329 research outputs found
Fair and Efficient Allocations under Subadditive Valuations
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents
with subadditive valuations in a fair and efficient manner. Envy-Freeness up to
any good (EFX) is the most compelling notion of fairness in the context of
indivisible goods. Although the existence of EFX is not known beyond the simple
case of two agents with subadditive valuations, some good approximations of EFX
are known to exist, namely -EFX allocation and EFX allocations
with bounded charity.
Nash welfare (the geometric mean of agents' valuations) is one of the most
commonly used measures of efficiency. In case of additive valuations, an
allocation that maximizes Nash welfare also satisfies fairness properties like
Envy-Free up to one good (EF1). Although there is substantial work on
approximating Nash welfare when agents have additive valuations, very little is
known when agents have subadditive valuations. In this paper, we design a
polynomial-time algorithm that outputs an allocation that satisfies either of
the two approximations of EFX as well as achieves an
approximation to the Nash welfare. Our result also improves the current
best-known approximation of and to
Nash welfare when agents have submodular and subadditive valuations,
respectively.
Furthermore, our technique also gives an approximation to a
family of welfare measures, -mean of valuations for ,
thereby also matching asymptotically the current best known approximation ratio
for special cases like while also retaining the fairness
properties
Finding fair and efficient allocations
We study the problem of fair division, where the goal is to allocate a set of items among a set of agents in a ``fair" manner. In particular, we focus on settings in which the items to be divided are either indivisible goods or divisible bads. Despite their practical significance, both these settings have been much less investigated than the divisible goods setting. In the first part of the dissertation, we focus on the fair division of indivisible goods. Our fairness criterion is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). An allocation is EFX if no agent envies another agent following the removal of a single good from the other agent's bundle. Despite significant investment by the research community, the existence of EFX allocations remains open and is considered one of the most important open problems in fair division. In this thesis, we make significant progress on this question. First, we show that when agents have general valuations, we can determine an EFX allocation with a small number of unallocated goods (almost EFX allocation). Second, we demonstrate that when agents have structured valuations, we can determine an almost EFX allocation that is also efficient in terms of Nash welfare. Third, we prove that EFX allocations exist when there are three agents with additive valuations. Finally, we reduce the problem of finding improved guarantees on EFX allocations to a novel problem in extremal graph theory. In the second part of this dissertation, we turn to the fair division of divisible bads. Like in the setting of divisible goods, competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) has emerged as the best mechanism for allocating divisible bads. However, neither a polynomial time algorithm nor any hardness result is known for the computation of CEEI with bads. We study the problem of dividing bads in the classic Arrow-Debreu setting (a setting that generalizes CEEI). We show that in sharp contrast to the Arrow-Debreu setting with goods, determining whether a competitive equilibrium exists, is NP-hard in the case of divisible bads. Furthermore, we prove the existence of equilibrium under a simple and natural sufficiency condition. Finally, we show that even on instances that satisfy this sufficiency condition, determining a competitive equilibrium is PPAD-hard. Thus, we settle the complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu setting with divisible bads.Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der gerechten Verteilung (fair division), welches zum Ziel hat, eine Menge von Gegenständen (items) einer Menge von Akteuren (agents) \zuzuordnen". Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt der Arbeit auf Szenarien, in denen die zu verteilenden Gegenstände entweder unteilbare Güter (indivisible goods) oder teilbare Pflichten (divisible bads) sind. Trotz ihrer praktischen Relevanz haben diese Szenarien in der Forschung bislang bedeutend weniger Aufmerksamkeit erfahren als das Szenario mit teilbaren Gütern (divisible goods). Der erste Teil der Arbeit konzentriert sich auf die gerechte Verteilung unteilbarer Güter. Unser Gerechtigkeitskriterium ist Neid-Freiheit bis auf irgendein Gut (envy- freeness up to any good, EFX). Eine Zuordnung ist EFX, wenn kein Akteur einen anderen Akteur beneidet, nachdem ein einzelnes Gut aus dem Bündel des anderen Akteurs entfernt wurde. Die Existenz von EFX-Zuordnungen ist trotz ausgeprägter Bemühungen der Forschungsgemeinschaft ungeklärt und wird gemeinhin als eine der wichtigsten offenen Fragen des Feldes angesehen. Wir unternehmen wesentliche Schritte hin zu einer Klärung dieser Frage. Erstens zeigen wir, dass wir für Akteure mit allgemeinen Bewertungsfunktionen stets eine EFX-Zuordnung finden können, bei der nur eine kleine Anzahl von Gütern unallokiert bleibt (partielle EFX-Zuordnung, almost EFX allocation). Zweitens demonstrieren wir, dass wir für Akteure mit strukturierten Bewertungsfunktionen eine partielle EFX-Zuordnung bestimmen können, die zusätzlich effizient im Sinne der Nash-Wohlfahrtsfunktion ist. Drittens beweisen wir, dass EFX-Zuordnungen für drei Akteure mit additiven Bewertungsfunktionen immer existieren. Schließlich reduzieren wir das Problem, verbesserte Garantien für EFX-Zuordnungen zu finden, auf ein neuartiges Problem in der extremalen Graphentheorie. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit widmet sich der gerechten Verteilung teilbarer Pflichten. Wie im Szenario mit teilbaren Gütern hat sich auch hier das Wettbewerbsgleichgewicht bei gleichem Einkommen (competitive equilibrium with equal incomes, CEEI) als der beste Allokationsmechanismus zur Verteilung teilbarer Pflichten erwiesen. Gleichzeitig sind weder polynomielle Algorithmen noch Schwere-Resultate für die Berechnung von CEEI mit Pflichten bekannt. Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der Verteilung von Pflichten im klassischen Arrow-Debreu-Modell (einer Generalisierung von CEEI). Wir zeigen, dass es NP-hart ist, zu entscheiden, ob es im Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit Pflichten ein Wettbewerbsgleichgewicht gibt { im scharfen Gegensatz zum Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit Gütern. Ferner beweisen wir die Existenz eines Gleichgewichts unter der Annahme einer einfachen und natürlichen hinreichenden Bedingung. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass die Bestimmung eines Wettbewerbsgleichgewichts sogar für Eingaben, die unsere hinreichende Bedingung erfüllen, PPAD-hart ist. Damit klären wir die Komplexität des Auffindens eines Wettbewerbsgleichgewichts im Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit teilbaren Pflichten
Sketching, Streaming, and Fine-Grained Complexity of (Weighted) LCS
We study sketching and streaming algorithms for the Longest Common Subsequence problem (LCS) on strings of small alphabet size |Sigma|. For the problem of deciding whether the LCS of strings x,y has length at least L, we obtain a sketch size and streaming space usage of O(L^{|Sigma| - 1} log L). We also prove matching unconditional lower bounds.
As an application, we study a variant of LCS where each alphabet symbol is equipped with a weight that is given as input, and the task is to compute a common subsequence of maximum total weight. Using our sketching algorithm, we obtain an O(min{nm, n + m^{|Sigma|}})-time algorithm for this problem, on strings x,y of length n,m, with n >= m. We prove optimality of this running time up to lower order factors, assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis
Combinatorial Algorithms for General Linear Arrow-Debreu Markets
We present a combinatorial algorithm for determining the market clearing prices of a general linear Arrow-Debreu market, where every agent can own multiple goods. The existing combinatorial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets consider the case where each agent can own all of one good only. We present an O~((n+m)^7 log^3(UW)) algorithm where n, m, U and W refer to the number of agents, the number of goods, the maximal integral utility and the maximum quantity of any good in the market respectively. The algorithm refines the iterative algorithm of Duan, Garg and Mehlhorn using several new ideas. We also identify the hard instances for existing combinatorial algorithms for linear Arrow-Debreu markets. In particular we find instances where the ratio of the maximum to the minimum equilibrium price of a good is U^{Omega(n)} and the number of iterations required by the existing iterative combinatorial algorithms of Duan, and Mehlhorn and Duan, Garg, and Mehlhorn are high. Our instances also separate the two algorithms
On the Existence of Competitive Equilibrium with Chores
We study the chore division problem in the classic Arrow-Debreu exchange setting, where a set of agents want to divide their divisible chores (bads) to minimize their disutilities (costs). We assume that agents have linear disutility functions. Like the setting with goods, a division based on competitive equilibrium is regarded as one of the best mechanisms for bads. Equilibrium existence for goods has been extensively studied, resulting in a simple, polynomial-time verifiable, necessary and sufficient condition. However, dividing bads has not received a similar extensive study even though it is as relevant as dividing goods in day-to-day life.
