Mossio, Matteo

Ruiz-Mirazo, Kepa

Saborido, Cristian

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In search of conceptual bridges: a review of Krohs, U. & Kroes, P. "Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds"

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In search of conceptual bridges: a review of Krohs, U. &
Kroes, P. ”Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds”
Cristian Saborido, Matteo Mossio, Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo
To cite this version:
Cristian Saborido, Matteo Mossio, Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo. In search of conceptual bridges: a review of
Krohs, U. & Kroes, P. ”Functions in Biological and Artificial Worlds”. 2010, pp.337-340. ￿halshs-
00792438￿
Book Review: In Search for
Conceptual Bridges: A Review of
“Functions in Biological and
Artificial Worlds”* Contact author.
** IAS Research Group, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of th
20080 Donostia–San Sebastián, Spain. E-mail: cristian.saborido@ehu.es (C.S.); matteo.m
(K.R.-M.)
© 2010 Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyCristian Saborido**
University of the Basque Country
Matteo Mossio**
University of the Basque Country
Kepa Ruiz-Mirazo*,**
University of the Basque CountryFunctions in Biological and Artificial Worlds. Comparative Philosophical Perspectives. U. Krohs and P. Kroes
(Eds.). Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology. (2009, MIT Press.) 302 pages.
In recent times, several collections of classical or recent articles on the concept of function have
appeared (see, e.g., [1–3]). The novelty of the book reviewed here deals with the concept of function
from a perspective rarely adopted in philosophy of science, namely, focusing on the role of this concept
as a common nexus between philosophy of biology and philosophy of technology. As a matter of
fact, the various chapters of the book are revised versions of communications given by the authors
during a workshop, held in 2006 at the Konrad Lorenz Institute in Vienna, on “Comparative Philosophy
of Technical Artefacts and Biological Organisms.” Functions are intriguing for philosophical analysis in
that they possess normative and teleological dimensions, which seem to be at odds with the accepted
structure of scientific explanation. In particular, as the editors note in the introduction, functional explana-
tions related to both biological organisms and human-made artefacts generate a number of theoretical
difficulties. On the one hand, it is not easy, particularly in the biological case, to provide a naturalized
grounding for the normative character of functional attributions, which is a necessary requirement to talk
about dysfunctions. On the other hand, there are so many differences between biology and technology
that no single theory has been able to characterize the concept of function as it is employed in each domain.
For instance, the role of intentionality and the grounds for normativity appear to be very different in the
two domains. In addition, whereas functional ascriptions concern artefacts as wholes, they usually refer
to parts of organisms.
Still, parallelisms do exist between the two fields, as it is shown by the analogous use of a number of
concepts or theoretical constructs (“hierarchically organized systemic structures,” “evolution,” “develop-
ment,” “(re)production,” “integrity,” etc.), and, according to the editors, the purpose of this book is to
offer an integrated framework for functionality as it pertains both to organisms and to artefacts. Actually,
in their view, the lack of an adequate characterization leads to many of the difficulties in getting a satis-
factory understanding of biological organisms, of technical artefacts, and of their mutual relations.
After the general introduction by the editors, the volume is divided in four main sections, each
grouping several chapters that deal with different issues. In the lines below, we provide a brief summary
of the contents of each section, followed by our own interpretation and critical remarks.
The first section (“Bridging Functions of Organisms and Artefacts”) presents several proposals ad-
vocating the theoretical integration of biological and artefactual functions. The chapter by Mark Perlman
(Chap. 2) formulates recommendations for the future development of the theories of functions, defend-
ing a position that he calls “pragmatic teleo-pluralism”: It depends on the observerʼs interests to choose
the more relevant or interesting theoretical analysis of function for a given situation. In Chap. 3, Beth
Preston makes the proposal to bring the etiological notion of biological proper function into the field of
artefacts, by means of the notions of use and reproduction, which are analogous in biology and culture, ande Basque Country (UPVEHU), Avda. Tolosa 70
ossio@ehu.es (M.M.); kepa.ruiz-mirazo@ehu.e
Artificial Life 16: 337–340 (2010,
s)
C. Saborido et al. Book Reviewcan offer us, according to her, a suitable etiological foundation for the idea of function in both domains
(organisms and artefacts). Françoise Longy, in turn (Chap. 4), argues that the distinction between se-
lection and intention is not valid for discerning between biological and technological functions and
puts forward an integrating theory based on a wide interpretation of Wrightʼs proto-etiological model
[7], so that it includes a variety of selective mechanisms. Finally, Pieter Vermaas (Chap. 5) develops
