Seasonal stability in parasite assemblages of the Brazilian flathead, Percophis brasiliensis (Perciformes: Percophidae): Predictable tools for stock identification

A comparison of the composition and structure of parasite communities of the Brazilian flathead, Percophis brasiliensis Quoy et Gaimard (Perciformes: Percophidae) among seasons during one year was carried out in the Argentine Sea. A total of 195 fish specimens were examined and 25 parasite species were found. Parasite communities in seasonal samples showed a high degree of homogeneity in taxonomic composition and infection levels. Similarity analysis showed that the seasonal stability within and between samples was constant in both the composition and community structure throughout the year. Parasites can, therefore, be considered predictable markers for fish stock identification, independently of the season of capture, at least on an annual scale. © Institute of Parasitology, Biology Centre ASCR.Fil: Braicovich, Paola Elizabeth. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Biología. Laboratorio de Parasitología; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Mar del Plata; ArgentinaFil: Timi, Juan Tomas. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Mar del Plata; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata. Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales. Departamento de Biología. Laboratorio de Parasitología; Argentin

La posibilidad de la "acción libre" en las disertaciones de Epicteto

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar dos alternativas presentes en las Disertaciones de Epicteto como posibles vías de acceso a la libertad y la eudaimonía: a) identificar nuestro querer con el querer de la divinidad; b) concentrarnos exclusivamente en aquello de "depende de nosotros". Dado que ambos caminos parecen conducir al solipsismo y la pasividad, ofreceremos una alternativa de interpretación que permite conciliar ambas estrategias con la impronta práctica que caracteriza a la ética del autor. The aim of this paper is to analyse two alternatives which are present in Epictetus' Dissertations as possible ways to reach freedom and happiness: a) to identify our will with the will of the divinity; b) to focus exclusively on "what depends on us". Since both paths seem to lead to solipsism and passiveness, we shall offer an alternative interpretation that can reconcile both strategies with the practical approach of the Epictetus's ethics

Conocimiento de sí y "paideia" política en el "Alcibíades" I de Platón

Against a recent line of interpretation, which suggests that the Socratic exhortation to know ourselves expresses an interest in the singularity of the individual, I will suggest that the «self» involved in the Socratic precept refers to a universal element, namely, each individual’s soul in its common and shared aspect. I will therefore defend a minimal interpretation of the idea of self-knowledge, which excludes the initial process of acknowledgment of one’s own ignorance and emphasizes the negative elements of the Socratic argument.Contra una línea de interpretación reciente, que propone que la exhortación socrática a conocernos a nosotros mismos expresa un interés en la singularidad del individuo, sugeriré que el «sí mismo» al que refi ere el precepto socrático constituye una instancia universal, a saber, el alma de cada individuo en su dimensión común y compartida por todos los seres racionales. Defenderé, por esta razón, una concepción mínima del «conocimiento de sí mismo», la cual excluye el proceso inicial de reconocimiento de la propia ignorancia y enfatiza los elementos negativos de la argumentación socrática

Asentimiento y “lo que depende de nosotros”: dos argumentos compatibilistas en el estoicismo antiguo

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar dos argumentos estoicos (uno de ellos transmitido por Cicerón y Aulo Gelio, el otro por Nemesio y Alejandro) que han sido frecuentemente interpretados como una defensa del compatibilismo. Presentaremos una interpretación alternativa de ambos argumentos, concentrándonos en el horizonte naturalista ofrecido por la metafísica y la ética del estoicismo antiguo. El análisis se articulará sobre el concepto de “asentimiento” y sobre la distinción entre aquello que “depende de nosotros” y aquello que no.The aim of the present paper is to analyse two stoic arguments (one of them preserved by Cicero and Aulus Gellius, the other by Nemesius and Alexander) frequently interpreted as a defense of compatibilism. We shall present an alternative interpretation of both arguments, focusing on the naturalistic context provided by early Stoic metaphysics and ethics. The two notions we will mainly deal with will be the concept of “assent” and the distinction between that which “depends on us” and that which doesn’t

