The Neurocognitive Theory of Dreaming

A comprehensive neurocognitive theory of dreaming based on the theories, methodologies, and findings of cognitive neuroscience and the psychological sciences. G. William Domhoff's neurocognitive theory of dreaming is the only theory of dreaming that makes full use of the new neuroimaging findings on all forms of spontaneous thought and shows how well they explain the results of rigorous quantitative studies of dream content. Domhoff identifies five separate issues—neural substrates, cognitive processes, the psychological meaning of dream content, evolutionarily adaptive functions, and historically invented cultural uses—and then explores how they are intertwined. He also discusses the degree to which there is symbolism in dreams, the development of dreaming in children, and the relative frequency of emotions in the dreams of children and adults. During dreaming, the neural substrates that support waking sensory input, task-oriented thinking, and movement are relatively deactivated. Domhoff presents the conditions that have to be fulfilled before dreaming can occur spontaneously. He describes the specific cognitive processes supported by the neural substrate of dreaming and then looks at dream reports of research participants. The “why” of dreaming, he says, may be the most counterintuitive outcome of empirical dream research. Though the question is usually framed in terms of adaptation, there is no positive evidence for an adaptive theory of dreaming. Research by anthropologists, historians, and comparative religion scholars, however, suggests that dreaming has psychological and cultural uses, with the most important of these found in religious ceremonies and healing practices. Finally, he offers suggestions for how future dream studies might take advantage of new technologies, including smart phones

An invitation to a four-network theory of power: a new viewpoint compatible with elite theory

"Starting with the multinetwork theories advocated by C. Wright Mills, Michael Mann and Richard Lachmann, and drawing on work by specialists in anthropology and social psychology, this article presents a history of social power from hunting and gathering societies to the present. Collective power, based on cooperation, came first in human history, with distributive power coming much later. With the rise of permanent hierarchical organizations at the dawn of civilization, the issue of distributive power became paramount, making it necessary to resolve distributive power conflicts among leaders before collective power could expand any further. At this point the rank-and-file lost their ability to replace organizational leaders, who then became 'political elites' or 'power elites'. The result was the kind of top-down societies analyzed by John Higley and Michael Burton in Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, which provides a provocative new challenge to traditional theories of democracy." (author's abstract

Senoi, Kilton Stewart and The Mystique of Dreams: Further Thoughts on an Allegory About an Allegory

"Senoi" dream theory, which is centered around the idea that we should share and control our dreams for spiritual development, is an attractive theory said to derive from an appealing, non-violent people living simply in the highlands of Malaysia. But the real story of "Senoi" dream theory can be a painful one for at least two reasons that go beyond the usual academic conflicts over the validity and usefulness of ideas. First, some people in the United States and elsewhere make their living off of it by leading dream groups; they therefore have more at stake than do professors who are secure in their jobs whether their ideas pan out or not. Second, the theory resonates with deeply held cultural and spiritual values that almost compel people to believe it; they therefore become very upset when it is questioned

Is the Corporate Elite Fractured, or is there Continuing Corporate Dominance? Two Contrasting Views

This article compares two recent analyses of continuity and change in the American power structure since 1900, with a main focus on the years after World War II. The first analysis asserts that the “corporate elite” has fractured and fragmented in recent decades and no longer has the unity to have a collective impact on public policy. The second analysis claims that corporate leaders remain united, albeit with moderate-conservative and ultra-conservative differences on several issues, and continue to have a dominant collective impact on public policies that involve their major goals. After comparing the two perspectives on key issues from 1900 to 1945, the article analyzes the fractured-elite theory’s three claims about the postwar era: an activist government constrained the corporate elite, the union movement negotiated a capital-labor accord; and bank boards created policy cohesion among corporations. Finally, it compares the two perspectives on tax issues, health-care policies, and trade expansion between 1990 and 2010

The content of recurrent dreams in young adolescents

Studies on children’s recurrent dreams have been largely anecdotal and based on adults’ recollections of dreams experienced during childhood. We collected 102 reports of recurrent dreams from a sample of young adolescents aged between 11 and 15 years and scored the narratives using a range of content measures, including in relation to the threat simulation theory (TST) of dreaming. The most frequently reported themes involved confrontations with monsters or animals, followed by physical aggressions, falling and being chased. Recurrent dreams were more likely to include negative content elements than positive elements. Only half of the recurrent dreams contained threatening elements and their analysis provided mixed support for the TST. Differences between the content of recurrent dreams reported by young adolescent versus adults are discussed as are possible sex effects and key issues that remain to be addressed by future researc

The policy-planning capacity of the American corporate community:Corporations, policy-oriented nonprofits, and the inner circle in 1935–1936 and 2010–2011