In this paper, we show that the problem of checking whether an equilibrium exists in chore division is NP-complete, which is in sharp contrast to the case of goods. Further, we derive a simple, polynomial-time verifiable, sufficient condition for existence. Our fixed-point formulation to show existence makes novel use of both Kakutani and Brouwer fixed-point theorems, the latter nested inside the former, to avoid the undefined demand issue specific to bads
Competitive Equilibrium for Chores: from Dual Eisenberg-Gale to a Fast, Greedy, LP-based Algorithm
We study the computation of competitive equilibrium for Fisher markets with
agents and divisible chores. Prior work showed that competitive
equilibria correspond to the nonzero KKT points of a non-convex analogue of the
Eisenberg-Gale convex program. We introduce an analogue of the Eisenberg-Gale
dual for chores: we show that all KKT points of this dual correspond to
competitive equilibria, and while it is not a dual of the non-convex primal
program in a formal sense, the objectives touch at all KKT points. Similar to
the primal, the dual has problems from an optimization perspective: there are
many feasible directions where the objective tends to positive infinity. We
then derive a new constraint for the dual, which restricts optimization to a
hyperplane that avoids all these directions. We show that restriction to this
hyperplane retains all KKT points, and surprisingly, does not introduce any new
ones. This allows, for the first time ever, application of iterative
optimization methods over a convex region for computing competitive equilibria
for chores.
We next introduce a greedy Frank-Wolfe algorithm for optimization over our
program and show a state-of-the-art convergence rate to competitive
equilibrium. In the case of equal incomes, we show a rate of convergence, which improves over the two prior
state-of-the-art rates of for an
exterior-point method and for a
combinatorial method. Moreover, our method is significantly simpler: each
iteration of our method only requires solving a simple linear program. We show
through numerical experiments on simulated data and a paper review bidding
dataset that our method is extremely practical. This is the first highly
practical method for solving competitive equilibrium for Fisher markets with
chores.Comment: 25 pages, 17 figure
Fairness in Federated Learning via Core-Stability
Federated learning provides an effective paradigm to jointly optimize a model
benefited from rich distributed data while protecting data privacy.
Nonetheless, the heterogeneity nature of distributed data makes it challenging
to define and ensure fairness among local agents. For instance, it is
intuitively "unfair" for agents with data of high quality to sacrifice their
performance due to other agents with low quality data. Currently popular
egalitarian and weighted equity-based fairness measures suffer from the
aforementioned pitfall. In this work, we aim to formally represent this problem
and address these fairness issues using concepts from co-operative game theory
and social choice theory. We model the task of learning a shared predictor in
the federated setting as a fair public decision making problem, and then define
the notion of core-stable fairness: Given agents, there is no subset of
agents that can benefit significantly by forming a coalition among
themselves based on their utilities and (i.e., ). Core-stable predictors are robust to low quality local data from
some agents, and additionally they satisfy Proportionality and
Pareto-optimality, two well sought-after fairness and efficiency notions within
social choice. We then propose an efficient federated learning protocol CoreFed
to optimize a core stable predictor. CoreFed determines a core-stable predictor
when the loss functions of the agents are convex. CoreFed also determines
approximate core-stable predictors when the loss functions are not convex, like
smooth neural networks. We further show the existence of core-stable predictors
in more general settings using Kakutani's fixed point theorem. Finally, we
empirically validate our analysis on two real-world datasets, and we show that
CoreFed achieves higher core-stability fairness than FedAvg while having
similar accuracy.Comment: NeurIPS 2022; code:
https://openreview.net/attachment?id=lKULHf7oFDo&name=supplementary_materia
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