Thurstonian Scaling of Compositional Questionnaire Data

To prevent response biases, personality questionnaires may use comparative response formats. These include forced choice, where respondents choose among a number of items, and quantitative comparisons, where respondents indicate the extent to which items are preferred to each other. The present article extends Thurstonian modeling of binary choice data (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011a) to “proportion-of-total” (compositional) formats. Following Aitchison (1982), compositional item data are transformed into log-ratios, conceptualized as differences of latent item utilities. The mean and covariance structure of the log-ratios is modelled using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), where the item utilities are first-order factors, and personal attributes measured by a questionnaire are second-order factors. A simulation study with two sample sizes, N=300 and N=1000, shows that the method provides very good recovery of true parameters and near-nominal rejection rates. The approach is illustrated with empirical data from N=317 students, comparing model parameters obtained with compositional and Likert scale versions of a Big Five measure. The results show that the proposed model successfully captures the latent structures and person scores on the measured traits

Preference purification and the inner rational agent:A critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics

Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference-satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational-choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic

Subjective well‐being and valuation of future health states : discrepancies between anticipated and experienced life satisfaction

One way of informing health policy decisions is to ask people about the impact that different health states would have on their future subjective well‐being. The present research explored the relation between anticipated and experienced changes in health‐related subjective well‐being, and examined whether affective forecasting errors could be reduced by psychological distancing manipulations. Using survey methodology, we tested whether people can accurately estimate the impact of different possible health states on their subjective well‐being. We also manipulated psychological distance: Forecasts were made about present self, future self, or others. Based on construal level theory and past work on affective forecasting errors, our prediction was that increasing psychological distance may reduce the mismatch between anticipated and experienced impact of health states on subjective well‐being. We found that the impact of ill health on subjective well‐being was greatly overpredicted and that this overprediction was not eliminated when participants were asked to make predictions about themselves in the future or about other people. Consistent with past work, we found that our participants correctly expected that their subjective well‐being would deteriorate more if they experienced the highest levels of mental illness as compared to the highest intensities of pain or most severe limitations to physical functioning

Near-wins and near-losses in gambling: a behavioral and facial EMG study.

This is thefinal published version. It originally appeared at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/psyp.12336/abstract.This study investigated responses to near-wins (i.e., nonwin outcomes that were close to a major win, and their counterpart, near-losses (nonwin outcomes that are proximal to a major loss) in a decision-making task, measuring (a) luck ratings, (b) adjustment of bet amount, and (c) facial muscle reactivity at zygomaticus and corrugator sites. Compared to full-misses, near-wins decreased self-perceived luck and near-losses increased self-perceived luck, consistent with the effects of upward versus downward counterfactual thinking, respectively. Wins and losses both increased zygomaticus reactivity, and losses selectively enhanced corrugator reactivity. Near-wins heightened zygomaticus activity, but did not affect corrugator activity, thus showing a similar response pattern to actual wins. There were no significant facial EMG effects of near-losses. We infer that near-wins engender some appetitive processing, despite their objective nonwin status.This work was completed within University of Cambridge Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute (director: TW Robbins), supported by a consortium award from the Medical Research Council (MRC) and Wellcome Trust. Y.W. was supported by a Chinese Scholarship Council – Cambridge International Scholarship and the Treherne Studentship in Biological Sciences from Downing College, Cambridge. The Centre for Gambling Research at UBC is supported by an award from the British Columbia Lottery Corporation and the British Columbia Government

Analytical reasoning task reveals limits of social learning in networks

Social learning -by observing and copying others- is a highly successful cultural mechanism for adaptation, outperforming individual information acquisition and experience. Here, we investigate social learning in the context of the uniquely human capacity for reflective, analytical reasoning. A hallmark of the human mind is our ability to engage analytical reasoning, and suppress false associative intuitions. Through a set of lab-based network experiments, we find that social learning fails to propagate this cognitive strategy. When people make false intuitive conclusions, and are exposed to the analytic output of their peers, they recognize and adopt this correct output. But they fail to engage analytical reasoning in similar subsequent tasks. Thus, humans exhibit an 'unreflective copying bias,' which limits their social learning to the output, rather than the process, of their peers' reasoning -even when doing so requires minimal effort and no technical skill. In contrast to much recent work on observation-based social learning, which emphasizes the propagation of successful behavior through copying, our findings identify a limit on the power of social networks in situations that require analytical reasoning

Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility

Two core meanings of “utility” are distinguished. “Decision utility” is the weight of an outcome in a decision. “Experienced utility” is hedonic quality, as in Bentham’s usage. Experienced utility can be reported in real time (instant utility), or in retrospective evaluations of past episodes (remembered utility). Psychological research has documented systematic errors in retrospective evaluations, which can induce a preference for dominated options. We propose a formal normative theory of the total experienced utility of temporally extended outcomes. Measuring the experienced utility of outcomes permits tests of utility maximization and opens other lines of empirical research

The use of happiness research for public policy

Research on happiness tends to follow a "benevolent dictator" approach where politicians pursue people's happiness. This paper takes an antithetic approach based on the insights of public choice theory. First, we inquire how the results of happiness research may be used to improve the choice of institutions. Second, we show that the policy approach matters for the choice of research questions and the kind of knowledge happiness research aims to provide. Third, we emphasize that there is no shortcut to an optimal policy maximizing some happiness indicator or social welfare function since governments have an incentive to manipulate this indicator

Game On? Smoking Cessation Through the Gamification of mHealth: A Longitudinal Qualitative Study

BACKGROUND: Finding ways to increase and sustain engagement with mHealth interventions has become a challenge during application development. While gamification shows promise and has proven effective in many fields, critical questions remain concerning how to use gamification to modify health behavior. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study is to investigate how the gamification of mHealth interventions leads to a change in health behavior, specifically with respect to smoking cessation. METHODS: We conducted a qualitative longitudinal study using a sample of 16 smokers divided into 2 cohorts (one used a gamified intervention and the other used a nongamified intervention). Each participant underwent 4 semistructured interviews over a period of 5 weeks. Semistructured interviews were also conducted with 4 experts in gamification, mHealth, and smoking cessation. Interviews were transcribed verbatim and thematic analysis undertaken. RESULTS: Results indicated perceived behavioral control and intrinsic motivation acted as positive drivers to game engagement and consequently positive health behavior. Importantly, external social influences exerted a negative effect. We identified 3 critical factors, whose presence was necessary for game engagement: purpose (explicit purpose known by the user), user alignment (congruency of game and user objectives), and functional utility (a well-designed game). We summarize these findings in a framework to guide the future development of gamified mHealth interventions. CONCLUSIONS: Gamification holds the potential for a low-cost, highly effective mHealth solution that may replace or supplement the behavioral support component found in current smoking cessation programs. The framework reported here has been built on evidence specific to smoking cessation, however it can be adapted to health interventions in other disease categories. Future research is required to evaluate the generalizability and effectiveness of the framework, directly against current behavioral support therapy interventions in smoking cessation and beyond

Modality-specific attention in foraging bumblebees

V.N. was funded by a Marie Curie Incoming International Fellowship. L.C. was funded by a Royal Society Wolfson Research Merit Award and an ERC Advanced Grant

Blaming Bill Gates AGAIN! Misuse, overuse and misunderstanding of performance data in sport

Recently in Sport, Education and Society, Williams and Manley (2014) argued against the heavy reliance on technology in professional Rugby Union and elite sport in general. In summary, technology is presented as an elitist, ‘gold standard’ villain that management and coaches use to exert control and by which players lose autonomy, identity, motivation, social interactions and expertise. In this article we suggest that the sociological interpretations and implications offered by Williams and Manley may be somewhat limited when viewed in isolation. In doing so, we identify some core methodological issues in Williams and Manley’s study and critically consider important arguments for utilising technology; notably, to inform coach decision making and generate player empowerment. Secondly, we present a different, yet perhaps equally concerning, practice-oriented interpretation of the same results but from alternative coaching and expertise literature. Accordingly, we suggest that Williams and Manley have perhaps raised their alarm prematurely, inappropriately and on somewhat shaky foundations. We also hope to stimulate others to consider contrary positions, or at least to think about this topic in greater detail. More specifically, we encourage coaches and academics to think carefully about what technology is employed, how and why, and then the means by which these decisions are discussed with and, preferably, sold to players. Certainly, technology can significantly enhance coach decision making and practice, while also helping players to optimise their focus, empowerment and independence in knowing how to achieve their personal and collective goals