Intervals of Quasi-Decompositionality and Emergent Properties

The notion of emergence has accompanied philosophy of science since the late XIX century, claiming that in some systems there are properties in certain levels that cannot be deduced from properties of their components as seen in more fundamental levels. Throughout the XX century, emergence has been characterized by four pillars: unpredictability, novelty, restriction and downward causation. These four pillars have been related to the assumption of a hierarchical order of reality in different levels of organization. In this paper, we show that it is possible to explain the nature of the (apparent) emergent properties through the nearly-decomposability criterion introduced by Herbert Simon

Did the bacterium really kill the colonel? Systemic view, inter-level causation, and levels of quasi-decompositionality in mechanistic explanations

In this paper, we critically analyze the mechanicist approach to scientific explanation and propose to complement this view with a conception of level as interval of quasi-decompositionality. This conception allows us to metaphysically base the mechanicist proposals on characteristic systemic features. By means of concrete examples, we claim that this proposal is able to overcome some of the alleged limitations of predominant models of mechanistic explanation

Is aging a disease? The theoretical definition of aging in the light of the philosophy of medicine

In this talk, I attempt to shed light on the philosophical debate about the theoretical definition of aging from the discussion of the notion of disease in the philosophy of medicine. As a result, I introduce a concrete approach -- the pragmatist approach to aging -- to account for the theoretical relationship between the notions of disease and aging, as they are addressed in the philosophy of aging. To that end, the structure of this work is as follows: first, in section 2, I analyze the discussion between the two major positions in this debate, and introduce the influential accounts of authors such as Hayflick, Schramme, Caplan, Murphy, and Callahan & Topinkova. I will show that in this discussion it is being assumed by some authors that the definition of disease is univocal and corresponds to what some of these authors understand as a "non-natural state". The motivation of this is straightforward: in order to decide if aging should be defined as a disease we need to clarify first what a disease is and what implies to characterize something as such. In section 3, I will show that the disagreement between those who argue that aging is a disease and those who claim that it is not is ultimately based on an assumption of different notions of disease. In addition, I will also turn to the debate on disease in the philosophy of medicine to analyze the proposals of Callahan & Topinkova and Murphy. These authors advocate avoiding the question of whether or not aging is a disease for pragmatic reasons. The important thing would not be to define aging as a disease but to medically treat it as such. I propose to reformulate this proposal of pragmatic motivation to frame it in an approach to the concept of disease, which I call "pragmatist", that has advocated philosophers of medicine such as Cooper or Hofmann. I think that this pragmatist approach addresses the issue of medical categorization of aging in a more scientific and philosophical fruitful way.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

«Teme a la vejez, pues nunca viene sola». Nociones de envejecimiento, cambio conceptual y gerociencia

No nos gusta envejecer. Desde luego, no es necesaria una elaborada investigación sociológica para comprobar esto. Ni siquiera una reflexión muy profunda. Que no nos gusta hacernos viejos es una evidencia patente en nuestra psicología y nuestra cultura.We don't like getting old. Of course, no elaborate sociological research is needed to prove this. Nor even very deep reflection. That we don't like getting old is evident in our psychology and our culture

Normas naturales y funciones biológicas

RESUMENEn este trabajo abordo el problema de la fundamentación teórica de la noción de normatividad natural desde una perspectiva naturalista. Presento el debate actual sobre las funciones biológicas en filosofía de la biología, en el cual pueden encontrarse algunos intentos de fundamentar las normas naturales a través del concepto de función biológica. Sostengo que el enfoque predominante etiológico-evolutivo no es capaz justificar la adscripción de normas naturales en los sistemas biológicos y propongo que la nueva perspectiva organizacional está en la mejor posición para ofrecer un tratamiento naturalista de la teleología biológica y de la normatividad natural.PALABRAS CLAVENORMATIVIDAD, FUNCIÓN, NATURALISMO, TELEOLOGÍA, MALFUNCIÓN, ORGANIZACIÓNABSTRACTIn this paper I consider the problem of the theoretical grounding of the notion of natural normativity for the naturalistic perspective. I present the current debate on biological functions in philosophy of biology in which there are some attempts to ground natural norms through the notion of biological function. I argue that the mainstream account, i.e. the evolutive-etiological approach, is not able to ground the ascription of natural norms in biological systems and I defend that the new organizational approach is in the best position to offer an adequate naturalistic account for biological teleology and natural normativity.KEYWORDSNORMATIVITY, FUNCTION, NATURALISM, TELEOLOGYGY, MALFUNCTION, ORGANIZATIO

Biological organization and cross-generation functions

International audienceThe organizational account of biological functions interprets functions as contributions of a trait to the maintenance of the organization that, in turn, maintains the trait. As has been recently argued, however, the account seems unable to provide a unified grounding for both intra- and cross-generation functions, since the latter do not contribute to the maintenance of the same organization which produces them. To face this 'ontological problem', a splitting account has been proposed, according to which the two kinds of functions require distinct organizational definitions. In this article, we propose a solution for the ontological problem, by arguing that intra- and cross-generation functions can be said to contribute in the same way to the maintenance of the biological organization, characterized in terms of organizational self-maintenance. As a consequence, we suggest maintaining a unified organizational account of biological functions

An Organizational Account of Biological Functions

International audienceIn this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework

In search of conceptual bridges: a review of Krohs, U. & Kroes, P. "Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds"

International audienc

Incommensurability and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis: Taking Kuhn Seriously

In this paper, we analyze the debate between the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis in light of the concept of incommensurability developed by Thomas Kuhn. In order to do so, first we briefly present both the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Then, we clarify the meaning and interpretations of incommensurability throughout Kuhn’s works, concluding that the version of this concept deployed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is the best suited to the analysis of scientific disputes. After discussing incommensurability in Kuhn’s works, we address the question of whether the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis can be considered semantically, methodologically, and ontologically incommensurable, concluding that they can. Finally, we discuss three problems that arise from such a conclusion: firstly, what are the consequences of incommensurability; secondly, which mode of scientific change better explains this current dispute in evolutionary biology; and thirdly, whether rational theory comparison is possible given incommensurability. We suggest that the main consequence of incommensurability is profound disagreement, that the kind of scientific change that better explains the current dispute between the MS and the EES may be scientific specialization, and that incommensurability does not preclude rational theory comparison