Seneca's Medea and De ira: justice and revenge

I try to show Seneca’s Medea provides us with two elements -which, as far as I am aware, have not received proper attention- that complement his approach to the phenomenon of anger and can improve our understanding of the Stoic psychology of action defended in De ira. The first element is linked to the question of whether the angry person is responsive to reasons or not; the second one concerns the question of indifference, tolerance and forgiveness, and addresses the issue of Medea's inability to conceive of a more appropriate or desirable irtreaction to Jason’s offense than anger

Constructionism and anger, rage and indignation. Deconstructing the discrete and adaptive character of emotions

A widespread conception of anger both within and outside academia proposes to interpret it (along with other emotions) as an adaptive response to certain recurrent problems in our evolutionary past, which implies interpreting anger as a discrete, basic, innate and adaptive emotion. In view of the crisis that the Basic Emotions thesis is going through, and taking into account a number of important objections that have been raised to the idea that anger represents a discrete emotion, I will suggest that the definitive abandonment of the concept of anger (and its close relatives, rage and indignation) has important hermeneutical advantages, including the possibility of approaching the problem of the phylogenesis of our sense of justice from a perspective that avoids the rupturist and continuist extremes that rely on a discrete conception of the emotions

Monismo e inmanencia en la cosmología estoica

The aim of this paper is to bring out to light the monistic cosmological foundations on which any interpretation of Stoic ethics must be constructed, articulated around the concepts of immanence and necessity

Seneca's Medea and De ira: justice and revenge

I try to show Seneca’s Medea provides us with two elements -which, as far as I am aware, have not received proper attention- that complement his approach to the phenomenon of anger and can improve our understanding of the Stoic psychology of action defended in De ira. The first element is linked to the question of whether the angry person is responsive to reasons or not; the second one concerns the question of indifference, tolerance and forgiveness, and addresses the issue of Medea's inability to conceive of a more appropriate or desirable irtreaction to Jason’s offense than anger

El problema de la akrasia en las Disertaciones de Epicteto

La argumentación en contra de la posibilidad de akrasia (“Veo lo mejor y, sin embargo, hago lo peor”, según la clásica formulación de Ovidio) que encontramos en las Disertaciones de Epicteto (Arriano) ha sido frecuentemente desatendida en los desarrollos modernos y contemporáneos de la problemática de la incontinencia. Esto se ha debido fundamentalmente al hecho de que las reflexiones de Epicteto suelen ser reducidas a una mera reelaboración de motivos socráticos bajo ejes dogmáticos estoicos. Por el contrario, será nuestro objetivo poner de manifiesto la singular riqueza teórica que subyace bajo la argumentación de nuestro esclavo estoico destinada a comprender en forma sistemática la conducta del incontinente. Esto exigirá contrastar el modelo de análisis de Epicteto con otras alternativas interpretativas del fenómeno de la akrasia.The argument against the possibility of akrasia (“I see what is best, and yet I do what is worse”, according to the classical formula of Ovidius) that we find en Epictetus (Arrianus), has frequently been neglected in modern and contemporary discussions around the problem of incontinence. This has mainly been due to the fact that Epictetus’ meditations tend to be reduced to a mere reproduction of Socratic issues under Stoic dogmas. On the contrary, it will be our goal to bring to light the remarkable theoretical richness that underlies the argument of our Stoic slave that aims at understanding in a systematic manner the behaviour of the incontinent. This will oblige us to contrast Epictetus’ model of analysis with other interpretative alternatives of the phenomenon of akrasia

Coloreando la geografía desde el plano al toroide

El tema "grafos", en general, no se encuentra en los programas oficiales de los distintos niveles educativos, ni en su faceta "matemática pura" ni desde sus conceptos básicos que, creemos, pueden ser utilizados como un juego de manera muy intuitiva con niños desde corta edad. En esta oportunidad trabajamos con el tema coloreo de grafos, experiencia realizada con niños de edades comprendidas entre los 5 y los 14 años de edad, y que presentamos en este trabajo con el análisis correspondiente