Pure bargaining problems with a coalition structure

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s41412-016-0007-2We consider here pure bargaining problems endowed with a coalition structure such that each union is given its own utility. In this context we use the Shapley rule in order to assess the main options available to the agents: individual behavior, cooperative behavior, isolated unions behavior, and bargaining unions behavior. The latter two respectively recall the treatment given by Aumann–Drèze and Owen to cooperative games with a coalition structure. A numerical example illustrates the procedure. We provide criteria to compare any pair of behaviors for each agent, introduce and axiomatically characterize a modified Shapley rule, and determine its natural domain, that is, the set of problems where the bargaining unions behavior is the best option for all agents.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices

We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Drèze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.''Cooperative Game Theory, Technology Transfers, Modified Shapley Value

The impact of intermediaries on a negotiation: an approach from game theory

Standard approaches to model interaction networks are limited in their capacity to describe the nuances of real communication. We present a game theoretical framework to quantify the effect of intermediaries on the interaction between agents. Inspired by the seminal work Myerson (1977). on cooperative structures in cooperative games, we set the basis for multidimensional network analysis within game theory. More specifically, an extension of the point-arc game Feltkamp and van den Nouwe51 land (1992). is introduced, generalizing the analysis of cooperative games to multigraphs. An efficient algorithm is proposed for the computation of Shapley value of this game. We prove the validity of our approach by applying it to a intermediaries network model. We are able to recover meaningful results on the dependence of the game outcome on the intermediaries network. This work contributes to the optimal design of networks in economic environments and allows the ranking of players in complex network

Simple “Market Value” Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems

Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. They claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted voter’s bribeworthiness or market value. Here, after reviewing the basic elements of their model, we provide a characterization result for this model and show its links to other bargaining model approaches in the literature. Then we offer some limit results showing that, with certain reasonable conditions on the distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases, the values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach both the weights themselves and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also show that, even for relatively small groups using weighted voting, such as the membership of the European Council of Ministers (and its precedessors) 1958-2003, similarities among the usual a priori power scores, bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights themselves, will be quite strong

Una generalización de las leyes de atrición de lanchester

En su tratado clásico [2], Lanchester nos da dos leyes para la atrición de dos fuerzas opuestas homogéneas, de tamaño m y  n  respectivamente. Estas son la primera ley (ley lineal)

Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach

The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.Shapley Value; Syndicate; Coalition formation; Increasing return to scale.

A theorem on the optimal allocation of effort

A limited time budget is to be allocated to several tasks, so as to maximize the probability that a majority of these tasks will be performed correctly. It is shown that in the symmetric linear case, it is optimal to allocate time equally among k of the tasks, where k is at least a majority, but may be more, depending on the actual time available. In particular, time is allocated to all tasks if there is little time available, but to only a majority of the tasks if the available amount of time is  reasonably large

The Benefits of Using XML Technologies in Astronomical Data Retrieval and Interpretation

This paper describes a solution found during recent research that could provide improvements in the efficiency, reliability and cost of retrieving stored astronomical data. This solution uses XML Technologies in showing that when querying a variety of astronomical data sources a standardised data structure can be output into an XML query results Document. This paper shows the astronomical XMLSchema that has been partially developed in conjunction with simple custom supporting system software. It also discusses briefly possible future implications