Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)], Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components, and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004 design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by U.S. ITER. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design-basis accident:1 a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassettes lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout anddimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction

Thermal Analysis of the Divertor Primary Heat Transfer System Piping During the Gas Baking Process

A preliminary analysis has been performed examining the temperature distribution in the Divertor Primary Heat Transfer System (PHTS) piping and the divertor itself during the gas baking process. During gas baking, it is required that the divertor reach a temperature of 350 C. Thermal losses in the piping and from the divertor itself require that the gas supply temperature be maintained above that temperature in order to ensure that all of the divertor components reach the required temperature. The analysis described in this report was conducted in order to estimate the required supply temperature from the gas heater

Potential applications of artificial intelligence in computer-based management systems for mixed waste incinerator facility operation

The Department of Energy/Oak Ridge Field Office (DOE/OR) operates a mixed waste incinerator facility at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site, designed for the thermal treatment of incinerable liquid, sludge, and solid waste regulated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Resource Conversion and Recovery Act (RCRA). Operation of the TSCA Incinerator is highly constrained as a result of the regulatory, institutional, technical, and resource availability requirements. This presents an opportunity for applying computer technology as a technical resource for mixed waste incinerator operation to facilitate promoting and sustaining a continuous performance improvement process while demonstrating compliance. This paper describes mixed waste incinerator facility performance-oriented tasks that could be assisted by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the requirements for AI tools that would implement these algorithms in a computer-based system. 4 figs., 1 tab

Singular Location and Signaling Profile of Adenosine A2A-Cannabinoid CB1 Receptor Heteromers in the Dorsal Striatum

The dorsal striatum is a key node for many neurobiological processes such as motor activity, cognitive functions, and affective processes. The proper functioning of striatal neurons relies critically on metabotropic receptors. Specifically, the main adenosine and endocannabinoid receptors present in the striatum, ie, adenosine A2A receptor (A2AR) and cannabinoid CB1 receptor (CB1R), are of pivotal importance in the control of neuronal excitability. Facilitatory and inhibitory functional interactions between striatal A2AR and CB1R have been reported, and evidence supports that this cross-talk may rely, at least in part, on the formation of A2AR-CB1R heteromeric complexes. However, the specific location and properties of these heteromers have remained largely unknown. Here, by using techniques that allowed a precise visualization of the heteromers in situ in combination with sophisticated genetically-modified animal models, together with biochemical and pharmacological approaches, we provide a high resolution expression map and a detailed functional characterization of A2AR-CB1R heteromers in the dorsal striatum. Specifically, our data unveil that the A2AR-CB1R heteromer (i) is essentially absent from corticostriatal projections and striatonigral neurons, and, instead, is largely present in striatopallidal neurons, (ii) displays a striking G protein-coupled signaling profile, where co-stimulation of both receptors leads to strongly reduced downstream signaling, and (iii) undergoes an unprecedented dysfunction in Huntington’s disease, an archetypal disease that affects striatal neurons. Altogether, our findings may open a new conceptual framework to understand the role of coordinated adenosine-endocannabinoid signaling in the indirect striatal pathway, which may be relevant in motor function and neurodegenerative diseases

The open abdomen in trauma and non-trauma patients : WSES guidelines

Damage control resuscitation may lead to postoperative intra-abdominal hypertension or abdominal compartment syndrome. These conditions may result in a vicious, self-perpetuating cycle leading to severe physiologic derangements and multiorgan failure unless interrupted by abdominal (surgical or other) decompression. Further, in some clinical situations, the abdomen cannot be closed due to the visceral edema, the inability to control the compelling source of infection or the necessity to re-explore (as a "planned second-look" laparotomy) or complete previously initiated damage control procedures or in cases of abdominal wall disruption. The open abdomen in trauma and non-trauma patients has been proposed to be effective in preventing or treating deranged physiology in patients with severe injuries or critical illness when no other perceived options exist. Its use, however, remains controversial as it is resource consuming and represents a non-anatomic situation with the potential for severe adverse effects. Its use, therefore, should only be considered in patients who would most benefit from it. Abdominal fascia-to-fascia closure should be done as soon as the patient can physiologically tolerate it. All precautions to minimize complications should be implemented.Peer reviewe

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)], Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components, and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004 design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by U.S. ITER. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design-basis accident:1 a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassettes lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout anddimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction

Drain Tank Information for Developing Design Basis of the Preliminary Design

Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) drain tanks (DTs) serve two functions: normal operation and safety operation. Normal DTs are used for regular maintenance operations when draining is necessary. Safety DTs are used to receive the water leaked into the Vacuum Vessel (VV) after an in-vessel loss of cooling accident (LOCA) event. The preliminary design of the DTs shall be based on the information provided by this document. The capacity of the normal DTs is estimated based on the internal volume of in-vessel components [e.g., First Wall/Blanket (FW/BLK) and Divertor (DIV)], Neutral Beam Injector (NBI) components, and TCWS piping, heat exchangers, electric heaters, pump casing, pressurizers, and valves. Water volumes have been updated based on 2004 design information, changes adopted because of approved Project Change Requests (PCRs), and data verification by U.S. ITER. Two tanks will store water from normal draining operations of the FW/BLK and DIV Primary Heat Transfer Systems (PHTSs). One tank will store water from normal draining operations of the NBI PHTS. The capacity of the safety DTs is based on analysis of a design-basis accident:1 a large leak from in-vessel components. There are two safety DTs that will receive water from a VV LOCA event and drainage from the VV, as needed. In addition, there is one sump tank for the DIV that will be used for collecting drain water from the draining and drying processes and specifically for draining the DIV system as the DIV cassettes lines are at a lower elevation than the DT connection point. Information documented in this report must be refined and verified during the preliminary design of the DTs, and there are several aspects to be considered to complete the preliminary design. Input to these design considerations is discussed in this report and includes, but is not limited to, water inventory; operating procedures/maintenance; Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA); tank layout anddimensions, including design margin; classification under French Nuclear Pressure Directives, Equipements Sous Pression Nucleaires (ESPN); and adaptations for construction