The Potential Trajectory of Carbapenem-Resistant Enterobacteriaceae, an Emerging Threat to Health-Care Facilities, and the Impact of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Toolkit.

Carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), a group of pathogens resistant to most antibiotics and associated with high mortality, are a rising emerging public health threat. Current approaches to infection control and prevention have not been adequate to prevent spread. An important but unproven approach is to have hospitals in a region coordinate surveillance and infection control measures. Using our Regional Healthcare Ecosystem Analyst (RHEA) simulation model and detailed Orange County, California, patient-level data on adult inpatient hospital and nursing home admissions (2011-2012), we simulated the spread of CRE throughout Orange County health-care facilities under 3 scenarios: no specific control measures, facility-level infection control efforts (uncoordinated control measures), and a coordinated regional effort. Aggressive uncoordinated and coordinated approaches were highly similar, averting 2,976 and 2,789 CRE transmission events, respectively (72.2% and 77.0% of transmission events), by year 5. With moderate control measures, coordinated regional control resulted in 21.3% more averted cases (n = 408) than did uncoordinated control at year 5. Our model suggests that without increased infection control approaches, CRE would become endemic in nearly all Orange County health-care facilities within 10 years. While implementing the interventions in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's CRE toolkit would not completely stop the spread of CRE, it would cut its spread substantially, by half

SARS Clinical Features, United States, 2003

We compared the clinical features of 8 U.S. case-patients with laboratory-confirmed severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) to 65 controls who tested negative for SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) infection. Shortness of breath, vomiting, diarrhea, progressive bilateral infiltrates on chest radiograph, and need for supplemental oxygen were significantly associated with confirmed SARS-CoV infection

Effect of daily chlorhexidine bathing on hospital-acquired infection

BACKGROUND Results of previous single-center, observational studies suggest that daily bathing of patients with chlorhexidine may prevent hospital-acquired bloodstream infections and the acquisition of multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). METHODS We conducted a multicenter, cluster-randomized, nonblinded crossover trial to evaluate the effect of daily bathing with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths on the acquisition of MDROs and the incidence of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections. Nine intensive care and bone marrow transplantation units in six hospitals were randomly assigned to bathe patients either with no-rinse 2% chlorhexidine– impregnated washcloths or with nonantimicrobial washcloths for a 6-month period, exchanged for the alternate product during the subsequent 6 months. The incidence rates of acquisition of MDROs and the rates of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections were compared between the two periods by means of Poisson regression analysis. RESULTS A total of 7727 patients were enrolled during the study. The overall rate of MDRO acquisition was 5.10 cases per 1000 patient-days with chlorhexidine bathing versus 6.60 cases per 1000 patient-days with nonantimicrobial washcloths (P=0.03), the equivalent of a 23% lower rate with chlorhexidine bathing. The overall rate of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections was 4.78 cases per 1000 patient-days with chlorhexidine bathing versus 6.60 cases per 1000 patient-days with nonantimicrobial washcloths (P=0.007), a 28% lower rate with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths. No serious skin reactions were noted during either study period. CONCLUSIONS Daily bathing with chlorhexidine-impregnated washcloths significantly reduced the risks of acquisition of MDROs and development of hospital-acquired bloodstream infections. (Funded by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Sage Products; ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT00502476.

Lethal Factor Toxemia and Anti-Protective Antigen Antibody Activity in Naturally Acquired Cutaneous Anthrax

Cutaneous anthrax outbreaks occurred in Bangladesh from August to October 2009. As part of the epidemiological response and to confirm anthrax diagnoses, serum samples were collected from suspected case patients with observed cutaneous lesions. Anthrax lethal factor (LF), anti-protective antigen (anti-PA) immunoglobulin G (IgG), and anthrax lethal toxin neutralization activity (TNA) levels were determined in acute and convalescent serum of 26 case patients with suspected cutaneous anthrax from the first and largest of these outbreaks. LF (0.005–1.264 ng/mL) was detected in acute serum from 18 of 26 individuals. Anti-PA IgG and TNA were detected in sera from the same 18 individuals and ranged from 10.0 to 679.5 μg/mL and 27 to 593 units, respectively. Seroconversion to serum anti-PA and TNA was found only in case patients with measurable toxemia. This is the first report of quantitative analysis of serum LF in cutaneous anthrax and the first to associate acute stage toxemia with subsequent antitoxin antibody responses

Two-Component Direct Fluorescent-Antibody Assay for Rapid Identification of Bacillus anthracis

