The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour involving simultaneous decisions and variable investment levels

In the “producer–scrounger” model, a producer discovers a resource and is in turn discovered by a second individual, the scrounger, who attempts to steal it. This resource can be food or a territory, and in some situations, potentially divisible. In a previous paper we considered a producer and scrounger competing for an indivisible resource, where each individual could choose the level of energy that they would invest in the contest. The higher the investment, the higher the probability of success, but also the higher the costs incurred in the contest. In that paper decisions were sequential with the scrounger choosing their strategy before the producer. In this paper we consider a version of the game where decisions are made simultaneously. For the same cost functions as before, we analyse this case in detail, and then make comparisons between the two cases. Finally we discuss some real examples with potentially variable and asymmetric energetic investments, including intraspecific contests amongst spiders and amongst parasitoid wasps. In the case of the spiders, detailed estimates of energetic expenditure are available which demonstrate the asymmetric values assumed in our models. For the wasps the value of the resource can affect the probabilities of success of the defender and attacker, and differential energetic investment can be inferred. In general for real populations energy usage varies markedly depending upon crucial parameters extrinsic to the individual such as resource value and intrinsic ones such as age, and is thus an important factor to consider when modelling

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model for a specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a fight for concave cost functions, but for convex functions the scrounger obtains the resource (albeit at some cost)

When optimal foragers meet in a game theoretical conflict: A model of kleptoparasitism

Kleptoparasitism can be considered as a game theoretical problem and a foraging tactic at the same time, so the aim of this paper is to combine the basic ideas of two research lines: evolutionary game theory and optimal foraging theory. To unify these theories, firstly, we take into account the fact that kleptoparasitism between foragers has two consequences: the interaction takes time and affects the net energy intake of both contestants. This phenomenon is modeled by a matrix game under time constraints. Secondly, we also give freedom to each forager to avoid interactions, since in optimal foraging theory foragers can ignore each food type (we have two prey types: either a prey item in possession of another predator or a free prey individual is discovered). The main question of the present paper is whether the zero-one rule of optimal foraging theory (always or never select a prey type) is valid or not, in the case where foragers interact with each other? In our foraging game we consider predators who engage in contests (contestants) and those who never do (avoiders), and in general those who play a mixture of the two strategies. Here the classical zero-one rule does not hold. Firstly, the pure avoider phenotype is never an ESS. Secondly, the pure contestant can be a strict ESS, but we show this is not necessarily so. Thirdly, we give an example when there is mixed ESS

Construction and characterization of a large insert porcine YAC library

The recent construction of genetic linkage maps of the porcine genome (Rohrer et al. 1994, 1996; Ellegren et al. 1994; Archibald et al. 1995) allows the assignment of loci affecting heritable traits of economic importance (ETLs; Lander and Botstein 1989) to specific chromosomal segments. Markers can thus be identified that may be useful in marker-assisted selection (MAS) to increase the frequency of favorable allele(s) in resource populations (reviewed in Soller 1994). In addition, mapping of these loci creates the opportunity to identify gene(s) influencing a trait, through positional cloning or positional cnadidate gene approaches (Grootscholten et al. 1991). A positional cloning strategy requires the construction of contigs that physically span large sections of chromosomes. In the human and mouse systems, contig construction has depended on the availability of multiple YAC libraries that provide depth of coverage to minimize the impact of chimeric and deleted clones inherent in these libraries. A single porcine genomic YAC library has been reported (Leeb et al. 1995), but contains only one genome coverage, which limits the ability to make large contigs. We report the construction of a porcine YAC library, with approximately 5.5-fold coverage of the genome and a low rate of chimerism, that provides an additional resource for contig construction and positional cloning

Ecological theatre and the evolutionary game: how environmental and demographic factors determine payoffs in evolutionary games

In the standard approach to evolutionary games and replicator dynamics, differences in fitness can be interpreted as an excess from the mean Malthusian growth rate in the population. In the underlying reasoning, related to an analysis of "costs" and "benefits", there is a silent assumption that fitness can be described in some type of units. However, in most cases these units of measure are not explicitly specified. Then the question arises: are these theories testable? How can we measure "benefit" or "cost"? A natural language, useful for describing and justifying comparisons of strategic "cost" versus "benefits", is the terminology of demography, because the basic events that shape the outcome of natural selection are births and deaths. In this paper, we present the consequences of an explicit analysis of births and deaths in an evolutionary game theoretic framework. We will investigate different types of mortality pressures, their combinations and the possibility of trade-offs between mortality and fertility. We will show that within this new approach it is possible to model how strictly ecological factors such as density dependence and additive background fitness, which seem neutral in classical theory, can affect the outcomes of the game. We consider the example of the Hawk-Dove game, and show that when reformulated in terms of our new approach new details and new biological predictions are produced

Global warming: is weight loss a solution?

The current climate change has been most likely caused by the increased greenhouse gas emissions. We have looked at the major greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide (CO2), and estimated the reduction in the CO2 emissions that would occur with the theoretical global weight loss. The calculations were based on our previous weight loss study, investigating the effects of a low-carbohydrate diet on body weight, body composition and resting metabolic rate of obese volunteers with type 2 diabetes. At 6 months we observed decreases in weight, fat mass, fat free mass and CO2 production. We estimated that a 10 kg weight loss of all obese and overweight people would result in a decrease of 49.560 Mt of CO2 per year, which would equal to 0.2 % of the CO2 emitted globally in 2007. This reduction could help meet the CO2 emission reduction targets and unquestionably would be of a great benefit to the global health

Deducing the source and composition of rare earth mineralising fluids in carbonatites: insights from isotopic (C, O, 87Sr/86Sr) data from Kangankunde, Malawi

This is the final version of the article. Available from Springer Verlag via the DOI in this record.Carbonatites host some of the largest and highest grade rare earth element (REE) deposits but the composition and source of their REE-mineralising fluids remains enigmatic. Using C, O and 87Sr/86Sr isotope data together with major and trace element compositions for the REE-rich Kangankunde carbonatite (Malawi), we show that the commonly observed, dark brown, Fe-rich carbonatite that hosts REE minerals in many carbonatites is decoupled from the REE mineral assemblage. REE-rich ferroan dolomite carbonatites, containing 8–15 wt% REE2O3, comprise assemblages of monazite-(Ce), strontianite and baryte forming hexagonal pseudomorphs after probable burbankite. The 87Sr/86Sr values (0.70302–0.70307) affirm a carbonatitic origin for these pseudomorph-forming fluids. Carbon and oxygen isotope ratios of strontianite, representing the REE mineral assemblage, indicate equilibrium between these assemblages and a carbonatite-derived, deuteric fluid between 250 and 400 °C (δ18O + 3 to + 5‰VSMOW and δ13C − 3.5 to − 3.2‰VPDB). In contrast, dolomite in the same samples has similar δ13C values but much higher δ18O, corresponding to increasing degrees of exchange with low-temperature fluids (< 125 °C), causing exsolution of Fe oxides resulting in the dark colour of these rocks. REE-rich quartz rocks, which occur outside of the intrusion, have similar δ18O and 87Sr/86Sr to those of the main complex, indicating both are carbonatite-derived and, locally, REE mineralisation can extend up to 1.5 km away from the intrusion. Early, REE-poor apatite-bearing dolomite carbonatite (beforsite: δ18O + 7.7 to + 10.3‰ and δ13C −5.2 to −6.0‰; 87Sr/86Sr 0.70296–0.70298) is not directly linked with the REE mineralisation.This project was funded by the UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) SoS RARE project (NE/M011429/1) and by NIGL (NERC Isotope Geoscience Laboratory) Project number 20135