an account that interprets both biological and artefactual functions as objective properties possessed
by specific kinds of entities, and not just as subjective ascriptions depending on the intentionality of an
external observer.
Globally speaking, we can say that this section grasps the interest of the reader, providing good
conceptual resources to tackle and understand the issue of natural versus artificial functions, as well
as their mutual connections. All four contributors advocate a common approach that should deal in
a coherent way with both biological and artefactual functions. The chapter by Perlman is adequate
as a start, because it identifies many of the theoretical questions and problems later posed by the other
three authors. Prestonʼs chapter is well argued, but it is only suggestive if one accepts the etiological
perspective as correct. Besides, there seems to be little novelty with regard to a previous proposal by
Griffiths [5], which is embraced by Preston. François Longy explains why it is so convenient to develop
a unified theory of functions, though she is not that clear on the way to accomplish it. And the final
contribution by Vermaas is possibly the one with the most solid line of argument, although it does not
look (to us) ambitious enough, since it focuses on epistemic issues and does not really aim for an
objective account of functionality.
The second section of the book, entitled “Functions and Normativity,” deals with the philosophical
foundations of the normative character usually attributed to functional ascriptions. Peter McLaughlin
(Chap. 6) looks into the conceptual origin of normativity in functions, arguing that, actually, it appears at
a deep level, inherent in any functional ascription, regardless of whether these stand for means-ends,
part-whole, or type-token types of relations. Maarten Franssen (Chap. 7), in contrast, holds that nor-
mativity derives from human intentionality and it is directly related to justifying certain beliefs about the
way in which various entities operate in the world. In a similar vein, Paul Sheldon Davies (Chap. 8)
further argues that the act of considering functional ascriptions functional corresponds to a “conceptual
conservationism,” with psychological and cultural roots, which should be avoided to build proper,
objective knowledge. The last contribution, written by Andrew Light (Chap. 9) discusses the issue of
ecological restoration, by focusing on its descriptive and normative aspects. Light claims that restored
ecosystems should be conceived as artefacts, and restorations as reproduction of damaged functions
of ecosystems, by relying on the ICE account of technological functions described by Houkes and
Vermaas [6].
Despite the interest and quality of the works included, the general structure of this section is not fully
convincing. First, it does not seem to have a direct relationship with the overall theme of the book
(functions in artefacts and organisms, and their interconnections); and, second, it lacks theoretical or
thematic coherence among the different chapters. The chapter by McLaughlin investigates the sources
of normativity in functional explanations, claiming that functional ascriptions have, indeed, an inherent
normative nature. But this is precisely the idea that is criticized and rejected in Franssenʼs and Daviesʼ
chapters, which embrace systemic views very close to Cumminsʼ [4]. Davies even states that the nor-
mativity of functions just stems from a noxious conceptual conservationism. Finally, Lightʼs contribu-
tion, although it deals with the idea of function from a seldom treated, interesting perspective and has
potential applications, does not really connect with the other chapters at all, and the reader wonders
whether it could have been inserted somewhere else.
The third section, “Functions and Classification,” is more obviously linked with the first, since it is
devoted to analyzing various criteria that can be used to distinguish between different types of func-
tions and functional domains (the artificial versus the natural). Giacomo Romano (Chap. 10), focusing
on the cognitive mechanisms through which humans are able to recognize functionality, criticizes func-
tional accounts based on meta-intentional capacities in various ways, and puts forward a view in which
functionality is perceived as for-ness in terms of a tripartite relation between an antecedent state, a con-
sequent state, and a process of transformation realized by the functional object. Marzia Soavi (Chap. 11)338 Artificial Life Volume 16, Number 4
C. Saborido et al. Book Reviewdefends a realist position concerning the functions of artefacts, arguing that artefacts, as functional kinds
defined by the intentions of the designer, correspond to real kinds (if functional relations are characterized
in an adequately narrow way). Thus, Soavi interprets artefacts as functional kinds, emphasizing that the
designerʼs intentions include the relation between function and structure, which is at odds with the idea
that artefactual functions would be generically multi-realizable. In the last chapter of this section (Chap. 12),
Kitamura and Mizoguchi approach the idea of function from an engineering perspective, and propose a
characterization based on the notion of device. A function would be the role played by the behavior of the
device in a given context of use, defined by an external user (which generates what they call external func-
tions), or by the system of which the device is a part (which generates component functions).