A two-component direct fluorescent-antibody (DFA) assay, using fluorescein-labeled monoclonal antibodies specific to the Bacillus anthracis cell wall (CW-DFA) and capsule (CAP-DFA) antigens, was evaluated and validated for rapid identification of B. anthracis. We analyzed 230 B. anthracis isolates; 228 and 229 were positive by CW-DFA and CAP-DFA assays, respectively. We also tested 56 non–B. anthracis strains; 10 B. cereus and 2 B. thuringiensis were positive by the CW-DFA assay, and 1 B. megaterium strain was positive by CAP-DFA. Analysis of the combined DFA results identified 227 of 230 B. anthracis isolates; all 56 strains of the other Bacillus spp. were negative. Both DFA assays tested positive on 14 of 26 clinical specimens from the 2001 anthrax outbreak investigation. The two-component DFA assay is a sensitive, specific, and rapid confirmatory test for B. anthracis in cultures and may be useful directly on clinical specimens

Bioterrorism-related Inhalational Anthrax in an Elderly Woman, Connecticut, 2001

On November 20, 2001, inhalational anthrax was confirmed in an elderly woman from rural Connecticut. To determine her exposure source, we conducted an extensive epidemiologic, environmental, and laboratory investigation. Molecular subtyping showed that her isolate was indistinguishable from isolates associated with intentionally contaminated letters. No samples from her home or community yielded Bacillus anthracis, and she received no first-class letters from facilities known to have processed intentionally contaminated letters. Environmental sampling in the regional Connecticut postal facility yielded B. anthracis spores from 4 (31%) of 13 sorting machines. One extensively contaminated machine primarily processes bulk mail. A second machine that does final sorting of bulk mail for her zip code yielded B. anthracis on the column of bins for her carrier route. The evidence suggests she was exposed through a cross-contaminated bulk mail letter. Such cross-contamination of letters and postal facilities has implications for managing the response to future B. anthracis–contaminated mailings

LSST: from Science Drivers to Reference Design and Anticipated Data Products

(Abridged) We describe here the most ambitious survey currently planned in the optical, the Large Synoptic Survey Telescope (LSST). A vast array of science will be enabled by a single wide-deep-fast sky survey, and LSST will have unique survey capability in the faint time domain. The LSST design is driven by four main science themes: probing dark energy and dark matter, taking an inventory of the Solar System, exploring the transient optical sky, and mapping the Milky Way. LSST will be a wide-field ground-based system sited at Cerro Pach\'{o}n in northern Chile. The telescope will have an 8.4 m (6.5 m effective) primary mirror, a 9.6 deg$^2$ field of view, and a 3.2 Gigapixel camera. The standard observing sequence will consist of pairs of 15-second exposures in a given field, with two such visits in each pointing in a given night. With these repeats, the LSST system is capable of imaging about 10,000 square degrees of sky in a single filter in three nights. The typical 5$\sigma$ point-source depth in a single visit in $r$ will be $\sim 24.5$ (AB). The project is in the construction phase and will begin regular survey operations by 2022. The survey area will be contained within 30,000 deg$^2$ with $\delta<+34.5^\circ$, and will be imaged multiple times in six bands, $ugrizy$, covering the wavelength range 320--1050 nm. About 90\% of the observing time will be devoted to a deep-wide-fast survey mode which will uniformly observe a 18,000 deg$^2$ region about 800 times (summed over all six bands) during the anticipated 10 years of operations, and yield a coadded map to $r\sim27.5$. The remaining 10\% of the observing time will be allocated to projects such as a Very Deep and Fast time domain survey. The goal is to make LSST data products, including a relational database of about 32 trillion observations of 40 billion objects, available to the public and scientists around the world.Comment: 57 pages, 32 color figures, version with high-resolution figures available from https://www.lsst.org/overvie

Bioterrorism-Related Anthrax Surveillance, Connecticut, September–December, 2001

On November 19, 2001, a case of inhalational anthrax was identified in a 94-year-old Connecticut woman, who later died. We conducted intensive surveillance for additional anthrax cases, which included collecting data from hospitals, emergency departments, private practitioners, death certificates, postal facilities, veterinarians, and the state medical examiner. No additional cases of anthrax were identified. The absence of additional anthrax cases argued against an intentional environmental release of Bacillus anthracis in Connecticut and suggested that, if the source of anthrax had been cross-contaminated mail, the risk for anthrax in this setting was very low. This surveillance system provides a model that can be adapted for use in similar emergency settings