155 research outputs found
The Problem of Analogical Inference in Inductive Logic
We consider one problem that was largely left open by Rudolf Carnap in his
work on inductive logic, the problem of analogical inference. After discussing
some previous attempts to solve this problem, we propose a new solution that is
based on the ideas of Bruno de Finetti on probabilistic symmetries. We explain
how our new inductive logic can be developed within the Carnapian paradigm of
inductive logic-deriving an inductive rule from a set of simple postulates
about the observational process-and discuss some of its properties.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2015, arXiv:1606.0729
Quantum Randomness and Underdetermination
We consider the nature of quantum randomness and how one might have empirical evidence for it. We will see why, depending on one's computational resources, it may be impossible to determine whether a particular notion of randomness properly characterizes one's empirical data. Indeed, we will see why even an ideal observer under ideal epistemic conditions may never have any empirical evidence whatsoever for believing that the results of one's quantum-mechanical experiments are randomly determined. This illustrates a radical sort of empirical underdetermination faced by fundamentally stochastic theories like quantum mechanics
Signals without teleology
"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication
Signals without teleology
"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication
Invariance and Symmetry in Evolutionary Dynamics
The concept of fitness is central to evolutionary biology. Models of evolutionary change typically use some quantity called âfitnessâ which measures an organismâs reproductive success. But what exactly does it mean that fitness is such a measure? In what follows, we look at the interplay between abstract evolutionary models and quantitative measures of fitness and develop a measurement-theoretic perspective on fitness in order to explore what makes certain measures of fitness significant
Indirect reciprocity and the evolution of âmoral signalsâ
Signals regarding the behavior of others are an essential element of human moral systems and there are important evolutionary connections between language and large-scale cooperation. In particular, social communication may be required for the reputation tracking needed to stabilize indirect reciprocity. Additionally, scholars have suggested that the benefits of indirect reciprocity may have been important for the evolution of language and that social signals may have coevolved with large-scale cooperation. This paper investigates the possibility of such a coevolution. Using the tools of evolutionary game theory, we present a model that incorporates primitive âmoral signalingâ into a simple setting of indirect reciprocity. This model reveals some potential difficulties for the evolution of âmoral signals.â We find that it is possible for âmoral signalsâ to evolve alongside indirect reciprocity, but without some external pressure aiding the evolution of a signaling system, such a coevolution is unlikely
Strictly Dominated Strategies in the Replicator-Mutator Dynamics
The replicator-mutator dynamics is a set of differential equations frequently used in biological and socioeconomic contexts to model evolutionary processes subject to mutation, error or experimentation. The replicator-mutator dynamics generalizes the widely used replicator dynamics, which appears in this framework as the extreme case where replication is perfectly precise. This paper studies the influence of strictly dominated strategies on the location of the rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics, at the limit where the mutation terms become arbitrarily small. It can be proved that such limit rest points for small mutation are Nash equilibria, so strictly dominated strategies do not occur at limit stationary points. However, we show through a simple case how strictly dominated strategies can have an influence on the location of the limit rest points for small mutation. Consequently, the characterization of the limit rest points of the replicator-mutator dynamics cannot in general proceed safely by readily eliminating strictly dominated strategiesJCyL (GREX251-2009 and VA006B09), Ministry of Science and Innovation (TIN2008-06464-C03-02, DPI2010-16920 and CSD2010-00034), Ministry of Education (grant JC2009-00263
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