I begin by emphasizing the crucial distinction between ‘narrow’ and ‘wide’ functional explanations. Second, I question Meyering's (1997) focus on the metaphysical foundations of functional explanation and the notion of (multiple) supervenience which seems designed to provide such a foundation. More precisely, I doubt both the viability and the necessity of a causal underpinning of wide functional explanation. In my opinion, the notion of cause is as interest-relative as the notion of function, and not necessarily more fundamental. Also, the suggestion that explanations need an independent justification over and above empirical and pragmatic success is disputable. © 1997, Sage Publications. All rights reserved

A new test of the construct validity of the CarerQol instrument: measuring the impact of informal care giving

Purpose: Most economic evaluations of health care programmes do not consider the effects of informal care, while this could lead to suboptimal policy decisions. This study investigates the construct validity of the CarerQol instrument, which measures and values carer effects, in a new population of informal caregivers. Methods: A questionnaire was distributed by mail (n = 1,100, net response rate = 21%) to regional informal care support centers throughout the Netherlands. Two types of construct validity, i.e., convergent and clinical validity, have been analyzed. Convergent validity was assessed with Spearman's correlation coefficients and multivariate correlation between the burden dimensions (CarerQol-7D) and the valuation component (CarerQol-VAS) of the CarerQol. Additionally, convergent validity was analyzed with Spearman's correlation coefficients between the CarerQol and other measures of subjective caregiver burden (SRB, PU). Clinical validity was evaluated with multivariate correlation between CarerQol-VAS and CarerQol-7D, characteristics of caregivers, care recipients and care situation among the whole sample of caregivers and subgroups. Results: The positive (negative) dimensions of CarerQol-7D were positively (negatively) related to CarerQol-VAS, and almost all had moderate strength of convergent validity. CarerQol-VAS was positively associated with PU and negatively with SRB. The CarerQol-VAS reflects differences in important background characteristics of informal care: type of relationship, age of the care recipient and duration of care giving were associated with higher CarerQol-VAS scores. These results confirmed earlier tests of the construct validity of the CarerQol. Furthermore, the dimensions of CarerQol-7D significantly explained differences in CarerQol-VAS scores among subgroups of carers. Conclusion: Notwithstanding the limitations of our study, such as the low response rate, this study shows that the CarerQol provides a valid means to measure carer effects for use in economic evaluations. Future research should derive a valuation set for the CarerQol and further address the instrument's content validity, sensitivity and reliability

On ecological conceptualizations of perceptual systems and action systems

This article examines Gibson's concept of perceptual system and Reed's concept of action system. After discussing several assumptions underlying these concepts, the ontological status of these systems is considered. It is argued that perceptual systems and action systems should be conceptualized neither as parts of an animal's body nor as softly (temporarily) assembled devices; rather, they are best understood as animals' abilities to achieve functional relationships, that is, as dispositional properties. This conceptualization entails that these systems are relatively permanent properties of the animal that are causally supported by, though not identical to, anatomical substrates. Further, it entails that it is the animal that perceives and acts, not its perceptual and action systems