Determinants and value relevance of UK CEO pay slice

This paper studies the CEO pay slice (CPS) of UK listed firms during the period 2003 to 2009. We investigate the determinants of CPS. We study the links between CPS and measures of firm performance. We find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance ratings and those with more independent boards tend to have higher CPS. In addition, we find that CEOs are more likely to receive lower compensation when they chair the board and when they work in firms with large board size. We also find that higher CPS is positively associated with firm performance after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance variables. We get compatible results when we examine the association between equity-based CPS and firm performance. Our results remain robust to alternative accounting measures of firm performance. Our results suggest that high UK CPS levels do indeed reflect top managerial talent rather than managerial power

ERP systems introduction and internal auditing legitimacy: An institutional analysis

In this paper, the authors examine how the internal audit function (IAF) maintains its legitimacy when enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems are introduced. This work centers on an in-depth case study of a multinational bank and finds that ERP systems impose an institutional logic of control based on interlinked assumptions. These assumptions motivate changes in the practice and structure of the IAF to become an integrated and comprehensive function to maintain its legitimacy

Directors' remuneration: A comparison of Italian and UK non-financial listed firms' disclosure

Directors' remuneration is a key issue for both academics and policymakers. It has caused enormous controversy in recent years. This study uses a comprehensive index to analyse the disclosure of directors' remuneration in Italian and UK listed firms. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly associated with firm-specific incentives, such as the demand for information from investors and the need for legitimacy. It finds that the level of voluntary disclosure is significantly higher in the UK than in Italy and that firm-specific incentives to disclose voluntary information differ according to the institutional setting in which a firm operates. In the UK, firm-specific incentives mostly come from the demand for information, estimated with the level of ownership diffusion, and the need for legitimacy generated by poor market performance and shareholders' dissent. In Italy, firm-specific incentives seem to be represented by the need for legitimacy generated by media coverage. This study also provides evidence that, in both countries, the information disclosed in corporate documents does not allow readers to obtain a comprehensive picture of directors' remuneration. Bonuses are poorly disclosed even though they are a key element of directors' remuneration. This finding is clearly important for policymakers at European and national level

Liberal conservatism, ‘boardization’ and the government of civil servants

Drawing inspiration from the loosely coupled genre of studies of governmentality, this article explores the emergence in Britain during the early years of the millennium of a distinctive liberal conservative scheme for the government of civil servants. The term ‘boardization’ has been used to characterize the trend to reproduce the technology of the board of directors in central government. Conservatives currently assign a distinctive role to the work of departmental ‘boards’ in the effective management of the Civil Service. Intimating the costs and risks of the Conservatives’ programme, we explore the role of diverse governmental forces in the emergence of the boards of the Civil Service as an object for action and intervention during the early years of the new millennium. We explore a mutation in the application of practices and techniques drawn from the domain of the business enterprise to the organization of the Civil Service. </jats:p

The effect of culture on Corporate Governance Practices in Nigeria

This study focuses on the effect of culture on the application of corporate governance practices in Nigeria. Corporate governance has been receiving serious attention in emerging markets over the past two decades. But relatively little attention has been given to the study on corporate governance in a country study. The current situations in Nigerian public and private sectors such as the corporate scandal resulting from Lever Brothers Nigeria plc, Siemens, Shell, Halliburton, and Cadbury Nigeria plc, have shown that the issue of fraud, corruption, and corporate scandals cannot be overlooked. Most top management, as this study argues, bring in beliefs acquired from their early childhood into their senior management roles and responsibilities. This study adopts a grounded theory and reports on the effect of culture on the implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria. Based on the interview with 32 staffs, this study identifies the effect of culture that shapes corporate governance and they include abuse of power by top management, weak legal framework, poor recruitment and ineffective control. Although having efficient corporate governance is worth pursuing, this depends on the power of top management, the strength of internal control procedures and the legal framework put in place by management

A Longitudinal Study of the Implementation of the Corporate Governance Code in a Developing Country

This exploratory study investigates firms’ implementation of a new corporate governance code in Mauritius, a developing economy. The authors rely on annual report disclosures during a four-year period (2004-2007). The authors analyze the level of corporate engagement with the code’s requirements, including corporate social responsibility initiatives, relative to a 2004 (when the code was enacted) benchmark over the three subsequent years. The study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it provides much needed evidence of longitudinal implementation within developing economies that exhibit, or have started to exhibit, a combination of ownership and control features found in more advanced economies and characterized in the literature as an “emerging governance” model. Second, the authors develop a more comprehensive assessment of implementation using a scoring system that combines trichotomous weighting of each governance component (as 1, 3, or 5) and trichotomous rating of implementation of each component (as 0, 0.5, or 1). The authors argue that this system is superior to the un-weighted, dichotomous approach typically used in the literature. The analysis of weighted assessment scores for reveals a significant implementation of the code initially after 2004; but implementation began to level off by 2007 well below maximum assignable scores. Detailed requirements regarding directors’ appraisal and training, remuneration policies and remuneration information appear to be ignored by companies through 2007. A correlation analysis of the corporate governance scores and firm-based measures (level and changes) shows that the association between these different variables fluctuates significantly over the implementation window. </jats:p

When two worlds collide: corporate and clinical governance

Clinical and corporate governance have been an area of ongoing concerns in the NHS. Since the Bristol Royal Infirmary scandal of the 1990s and the events concerning Sir Jimmy Savile there has been a dilemma of its true nature and relationship. Clinical and corporate governance are closely related as the two of them share similar processes such as openness, performance review, striving for effective end results, and accountability in the use of resources and power within healthcare management