Weight‐of‐Evidence Approach for Assessing Removal of Metals from the Water Column for Chronic Environmental Hazard Classification

The United Nations and the European Union have developed guidelines for the assessment of long‐term (chronic) chemical environmental hazards. This approach recognizes that these hazards are often related to spillage of chemicals into freshwater environments. The goal of the present study was to examine the concept of metal ion removal from the water column in the context of hazard assessment and classification. We propose a weight‐of‐evidence approach that assesses several aspects of metals including the intrinsic properties of metals, the rate at which metals bind to particles in the water column and settle, the transformation of metals to nonavailable and nontoxic forms, and the potential for remobilization of metals from sediment. We developed a test method to quantify metal removal in aqueous systems: the extended transformation/dissolution protocol (T/DP‐E). The method is based on that of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD). The key element of the protocol extension is the addition of substrate particles (as found in nature), allowing the removal processes to occur. The present study focused on extending this test to support the assessment of metal removal from aqueous systems, equivalent to the concept of “degradability” for organic chemicals. Although the technical aspects of our proposed method are different from the OECD method for organics, its use for hazard classification is equivalent. Models were developed providing mechanistic insight into processes occurring during the T/DP‐E method. Some metals, such as copper, rapidly decreased (within 96 h) under the 70% threshold criterion, whereas others, such as strontium, did not. A variety of method variables were evaluated and optimized to allow for a reproducible, realistic hazard classification method that mimics reasonable worst‐case scenarios. We propose that this method be standardized for OECD hazard classification via round robin (ring) testing to ascertain its intra‐ and interlaboratory variability. Environ Toxicol Chem 2019;38:1839–1849. © 2019 SETAC.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/151334/1/etc4470_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/151334/2/etc4470.pd

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Identifying discrete behavioural types: A re-analysis of public goods game contributions by hierarchical clustering

We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contributions games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a simi- larity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct sterotypical behaviours, which together account for about 90% of participants. Compared to previous approaches, our method produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

The joy of ruling: an experimental investigation on collective giving

We analyse team dictator games with different voting mechanisms in the laboratory. Individuals vote to select a donation for all group members. Standard Bayesian analysis makes the same prediction for all three mechanisms: participants should cast the same vote regardless of the voting mechanism used to determine the common donation level. Our experimental results show that subjects fail to choose the same vote. We show that their behaviour is consistent with a joy of ruling: individuals get an extra utility when they determine the voting outcome

Social Experiments in the Mesoscale: Humans Playing a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma

Background: The evolutionary origin of cooperation among unrelated individuals remains a key unsolved issue across several disciplines. Prominent among the several mechanisms proposed to explain how cooperation can emerge is the existence of a population structure that determines the interactions among individuals. Many models have explored analytically and by simulation the effects of such a structure, particularly in the framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, but the results of these models largely depend on details such as the type of spatial structure or the evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, experimental work suitably designed to address this question is needed to probe these issues. Methods and Findings: We have designed an experiment to test the emergence of cooperation when humans play Prisoner’s Dilemma on a network whose size is comparable to that of simulations. We find that the cooperation level declines to an asymptotic state with low but nonzero cooperation. Regarding players ’ behavior, we observe that the population is heterogeneous, consisting of a high percentage of defectors, a smaller one of cooperators, and a large group that shares features of the conditional cooperators of public goods games. We propose an agent-based model based on the coexistence of these different strategies that is in good agreement with all the experimental observations. Conclusions: In our large experimental setup, cooperation was not promoted by the existence of a lattice beyond a residual level (around 20%) typical of public goods experiments. Our findings also indicate that both heterogeneity and a ‘‘moody’