2012 Dewey Lecture: Making Meaning Together Beyond Theory and Practice

Educators frequently fret over how to bridge the gap between theory and practice. In an important sense, it is a false problem. Theory is simply the thoughtful, reflective phase of good practice. We will approach Dewey’s philosophy as one of continuous creation and re-creation or even more precisely, social co-creation, that requires making meaning, knowledge, and value together. We will look at each one of these three in some detail along with the ways they transact with one another. Fundamentally, we can only distinguish them for some purposes, but never fully separate them. Everywhere we look, we will see we cannot entirely pull theory and practice apart. There-fore, the paper will conclude that if we unify theory with practice, we may use the same paradigm for the intelligent production of meaning, knowing, and valuing, thereby obviating the functional independencies among them

Deweyan tools for inquiry and the epistemological context of critical pedagogy

This article develops the notion of resistance as articulated in the literature of critical pedagogy as being both culturally sponsored and cognitively manifested. To do so, the authors draw upon John Dewey\u27s conception of tools for inquiry. Dewey provides a way to conceptualize student resistance not as a form of willful disputation, but instead as a function of socialization into cultural models of thought that actively truncate inquiry. In other words, resistance can be construed as the cognitive and emotive dimensions of the ongoing failure of institutions to provide ideas that help individuals both recognize social problems and imagine possible solutions. Focusing on Dewey\u27s epistemological framework, specifically tools for inquiry, provides a way to grasp this problem. It also affords some innovative solutions; for instance, it helps conceive of possible links between the regular curriculum and the study of specific social justice issues, a relationship that is often under-examined. The aims of critical pedagogy depend upon students developing dexterity with the conceptual tools they use to make meaning of the evidence they confront; these are background skills that the regular curriculum can be made to serve even outside social justice-focused curricula. Furthermore, the article concludes that because such inquiry involves the exploration and potential revision of students\u27 world-ordering beliefs, developing flexibility in how one thinks may be better achieved within academic subjects and topics that are not so intimately connected to students\u27 current social lives, especially where students may be directly implicated

The company\u27s town : an examination of the longevity and legacy of Scotia, California

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Nietzsche, Dewey, and the Artistic Creation of Truth

My paper focuses on the following famous passage from Friedrich Nietzsche’s “Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”: “What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms” (OTL 1). I will show that John Dewey entirely agrees with this statement. Dewey and Nietzsche has a rich and novel understanding of metaphor, metonymy, simile, and such that they use to comprehend the creation of linguistic meanings, the identity of things, the creation of objects (essences, eidos, etc.), cause and effect, free will, and necessity as serving anthropomorphic purposes. My conclusion presents Dewey as a gay scientist joining Nietzsche in making creative use of the genetic method. The result of is a surprisingly poetic and rhetorical interpretation of Dewey that should not astonish anyone who reads him carefully. We arrive at this radical reading of Deweyan pragmatism by a metaphorical transfer from Nietzsche as the more familiar source domain to Dewey as the target domain. All along the way, things will fall into place if we carefully distinguish our anoetic experience of existence from the cognitive linguistic meanings, identities, and essences we create from our experience of existence

Humboldt\u27s uncivil war

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Introdução à Teoria do Raciocí­nio Prático de Dewey

A afirmação básica do pragmatismo de Dewey é que todo raciocí­nio está subordinado ao raciocí­nio prático orgânico (full-bodied) de meios-fins conduzido em um contexto especí­fico com o propósito humano de melhorar uma determinada situação. Outras formas de razão, por exemplo, a chamada razão "pura", racionalidade técnica, racionalidade interpretativa e racionalidade comunicativa são partes ou órgãos do raciocí­nio orgânico. Meu artigo começa com uma revisão da teoria do raciocí­nio prático de Aristóteles apresentada no livro Ética a Nicômaco. Geralmente esquecemos que, para Aristóteles, e Dewey, todo o raciocí­nio prático envolvia Eros, ou desejo apaixonado. No raciocí­nio prático nós raciocinamos intencionalmente em relação a valores e objetos do desejo. Para Aristóteles, e Dewey, meios não eram totalmente apartados dos fins, alguns meios constituem o fim da mesma forma que tijolos, cimento e trabalho permanecem após retirarmos os andaimes do edifí­cio. Por trás disso está a perspectiva dominante do raciocí­nio prático promulgada pelos positivistas lógicos, campeões da racionalidade burocrática, e outros em que os meios são separados dos fins. Essa perspectiva contribui para a confusão que cerca o instrumentalismo de Dewey. Para Dewey, meios constituem o fim. Mostrarei como Dewey desenvolveu uma teoria da intencionalidade não-teológica como parte de sua teoria do raciocí­nio prático. Para Dewey, os objetos do raciocí­nio prático, valores, ideais, ou o que ele prefere chamar de "fins-em-vista", não são fixos. Eles alteram conforme a investigação avança, da mesma forma que suas possibilidades servem como meios para sua atualização. Palavras-chave: Dewey, John, 1859-1952. Crí­tica e interpretação. Raciocí­nio. Definição (Lógica)

Embodying Global Citizenship

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The Transformation of Teaching Habits in Relation to the Introduction of Grading and National Testing in Science Education in Sweden

In Sweden, a new curriculum and new methods of assessment (grading of students and national tests) in science education were introduced in grade 6 in 2012/2013. We have investigated what implications these reforms have for teachers’ teaching and assessment practices in order to explore the question of how teachers transform their teaching habits in relation to policy reforms. Interviews with 16 teachers teaching science in grade 6 (Y6), over 3 years after the reforms were introduced, were analysed. Building on the ideas of John Dewey, we consider teachers’ talk about their everyday practice as expressions of their habits of teaching. Habits of teaching are related both to individual experiences as well as institutional traditions in and about teaching. A categorisation of educational philosophies was used to teachers’ habits of teaching to a collective level and to show how habits can be transformed and developed over time in specific sociocultural contexts. The teachers were categorised as using essentialist and/or progressivist educational philosophy. In the responses to the introduction of grading and national testing, the teachers took three approaches: Their habits being reinforced, revised or unchanged in relation to the reforms. Although the responses were different, a striking similarity was that all teachers justified their responses with wanting to do what is best for students. However, how to show care for students differed, from delivering scientific knowledge in alignment with an essentialist educational philosophy, to preparing students to do well on tests, to supporting their development as individuals, which is in alignment with a progressivist educational philosophy