The three chapters included in this section deal with very heterogeneous issues, and they sometimes
hold rather opposing positions. Romano speaks about psychology and how mental processes would
tend to ascribe teleology to everything, whereas Soavi and Kitamura & Mizoguchi restrict themselves
to artefacts, although discussing two different questions: Soavi elaborates on the idea of “kinds” from
a very philosophical perspective, while Kitamura & Mizoguchi take an engineering standpoint, arriving
at quite opposite conclusions. This can be somewhat confusing for the reader, and the general impres-
sion is, again, an apparent lack of coherence among chapters, reflected in the actual title of the section
(which does not really cover, e.g., Kitamura & Mizoguchiʼs contribution, far away from the issue of
“classification”).
The last main section, “Evolutionary Perspectives,” consists of four chapters that take into consid-
eration evolutionary aspects both in biology and technology, and, although they do not address so di-
rectly the question of function, they turn out to be an interesting theoretical complement to it. Wybo
Houkes (Chap. 13) argues that, despite the differences between the domain of natural organisms and
that of technological artefacts, there are frequent concept exchanges between them according to their
specific needs or explanatory goals, and he explores two case studies (evolutionary design in electronics,
and evolutionary archeology) in which concepts coming from the selectionist theoretical framework of
evolutionary biology are transferred, in a rather spontaneous way, to fields that deal with “artefacts.”
Tim Lewens, in turn (Chap. 14), explores the benefits of transferring the evolutionary models of ex-
planation to understand technological change/innovation, in particular through the “population think-
ing” perspective that they present. Then, Ulrich Krohs (Chap. 15) takes into consideration the idea of
“modularity” (or near-decomposability) and explores how we could make better sense of its evolution-
ary origins and importance in the natural world by learning from the use of it in the technological
context. He focuses on the complex ways in which modularity may relate to functional/structural de-
composition in living organisms, as opposed to the simpler relationship that holds in technological
devices. Finally, Peter Kroes (Chap. 16) discusses whether the notion of emergence is applicable to
relatively simple technical devices and in what sense this could mean a challenge for the “control para-
digm” within the traditional engineering practice.
The contributions included in this last section deal with the implications of taking an evolutionary
standpoint to understand the functional organization of a natural entity or a technological artefact. Ex-
cept for Krohs, none of the other authors touch upon philosophically/conceptually deep questions
regarding the notion of function, in either the engineering or the biological context. The interconnec-
tions among the different chapters are also quite indirect. For instance, the text by Houkes, though quite
interesting, remains far away from the issue of functionality. In contrast, Krohs puts his finger on truly
relevant aspects to gain a better understanding of what the idea of function is and what it involves.
He focuses more on the biological domain, but the connections with the world of technologies and
engineering are quite appropriate, even if he ends up giving no conclusive solution to the problems
raised. Peter Kroes only speaks about function in an engineering context (no comparison whatsoever
with natural/biological phenomena).
In conclusion, although the book suffers from some lack of cohesion, mainly due to the variety
of themes discussed and theoretical perspectives adopted by the contributors, it offers an interesting
and innovative survey of foundational and philosophical issues on the concept of function, in its inter-
disciplinary and plural character. It demonstrates to what extent the concept of function is a central
theoretical tool in both philosophy of biology and philosophy of technology, and the various chaptersArtificial Life Volume 16, Number 4 339
C. Saborido et al. Book Reviewcollectively make a significant contribution to showing the need for a new framework establishing
conceptual bridges between these two philosophical domains, which tend to unfold separately. In this
manner the book paves the way to numerous conceptual and scientific developments in the future,
specifically relevant for all those scientific disciplines, like artificial life, that work at the edge between
the natural and artificial worlds.
References
1. Allen, C., Bekoff, M., & Lauder, G. V. (Eds.). (1998). Natureʼs purposes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
2. Ariew, A. R., Cummins, R., & Perlman, M. (Eds.). (2002). Functions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
3. Buller, D. J. (1999). Function, selection, and design. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
4. Cummins, R. (1975). Functional analysis. Journal of Philosophy, 72, 741–765.
5. Griffiths, P. E. (1993). Functional analysis and proper functions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 44,
409–422.
6. Houkes, W., & Vermaas, P. E. (2004). Actions versus functions. The Monist, 87, 52–71.
7. Wright, L. (1973). Functions. Philosophical Review, 82, 139–168.340 Artificial Life Volume 16, Number 4


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