Development of Benevolent Sexism Scale for working women in Japan

Even though many women continue to work after marriage or childbirth nowadays, the number of women in managerial positions is still lower in Japan than in other countries. Benevolent sexism (BS) at the workplace has been considered one of the obstacles that prevent women from being promoted. Based on ambivalent sexism theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), we developed a new scale to measure BS toward working women in order to investigate how BS affects womenʼs promotion in Japan. After performing a series of factor analyses and examining the validity using an original BS scale and other related scales, eight items were found to adequately construct three theoretical factors of BS.本研究は広島大学大学院教育学研究科倫理審査委員会の承認を受けて行われた（承認番号2019595）。本研究の一部は日本心理学会第第82回大会で発表した。また，本研究は科研費18K03007の助成を受けた

Gender Gap in Parental Leave Intentions: Evidence from 37 Countries

Despite global commitments and efforts, a gender-based division of paid and unpaid work persists. To identify how psychological factors, national policies, and the broader sociocultural context contribute to this inequality, we assessed parental-leave intentions in young adults (18–30 years old) planning to have children (N = 13,942; 8,880 identified as women; 5,062 identified as men) across 37 countries that varied in parental-leave policies and societal gender equality. In all countries, women intended to take longer leave than men. National parental-leave policies and women’s political representation partially explained cross-national variations in the gender gap. Gender gaps in leave intentions were paradoxically larger in countries with more gender-egalitarian parental-leave policies (i.e., longer leave available to both fathers and mothers). Interestingly, this cross-national variation in the gender gap was driven by cross-national variations in women’s (rather than men’s) leave intentions. Financially generous leave and gender-egalitarian policies (linked to men’s higher uptake in prior research) were not associated with leave intentions in men. Rather, men’s leave intentions were related to their individual gender attitudes. Leave intentions were inversely related to career ambitions. The potential for existing policies to foster gender equality in paid and unpaid work is discussed.Gender Gap in Parental Leave Intentions: Evidence from 37 CountriespublishedVersio

Gender Gap in Parental Leave Intentions: Evidence from 37 Countries

Despite global commitments and efforts, a gender-based division of paid and unpaid work persists. To identify how psychological factors, national policies, and the broader sociocultural context contribute to this inequality, we assessed parental-leave intentions in young adults (18–30 years old) planning to have children (N = 13,942; 8,880 identified as women; 5,062 identified as men) across 37 countries that varied in parental-leave policies and societal gender equality. In all countries, women intended to take longer leave than men. National parental-leave policies and women’s political representation partially explained cross-national variations in the gender gap. Gender gaps in leave intentions were paradoxically larger in countries with more gender-egalitarian parental-leave policies (i.e., longer leave available to both fathers and mothers). Interestingly, this cross-national variation in the gender gap was driven by cross-national variations in women’s (rather than men’s) leave intentions. Financially generous leave and gender-egalitarian policies (linked to men’s higher uptake in prior research) were not associated with leave intentions in men. Rather, men’s leave intentions were related to their individual gender attitudes. Leave intentions were inversely related to career ambitions. The potential for existing policies to foster gender equality in paid and unpaid work is discussed

Social Dilemma as a Device for Recognition of a Shared Goal : Development of “Consensus Building of Wind Farm Game”

This study explores the processes required to achieve consensus on controversial issues that involve social dilemmas and developed the “Con-sensus Building of Wind Farm Game” (WinG). A social dilemma is a conflict between personal profit and public benefits wherein the results of individuals pursuing their own profit means that public benefits decline; thus, ultimately, individuals lose their profit. Shared recognition of a common goal is crucial in resolving social dilemmas; however, in actual practice, developing such a shared recognition is difficult due to conflicts among stakeholders. To help identify effective resolutions to this problem, we examined a case of planning for a wind farm, which often involves controversy, even though many people generally agree to the plan. WinG was developed to simulate the type of con-flicts among stakeholders when planning a wind farm. There are five types of players (stakeholders) in WinG and each has a different goal and is provided with different information. All the players are required to maximize their in-dividual goals within the time limit, however at the same time, from the view-point of public benefit, an optimal achievement point is hidden in the game that results in the second best outcome for all the players. Through negotia-tions, bargaining, and debate, the social dynamics of achieving (or failing to achieve) a consensus were observed in WinG. Analysis from 10 games showed that shared recognition of a common goal was related to consensus, while on-ly information sharing was not sufficient.ISAGA/JASAG2015 the 46th ISAGA conference Japan Association of Simulation & Gaming hosts 17–21 July 2015 Kyoto, Japa

