1,434 research outputs found

    Aging, self-referencing, and medial prefrontal cortex

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    The lateral prefrontal cortex undergoes both structural and functional changes with healthy aging. In contrast, there is little structural change in the medial prefrontal cortex, but relatively little is known about the functional changes to this region with age. Using an event-related fMRI design, we investigated the response of medial prefrontal cortex during self-referencing in order to compare age groups on a task that young and elderly perform similarly and that is known to actively engage the region in young adults. Nineteen young (M age 23) and seventeen elderly (M age 72) judged whether adjectives described themselves, another person, or were presented in upper case. We assessed the overlap in activations between young and elderly for the self-reference effect (self vs. other person), and found that both groups engage medial prefrontal cortex and mid-cingulate during self-referencing. The only cerebral differences between the groups in self versus other personality assessment were found in somatosensory and motorrelated areas. In contrast, age-related modulations were found in the cerebral network recruited for emotional valence processing. Elderly (but not young) showed increased activity in the dorsal prefrontal cortex for positive relative to negative items, which could reflect an increase in controlled processing of positive information for elderly adults. Aging is associated with declines in cognitive performance in a number of domains. Recent neuroimaging data suggest that changes to the prefrontal cortex may contribute to impaired memory and cognition with age. Structurally, the prefrontal cortex shows pronounced shrinkage with age (Raz, 2000). Functionally, the engagement of frontal mnemonic processes appears to differ in young and elderly adults: Older adults show reduced activation of left inferior fronta

    Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking

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    Recent evidence suggests that our capacities to remember the past and to imagine what might happen in the future largely depend on the same core brain network that includes the middle temporal lobe, the posterior cingulate/retrosplenial cortex, the inferior parietal lobe, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the lateral temporal cortex. However, the extent to which regions of this core brain network are also responsible for our capacity to think about what could have happened in our past, yet did not occur (i.e., episodic counterfactual thinking), is still unknown. The present study examined this issue. Using a variation of the experimental recombination paradigm (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009. Neuropsychologia. 47: 2222–2238), participants were asked both to remember personal past events and to envision alternative outcomes to such events while undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging. Three sets of analyses were performed on the imaging data in order to investigate two related issues. First, a mean-centered spatiotemporal partial least square (PLS) analysis identified a pattern of brain activity across regions of the core network that was common to episodic memory and episodic counterfactual thinking. Second, a non-rotated PLS analysis identified two different patterns of brain activity for likely and unlikely episodic counterfactual thoughts, with the former showing significant overlap with the set of regions engaged during episodic recollection. Finally, a parametric modulation was conducted to explore the differential engagement of brain regions during counterfactual thinking, revealing that areas such as the parahippocampal gyrus and the right hippocampus were modulated by the subjective likelihood of counterfactual simulations. These results suggest that episodic counterfactual thinking engages regions that form the core brain network, and also that the subjective likelihood of our counterfactual thoughts modulates the engagement of different areas within this set of regions.Psycholog

    Deese-roediger-McDermott paradigm: Effect of previous recall and type of memory task

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    Pretendeu-se averiguar se a activação dos itens críticos no paradigma de Deese-Roediger-McDermott também ocorreria numa tarefa de completamento. Para analisar a contaminação explícita explorámos a existência de resultados dissociados em função da manipulação do nível de processamento. Na tarefa de completamento, a primação semântica foi estatisticamente superior à primação directa. A ausência do efeito do nível de processamento demonstra que o teste foi de memória implícita. Também avaliámos o impacto de uma tarefa de evocação numa tarefa de memória posterior. Verificámos que a evocação prévia anulou o efeito do nível de processamento na tarefa de reconhecimento. Na tarefa de completamento de inícios de palavras, o incremento de inícios de palavras completados com associados só foi expressivo quando as palavras foram codificadas superficialmente.This study aimed to verifj whether lhe activation ofcritical items in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm ofproducing false memories could also occur in the word stem completion task. The finding that lhe levei ofprocessing did not seem to have any effect on the word stem completion task supported lhe conclusion that the stem completion task was in fact an irnplicit memory test. The impact of a previous recali in a followng memory task was also evaluated. The results indicated that lhe previous recall inhibited the effect ofthe processing levei in lhe recognition task. In the word stem completion task lhe increase ofstems completed with associates was only relevam when words were encoded superficialiy.(undefined

    A Self-Reference False Memory Effect in the DRM Paradigm: Evidence from Eastern and Western Samples

