Overthrowing the dictator: a game-theoretic approach to revolutions and media

A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). In this paper, we study its role in mobilization. We assume that social media allow potential participants to observe the individual participation decisions of others, while traditional mass media allow potential participants to see only the total number of people who participated before them. We show that when individuals’ willingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts of media foster a successful revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private information, only social media ensure that a revolt succeeds, with mass media multiple outcomes are possible, one of which has individuals not participating in the revolt. This suggests that social media enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more than traditional mass media

Spreading order: religion, cooperative niche construction, and risky coordination problems

Adaptationists explain the evolution of religion from the cooperative effects of religious commitments, but which cooperation problem does religion evolve to solve? I focus on a class of symmetrical coordination problems for which there are two pure Nash equilibriums: (1) ALL COOPERATE, which is efficient but relies on full cooperation; (2) ALL DEFECT, which is inefficient but pays regardless of what others choose. Formal and experimental studies reveal that for such risky coordination problems, only the defection equilibrium is evolutionarily stable. The following makes sense of otherwise puzzling properties of religious cognition and cultures as features of cooperative designs that evolve to stabilise such risky exchange. The model is interesting because it explains lingering puzzles in the data on religion, and better integrates evolutionary theories of religion with recent, well-motivated models of cooperative niche construction

Strategic Belief Management

While (managerial) beliefs are central to many aspects of strategic organization, interactive beliefs are almost entirely neglected, save for some game theory treatments. In an increasingly connected and networked economy, firms confront coordination problems that arise because of network effects. The capability to manage beliefs will increasingly be a strategic one, a key source of wealth creation, and a key research area for strategic organization scholars. KEYWORDS: Interactive beliefs, coordination, network economy, common knowledge. JEL CODE: D84, M3

Trans-specialization understanding in international technology alliances: The influence of cultural distance

In the information age, the firm's performance hinges on combining partners' specialist knowledge to achieve value co-creation. Combining knowledge from different specialties could be a costly process in the international technology alliances (ITAs) context. We argue that the combination of different specializations requires the development of "trans-specialization understanding" (TSU) instead of the internalization of partners' specialist knowledge. This article examines the extent to which inter-firm governance in ITAs shapes TSU, and whether the development of TSU is endangered by cultural distance. We hypothesize that relational governance, product modularity, and cultural distance influence TSU development, which in turn influences firm performance. We collected data from 110 non-equity ITAs between software and hardware firms participating in the mobile device sector. We analyzed the data using partial least squares path modeling. Our findings suggest that TSU largely depends on product modularity and relational governance in alliances. However, while cultural distance negatively moderates the path from relational governance to TSU, it has no effect on the relationship between product modularity and TSU. Based on this, we conclude that product modularity can substitute for relational governance when strong relational norms are not well-developed in international alliances. Thus cultural distance does not invariably amount to a liability in ITAs