Enforcers beyond Borders: Transnational NGOs and the enforcement of international law

Scholars have studied international NGOs as advocates and service providers, but have neglected their importance in autonomously enforcing international law. We have two basic aims: first to establish the nature and significance of transnational NGO enforcement, and second to explore the factors behind its rise. NGO enforcement comprises a spectrum of practices, from indirect (e.g., monitoring and investigation), to direct enforcement (e.g., prosecution and interdiction). We explain NGO enforcement by an increased demand for the enforcement of international law, and factors that have lowered the cost of supply for non-state enforcement. Increased demand for enforcement reflects the growing gap between the increased legalization of international politics and states’ limited enforcement capacity. On the supply side, the diffusion of new technologies and greater access to new legal remedies facilitate increased non-state enforcement. We evidence these claims via case studies from the environmental and anti-corruption sectors.</jats:p

Why the World Needs an International Cyberwar Convention

States’ capacity for using information and communication technology (ICT) to inflict grave economic, political and material harm on enemies has been amply demonstrated. In recent years, many states have reported large-scale cyber-attacks against their military defense systems, water supply systems and other critical national infrastructure. Currently there is no agreed-upon set of international rules and norms governing conflict in cyberspace. Many states prefer to keep it that way. They insist that difficulties of verifiability and the challenges raised by rapid technological change preclude international agreement on a formal convention to govern cyber conflict and favor reliance on strategic deterrence to limit conflict. In this article, I review some of the main objections to an international convention regulating the use of cyber weapons. I argue that while there are significant obstacles to effective multilateral arms control in the cyber domain, experience from other areas of international arms control suggest none of these obstacles are insurmountable. I also argue that whereas most observers insist that cyberspace favors offensive strategies, closer examination of the political dynamics of the cyber domain in fact indicates the dominance of defensive strategies. This in turn improves the prospects for striking effective multilateral agreement(s) to reduce risks of international cyber conflict

Death of international organizations. The organizational ecology of intergovernmental organizations, 1815–2015

Funder: University of CambridgeAbstract: Under what conditions do international governmental organizations (IGOs) cease to exist? Surprisingly, leading theories of international organization rarely address this question. Across the theoretical spectrum scholars assume that international organizations have a high degree of “staying power”. Yet reality looks different. More than one-third of IGOs created since 1815 have since died. This article addresses the puzzle of why IGOs cease to exist. Using a combination of cross-sectional and survival analysis, I seek to identify factors associated with IGO termination. My analysis is based on a novel dataset coding detailed information on all IGO created since 1815, including their function, membership, and geographic span. Against prevailing theoretical expectations, my analysis demonstrates i) that overall mortality is high among IGOs, ii) that states often prefer to create new IGOs as opposed reforming existing ones, and iii) that having a large and heterogeneous membership is associated with greater organizational survivability. These findings indicate a need for refinement of existing theories of 'institutional robustness'

Is the liberal international order in a state of terminal decline?

The disengagement of the United States from multilateral cooperation and a rise in ‘illiberal’ politics across the globe have led many observers to conclude the liberal international order is in a state of decline. Drawing on a new study, Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Stephanie C. Hofmann argue that what we may be witnessing is not necessarily the breakdown of the existing order, but rather its transformation into a broader, more inclusive system of global governance, reflecting the need to accommodate new actors and problems

What kills international organisations? When and why international organisations terminate

This article addresses the puzzle of why, and under what conditions, international organisations cease to exist. International Relations literature offers rich explanations for the creation, design and effectiveness of international institutions and their organisational embodiments, international organizations (IOs), but surprisingly little effort has gone into studying the dynamics of IO termination. Yet if we want to understand the conditions under which international organisations endure, we must also explain why they frequently fail to do so. The article formulates and tests a theory of ‘IO death’ using a combination of population-wide statistical analysis and detailed historical case studies. My analysis is based on an original dataset covering the period 1815–2016. I find that exogenous shocks are a leading proximate cause of IO terminations since 1815 and that organisations that are newly created, have small memberships, and/or lack centralised structures are most likely to succumb. My analysis leads me to suggest a number of extensions and refinements to existing institutionalist theories

European Integration as a Solution to War

We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member states -even in the case of volatile preventive war dilemmas. Our primary case is post-war Europe. We show that European integration since the early 1950s was conceived as a means of committing a temporarily weakened West Germany not to use its future power to pursue military ends in Europe, thereby obviating a preventive war against it. The various institutions that form part of the European Communities, now the European Union, still bear the mark of this goal. In this article, we establish the game theoretic conditions for the existence of binding international institutions as a solution to preventive war. We also provide evidence that the model is a good approximation of what political elites had in mind in the wake of World War II. KEY WORDS ♦ credible commitment ♦ European integration ♦ institutional solutions to conflict ♦ integration theory ♦ power transition ♦ preventive war This article establishes the conditions in which binding international institutions -usually associated with political and economic integration among states -can serve as a solution to preventive war. Most theories of integration suggest that states integrate in order to solve problems of incomplete information and reduce transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we argue that integration can serve to establish a credible commitment that removes the risk of future conflict among states of unequal power. Specifically, we suggest European Journal of International Relation

Accountability in densely institutionalized governance spaces

Published online: 31 January 2024The concept of organizational accountability is central to good governance both domestically and internationally. However, assessing accountability in densely institutionalized global governance spaces requires new conceptual and analytical tools. Rather than concentrating on the accountability of states, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational corporations as distinct sets of global actors to whom different accountability criteria and mechanisms may apply, we want to focus on how growing overlap and interplay among diverse global policy actors affects organizational accountability. And rather than focusing exclusively on accountability in terms of retrospective sanctioning based on fixed standards or legal obligations, we suggest that, in a densely institutionalized world, accountability also needs to be thought of as a prospective process. We therefore suggest a stronger focus on pluralistic, participatory, and deliberative forms of accountability that emphasize standard-setting and responsiveness through collective deliberation, learning, and competition

Building Authority and Legitimacy in Transnational Climate Change Governance : Evidence from the Governors’ Climate and Forest Task Force

Transnational climate change initiatives have increased in number and relevance within the global climate change regime. Despite being largely welcomed, there are concerns about their ability to deliver ambitious climate action and about their democratic legitimacy. This paper disentangles the nature of both authority and legitimacy of a specific form of transnational networks, transgovernmental networks of subnational governments. It then investigates how a major transgovernmental initiative focusing on tropical forests, the Governors Climate and Forest Task Force, attempts to command authority and to build and maintain its legitimacy. The paper illustrates the particular challenges faced by initiatives formed primarily by jurisdictions from the Global South. Three major trade-offs related to authority and legitimacy dimensions are identified: first, the difficulty of balancing the need for increased representation with performance on ambitious climate goals; second, the need to deliver effectiveness while ensuring transparency of governance processes; and third, the limited ability to leverage formal authority of members to deliver climate action in local jurisdictions, while depending on external funds from the Global North.Peer reviewe