The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods

Even Unreliable Information Disclosure Makes People Cooperate in a Social Dilemma : Development of the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game”

This study explores whether information disclosure can cause co-operation in a social dilemma, even when people can disseminate false infor-mation. In the past, illegal dumping increased in Japan despite the strengthen-ing of penalties and surveillance laws, due to practical limitations in monitoring and surveillance. To resolve this, the tracking sheet used to trace the trading and processing of the wastes must be traceable in order to detect illegal dumping. This means that manifests must be written precisely in order to be effective but if maintaining a tracking log has some function other than surveillance this may not be the case. To examine this issue we used the “In-dustrial Waste Illegal Dumping game” (Ohnuma & Kitakaji, 2007) which sim-ulates the disposal of industrial waste and is structured as a social dilemma with asymmetry of information. In this study we utilised two conditions: a dis-closure and a control condition. Under the disclosure condition, players had to enter the amount of commission or disposal in the landfill but did not have to fill in the correct amount. Although players could read the report, they could not know who performed illegal dumping or how much they contributed. Therefore, this disclosure did not have an effective surveillance function and could not help detect non-cooperation. However, the results showed that the amount of illegal dumping was reduced, and information on payoffs was shared more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. Moreo-ver, players collected and shared their information more in the disclosure con-dition than in the control condition. The study thus indicates that the function of disclosure is not surveillance, but information sharing which is essential for voluntary cooperation.ISAGA/JASAG2015 the 46th ISAGA conference | Japan Association of Simulation & Gaming hosts 17–21 July 2015 Kyoto, Japan　post proceedingsへの掲載予

The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor

The evolution of cooperation is an unsolved research topic and has been investigated from the viewpoint of not only biology and other natural sciences but also social sciences. Much extant research has focused on the evolution of cooperation among peers. While, different players belonging to different organizations play different social roles, and players playing different social roles cooperate together to achieve their goals. We focus on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor that is defined as follows: a player in the i-th role interacts with a player in the i + 1-th role, and a player in the n-th role achieves their goal (1 <= i < n) if there are n roles in the division of labor. We take the industrial waste treatment process as an example for illustration. We consider three organizational roles and B-i is the i-th role. The player of B; can choose two strategies: legal treatment or illegal dumping, which can be interpreted as cooperation or defection (i = 1-3). With legally required treatment, the player of B-j pays a cost to ask the player of Bj+1 to treat the waste (j = 1, 2). Then, the cooperator of Bj+1 pays a cost to treat the waste properly. With illegal dumping, the player of Bi dumps the waste and does not pay any cost (i= 1-3). However, the waste dumped by the defector has negative environmental consequences, which all players in all roles suffer from. This situation is equivalent to a social dilemma encountered in common-pool resource management contexts. The administrative organ in Japan introduces two sanction systems to address the illegal dumping problem: the actor responsibility system and the producer responsibility system. In the actor responsibility system, if players in any role who choose defection are monitored and discovered, they are penalized via a fine. However, it is difficult to monitor and detect the violators, and this system does not work well. While, in the producer responsibility system, the player in B-1 is fined if the player cannot hand the manifest to the local administrative organ because the players of B-i (i=1-3) who choose defection do not hand the manifest to the player of B-1. We analyze this situation using the replicator equation. We reveal that (1) the three-role model has more empirical credibility than the two-role model including B-1 and B-3, and (2) the producer responsibility system promotes the evolution of cooperation more than the system without sanctioning. (3) the actor responsibility system does not promote the evolution of cooperation if monitoring and detecting defectors is unsuccessful. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved