Whatever happened to meaning? Commentary on Millikan: A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds

Even in infancy, concept formation has to do with creating meaning, not with tracking substances. Preverbal infants can identify a substance such as a dog, but their first concept of this substance is not dog but animal. It is difficult to account for such global concepts by the perceptual processes involved in object identification, yet these concepts are the foundation on which later concepts are built

Tensors and compositionality in neural systems

Neither neurobiological nor process models of meaning composition specify the operator through which constituent parts are bound together into compositional structures. In this paper, we argue that a neurophysiological computation system cannot achieve the compositionality exhibited in human thought and language if it were to rely on a multiplicative operator to perform binding, as the tensor product (TP)-based systems that have been widely adopted in cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence do. We show via simulation and two behavioural experiments that TPs violate variable-value independence, but human behaviour does not. Specifically, TPs fail to capture that in the statements fuzzy cactus and fuzzy penguin, both cactus and penguin are predicated by fuzzy(x) and belong to the set of fuzzy things, rendering these arguments similar to each other. Consistent with that thesis, people judged arguments that shared the same role to be similar, even when those arguments themselves (e.g., cacti and penguins) were judged to be dissimilar when in isolation. By contrast, the similarity of the TPs representing fuzzy(cactus) and fuzzy(penguin) was determined by the similarity of the arguments, which in this case approaches zero. Based on these results, we argue that neural systems that use TPs for binding cannot approximate how the human mind and brain represent compositional information during processing. We describe a contrasting binding mechanism that any physiological or artificial neural system could use to maintain independence between a role and its argument, a prerequisite for compositionality and, thus, for instantiating the expressive power of human thought and language in a neural system

Child categorization

Categorization is a process that spans all of development, beginning in earliest infancy yet changing as children's knowledge and cognitive skills develop. In this review article, we address three core issues regarding childhood categorization. First, we discuss the extent to which early categories are rooted in perceptual similarity versus knowledge-enriched theories. We argue for a composite perspective in which categories are steeped in commonsense theories from a young age but also are informed by low-level similarity and associative learning cues. Second, we examine the role of language in early categorization. We review evidence to suggest that language is a powerful means of expressing, communicating, shaping, and supporting category knowledge. Finally, we consider categories in context. We discuss sources of variability and flexibility in children's categories, as well as the ways in which children's categories are used within larger knowledge systems (e.g., to form analogies, make inferences, or construct theories). Categorization is a process that is intrinsically tied to nearly all aspects of cognition, and its study provides insight into cognitive development, broadly construed. WIREs Cogn Sci 2011 2 95–105 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.96 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs websitePeer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78491/1/96_ftp.pd

The effect of feature saliency on haptic subitizing

‘Subitizing’ refers to fast and error-free numerosity judgment for small (<4) sets of items. For larger sets, the slower process of ‘counting’ is used. Counting has a serial character, whereas subitizing is believed to have a parallel character. While subitizing was initially found in vision, it has been shown to exist in touch as well. In vision, it has been demonstrated that adding distractor items to a set of target items influences numerosity judgment of the target items. Subitizing was in this case only possible if the distractor item is highly salient among the targets. In the present study, we investigated the effect of adding a distractor item on haptic judgement of a set of target items. To this end, we asked subjects to judge the number of spheres grasped in their hand. Either a cube or an ellipsoid could be added to the set. A cube among spheres has been shown to be highly salient, while an ellipsoid among spheres is not. Our results show that adding a distractor item led to an increase in the response time slopes regardless of the distractor shape. Subitizing was, however, only possible in the case of a salient distractor. This is in agreement with results from vision

Episodic Source Memory over Distribution by Quantum-Like Dynamics – A Model Exploration

In source memory studies, a decision-maker is concerned with identifying the context in which a given episodic experience occurred. A common paradigm for studying source memory is the ‘three-list’ experimental paradigm, where a subject studies three lists of words and is later asked whether a given word appeared on one or more of the studied lists. Surprisingly, the sum total of the acceptance probabilities generated by asking for the source of a word separately for each list (‘list 1?’, ‘list 2?’, ‘list 3?’) exceeds the acceptance probability generated by asking whether that word occurred on the union of the lists (‘list 1 or 2 or 3?’). The episodic memory for a given word therefore appears over distributed on the disjoint contexts of the lists. A quantum episodic memory model [QEM] was proposed by Brainerd, Wang and Reyna [8] to explain this type of result. In this paper, we apply a Hamiltonian dynamical extension of QEM for over distribution of source memory. The Hamiltonian operators are simultaneously driven by parameters for re-allocation of gist-based and verbatim-based acceptance support as subjects are exposed to the cue word in the first temporal stage, and are attenuated for description-dependence by the querying probe in the second temporal stage. Overall, the model predicts well the choice proportions in both separate list and union list queries and the over distribution effect, suggesting that a Hamiltonian dynamics for QEM can provide a good account of the acceptance processes involved in episodic memory tasks

Conceptual and Visual Features Contribute to Visual Memory for Natural Images

We examined the role of conceptual and visual similarity in a memory task for natural images. The important novelty of our approach was that visual similarity was determined using an algorithm [1] instead of being judged subjectively. This similarity index takes colours and spatial frequencies into account. For each target, four distractors were selected that were (1) conceptually and visually similar, (2) only conceptually similar, (3) only visually similar, or (4) neither conceptually nor visually similar to the target image. Participants viewed 219 images with the instruction to memorize them. Memory for a subset of these images was tested subsequently. In Experiment 1, participants performed a two-alternative forced choice recognition task and in Experiment 2, a yes/no-recognition task. In Experiment 3, testing occurred after a delay of one week. We analyzed the distribution of errors depending on distractor type. Performance was lowest when the distractor image was conceptually and visually similar to the target image, indicating that both factors matter in such a memory task. After delayed testing, these differences disappeared. Overall performance was high, indicating a large-capacity, detailed visual long-term memory

How Emotion Strengthens the Recollective Experience: A Time-Dependent Hippocampal Process

Emotion significantly strengthens the subjective recollective experience even when objective accuracy of the memory is not improved. Here, we examine if this modulation is related to the effect of emotion on hippocampal-dependent memory consolidation. Two critical predictions follow from this hypothesis. First, since consolidation is assumed to take time, the enhancement in the recollective experience for emotional compared to neutral memories should become more apparent following a delay. Second, if the emotion advantage is critically dependent on the hippocampus, then the effects should be reduced in amnesic patients with hippocampal damage. To test these predictions we examined the recollective experience for emotional and neutral photos at two retention intervals (Experiment 1), and in amnesics and controls (Experiment 2). Emotional memories were associated with an enhancement in the recollective experience that was greatest after a delay, whereas familiarity was not influenced by emotion. In amnesics with hippocampal damage the emotion effect on recollective experience was reduced. Surprisingly, however, these patients still showed a general memory advantage for emotional compared to neutral items, but this effect was manifest primarily as a facilitation of familiarity. The results support the consolidation hypothesis of recollective experience, but suggest that the effects of emotion on episodic memory are not exclusively hippocampally mediated. Rather, emotion may enhance recognition by facilitating familiarity when recollection is impaired due to hippocampal damage

Berberine Attenuates Experimental Autoimmune Encephalomyelitis in C57 BL/6 Mice

Berberine, an isoquinoline derivative alkaloid, has a wide range of pharmacological properties and is considered to have anti-inflammatory and neuroprotective effects. However, there are no reports about the effects and mechanisms of berberine in experimental autoimmune encephalomyelitis (EAE), an established model of multiple sclerosis (MS).Female C57 BL/6 mice immunized with myelin oligodendrocyte glycoprotein 35–55 amino acid peptide were treated with berberine at the day of disease onset and medication was administered daily until mice were sacrificed. Blood–brain barrier (BBB) permeability and the alteration of matrix metalloproteinase-2 (MMP-2, 72 kDa) and matrix metalloproteinase-9 (MMP-9, 92 kDa) in the brain and cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) of EAE mice were detected by quantitative measurement for Evan's blue (EB) content, Western blot and gelatin zymography respectively. The results showed that berberine attenuated clinical and pathological parameters of EAE, reduced the permeability of BBB, inhibited the activity and expression of MMP-9 but not MMP-2 in the CSF and brain of EAE mice.These findings suggest that berberine is effective to attenuate the clinical severity of EAE in C57 BL/6 mice by reducing the permeability of BBB, decreasing the expression and activity of MMP-9, and decreasing the inflammatory infiltration. We think that berberine might be a potential therapeutic agent for MS

Team reasoning and the rational choice of payoff-dominant outcomes in games

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality

Memory development: implications for adults recalling childhood experiences in the courtroom

Adults frequently provide compelling, detailed accounts of early childhood experiences in the courtroom. Judges and jurors are asked to decide guilt or innocence based solely on these decades-old memories using 'common sense' notions about memory. However, these notions are not in agreement with findings from neuroscientific and behavioural studies of memory development. Without expert guidance, judges and jurors may have difficulty in properly adjudicating the weight of memory evidence in cases involving adult recollections of childhood experiences