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    It is well established that processing information in relation to oneself (i.e., selfreferencing) leads to better memory for that information than processing that same information in relation to others (i.e., other-referencing). However, it is unknown whether self-referencing also leads to more false memories than other-referencing. In the current two experiments with European and East Asian samples, we presented participants the Deese-Roediger/McDermott (DRM) lists together with their own name or other people’s name (i.e., “Trump” in Experiment 1 and “Li Ming” in Experiment 2). We found consistent results across the two experiments; that is, in the self-reference condition, participants had higher true and false memory rates compared to those in the other-reference condition. Moreover, we found that selfreferencing did not exhibit superior mnemonic advantage in terms of net accuracy compared to other-referencing and neutral conditions. These findings are discussed in terms of theoretical frameworks such as spreading activation theories and the fuzzytrace theory. We propose that our results reflect the adaptive nature of memory in the sense that cognitive processes that increase mnemonic efficiency may also increase susceptibility to associative false memories

    Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: A dual process account

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    © 2019 Springer Nature.This is the final published version of an article published in Psychological Research, licensed under a Creative Commons Attri-bution 4.0 International License. Available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-019-01262-7.In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two ‘routes’ whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the ‘routes’ being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows ‘fully-fledged’ episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are ‘pre-made’ (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a re-iteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.Peer reviewe

    Drawing to Remember: External Support of Older Adults’ Eyewitness Performance

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    Although healthy aging is accompanied by a general decline in memory functioning, environmental support at retrieval can improve older adults’ (+65 years) episodic remembering. Despite those over the age of 65years representing a growing proportion of the population, few environmental retrieval support methods have been empirically evaluated for use with older witnesses and victims of crime. Here, the efficacy of a novel retrieval technique, the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context, is compared with a standard Mental Reinstatement of Context and a no support control (Control). Fifty-one participants witnessed an unexpected live event, and 48 hours later were interviewed using one of three aforementioned techniques. In line with predictions emanating from cognitive theories of aging and the environmental support hypothesis, participants in the Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context condition recalled significantly more correct information and fewer inaccurate items. The Sketch Mental Reinstatement of Context technique appears to scaffold memory retrieval in an age-appropriate manner during a post-event interview, possibly by encouraging more effortful retrieval and reducing dual-task load. As such, this procedure offers an effective alternative to current approaches, adding to the toolbox of techniques available to forensic and other interviewers

    Priming Analogical Reasoning with False Memories

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    Like true memories, false memories are capable of priming answers to insight-based problems. Recent research has attempted to extend this paradigm to more advanced problem-solving tasks, including those involving verbal analogical reasoning. However, these experiments are constrained inasmuch as problem solutions could be generated via spreading activation mechanisms (much like false memories themselves) rather than using complex reasoning processes. In three experiments we examined false memory priming of complex analogical reasoning tasks in the absence of simple semantic associations. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated the robustness of false memory priming in analogical reasoning when backward associative strength among the problem terms was eliminated. In Experiments 2a and 2b, we extended these findings by demonstrating priming on newly created homonym analogies that can only be solved by inhibiting semantic associations within the analogy. Overall, the findings of the present experiments provide evidence that the efficacy of false memory priming extends to complex analogical reasoning problems

    Re-imagining the future:repetition decreases hippocampal involvement in future simulation

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    Imagining or simulating future events has been shown to activate the anterior right hippocampus (RHC) more than remembering past events does. One fundamental difference between simulation and memory is that imagining future scenarios requires a more extensive constructive process than remembering past experiences does. Indeed, studies in which this constructive element is reduced or eliminated by “pre-imagining” events in a prior session do not report differential RHC activity during simulation. In this fMRI study, we examined the effects of repeatedly simulating an event on neural activity. During scanning, participants imagined 60 future events; each event was simulated three times. Activation in the RHC showed a significant linear decrease across repetitions, as did other neural regions typically associated with simulation. Importantly, such decreases in activation could not be explained by non-specific linear time-dependent effects, with no reductions in activity evident for the control task across similar time intervals. Moreover, the anterior RHC exhibited significant functional connectivity with the whole-brain network during the first, but not second and third simulations of future events. There was also evidence of a linear increase in activity across repetitions in right ventral precuneus, right posterior cingulate and left anterior prefrontal cortex, which may reflect source recognition and retrieval of internally generated contextual details. Overall, our findings demonstrate that repeatedly imagining future events has a decremental effect on activation of the hippocampus and many other regions engaged by the initial construction of the simulation, possibly reflecting the decreasing novelty of simulations across repetitions, and therefore is an important consideration in the design of future studies examining simulation
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