Using a combination of network analysis and descriptive statistics, this study examines the extent to which six important and longstanding policy-oriented nonprofit organizations — foundations, think tanks, and policy-discussion groups — were connected via their directors with the 250 largest corporations in the United States in 1935–1936 and 2010–2011. The results demonstrate that the six nonprofit organizations included in the study were well integrated into corporate networks in both periods, and had an even greater integrative role in 2010–2011 than they did in 1935–1936. This finding supports the hypothesis that policy-oriented nonprofit organizations allow the corporate community to develop proposals, and to reach consensus, on major policy issues. This hypothesis is further supported by an overview of existing studies that illustrate the success of these organizations in shaping policy outcomes on a range of issues. Based on the overall results, the longstanding claim that corporations influence government primarily or solely at the “interest-group” level can be supplemented by the conclusion that policy-oriented nonprofits support a policy-planning process that links the corporate community to government on general issues. In addition, the findings cast doubt on the claim that the corporate community has lost its capacity for policy cohesion in recent decades, due primarily to a “fracturing” caused by a decline in bank centrality. Since general policies have been created within the policy-planning process since at least the mid-1930s, the decline in bank centrality is irrelevant to the corporate community’s ability to formulate general policy proposals

Corporate Political Power and US Foreign Policy, 1981-2002: The Role of the Policy-Planning Network

Recent empirical work has offered strong support for ‘biased pluralism’ and ‘economic elite’ accounts of political power in the United States, according a central role to interest groups as a mechanism through which corporate influence is exerted. Here, we propose an additional channel of influence for corporate interests: the ‘policy-planning network,’ consisting of corporate- dominated foundations, think tanks, and elite policy-discussion groups. To evaluate this assertion, we coded the policy preferences of one key policy-discussion group, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), on 295 foreign policy issues during the 1981-2002 period. In logistic regression analyses, the preferences of economic elites and the CFR were positive, statistically significant predictors of foreign policy outcomes while interest group preferences were not. These findings were further supported with a qualitative investigation of the patterns of CFR ‘successes’ and ‘failures.’ We conclude that ‘biased pluralism’ models should include corporate influence exerted through the policy-planning network

Oil elite networks in a transforming global oil market

This article analyses oil elite formation in light of the wider transformation that is taking place in the global oil order due to the rise of powers from the Global South, including Russia: in particular, the expansion and integration of the state-owned oil companies into the global oil market. This is done by analysing the networks that the directors of the world's largest oil companies create through their affiliations with a) other corporations, b) policy planning bodies and c) with the state. The most important finding is that the increased cooperation between the Western private oil companies and the non-Western state-owned oil companies has not yet translated into increased integration between their respective elite networks. It is argued that this indicates we are witnessing a transition towards a more multi-polar global oil order that increasingly needs to take into account the rising powers of the Global South. © The Author(s) 2012

Rapid Eye Movements (REMs) and visual dream recall in both congenitally blind and sighted subjects

Our objective was to evaluate rapid eye movements (REMs) associated with visual dream recall in sighted subjects and congenital blind. During two consecutive nights polysomnographic recordings were performed at subjects home. REMs were detected by visual inspection on both EOG channels (EOG-H, EOG-V) and further classified as occurring isolated or in bursts. Dream recall was defined by the existence of a dream report. The two groups were compared using t-test and also the two-way ANOVA and a post-hoc Fisher test (for the features diagnosis (blind vs. sighted) and dream recall (yes or no) as a function of time). The average of REM awakenings per subject and the recall ability were identical in both groups. CB had a lower REM density than CS; the same applied to REM bursts and isolated eye movements. In the two-way ANOVA, REM bursts and REM density were significantly different for positive dream recall, mainly for the CB group and for diagnosis; furthermore for both features significant results were obtained for the interaction of time, recall and diagnosis; the interaction of recall and time was however, stronger. In line with previous findings the data show that blind have lower REMs density. However the ability of dream recall in congenitally blind and sighted controls is identical. In both groups visual dream recall is associated with an increase in REM bursts and density. REM bursts also show differences in the temporal profile. REM visual dream recall is associated with increased REMs activity

The Elusive Rentier Rich: Piketty's Data Battles and the Power of Absent Evidence

The popularity of Thomas Piketty?s research on wealth inequality has drawn attention to a curious question: why was widening wealth inequality largely neglected by mainstream economists in recent decades? To explore and explain that neglect, I draw on the writing of the early neoclassical economist John Bates Clark, who introduced the notion of the marginal productivity of income distribution at the end of the nineteenth century. I then turn to Piketty?s Capital in order to analyze the salience of marginal productivity theories of income today. I suggest that most of the criticism and praise for Piketty?s research is focused on data that are accessible and measurable, obscuring attention to questions over whether current methods for measuring economic capital are defensible or not. My overarching aim is to explore how ?absent? data in economics as a whole help to reinforce blind spots within mainstream economic theory