Some two-process models for memory

Two-process models for memory and learnin

Some speculations on storage and retrieval processes in long term memory

Speculations on storage and retrieval processes in long term memor

Scientific progress despite irreproducibility: A seeming paradox

It appears paradoxical that science is producing outstanding new results and theories at a rapid rate at the same time that researchers are identifying serious problems in the practice of science that cause many reports to be irreproducible and invalid. Certainly the practice of science needs to be improved and scientists are now pursuing this goal. However, in this perspective we argue that this seeming paradox is not new, has always been part of the way science works, and likely will remain so. We first introduce the paradox. We then review a wide range of challenges that appear to make scientific success difficult. Next, we describe the factors that make science work-in the past, present, and presumably also in the future. We then suggest that remedies for the present practice of science need to be applied selectively so as not to slow progress, and illustrate with a few examples. We conclude with arguments that communication of science needs to emphasize not just problems but the enormous successes and benefits that science has brought and is now bringing to all elements of modern society.Comment: 3 figure

Prime diagnosticity in short-term repetition priming: Is primed evidence discounted, even when it reliably indicates the correct answer?

The authors conducted 4 repetition priming experiments that manipulated prime duration and prime diagnosticity in a visual forced-choice perceptual identification task. The strength and direction of prime diagnosticity produced marked effects on identification accuracy, but those effects were resistant to subsequent changes of diagnosticity. Participants learned to associate different diagnosticities with primes of different durations but not with primes presented in different colors. Regardless of prime diagnosticity, preference for a primed alternative covaried negatively with prime duration, suggesting that even for diagnostic primes, evidence discounting remains an important factor. A computational model, with the assumption that adaptation to the statistics of the experiment modulates the level of evidence discounting, accounted for these results

Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism

The University Archives has determined that this item is of continuing value to OSU's history.Shiffrin’s talk is drawn from her paper of the same name. In it she argues that conventional accounts of the moral foundation for promise and obligation miss the mark. She gives an alternate account of promising behavior and argues that binding promises between agents are integral to individual autonomy and relations of intimacy and complexity. Without what she calls “the power to promise,” we cannot live freely on an equal basis with others.Ohio State University. Mershon Center for International Security StudiesOhio State University. Dept. of Philosoph

Religion and Democracy

Should citizens armed with religious reasons for public policy outcomes present those reasons in the public forum or otherwise rely on them in making decisions? Those questions have produced a flurry of scholarship, both within and outside of the law. Moreover, as Kent Greenawalt\u27s work richly demonstrates, these related questions raise many more questions still. Do the answers to those questions differ, for example, if the citizen is a judge, a legislator, a columnist, a religious leader, or a mere voter? Are some religious reasons acceptable for presentation in a public forum, but not others? If one holds a constricted view of legal scholarship, the pursuit of these questions by legal scholars might seem odd. No one is contending that religious speech be banned. Instead, in most contexts, the claim is merely that the introduction of religious argument is uncivil, a type of political bad manners. But the debate is quite lively even in those contexts where no one seriously contends that an Establishment Clause issue exists. The debate, however, has important implications for free speech theory, for liberal theory, and for our understanding of the role of religion in a democratic society. Although it is fruitful to attack these questions with particular attention to discrete and varying contexts, I aim for the most part to paint with a broad brush and to argue that the literature is overly critical about the role that religious speech may properly play in democratic life. In particular, I will criticize the arguments that it is unfair to use religious arguments and that religious arguments are dangerous, whether because they lead to political instability or reactionary politics. In painting with a broad brush, I do not mean to suggest that religious arguments are always appropriate in democratic life. In some contexts, the Establishment Clause should be interpreted to prevent the use of such arguments. I do not believe, for example, that judges should resort to religious arguments in their opinions or that legislatures should use religious arguments in their whereas clauses. On the other hand, I maintain that participants in political debate, be they religious leaders, columnists, or commoners, may appropriately use religious argument. Neither democratic theory, as I argue in the first two Parts of the Article, nor the Establishment Clause, as I argue in the final Part of the Article, should counsel against such participation. Although I will deal with the fairness argument at some length, I should state at the outset that I have little patience with that aspect of the debate. Much of the literature is focused on how people should speak to one another in an imaginary well-ordered society—a utopian society that we do not now have and that I believe we never will have. I believe we live in an unjust society. Consequently, we should not be entertaining excessively precious conceptions of respect, nor should we be assuming that instability is necessarily a bad thing. We should instead be fostering dissent, and we should be recognizing that religious dissent has much to contribute to the creation of a more progressive society

Liberal Theory and the Need for Politics

A Review of Liberalism and the Good Edited by R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara, and Henry S. Richardso