Associations between exemption and survival outcomes in the UK's primary care pay-for-performance programme:a retrospective cohort study

PublishedJournal ArticleThis is the final version of the article. Available from BMJ Publishing Group via the DOI in this record.OBJECTIVES: The UK's Quality and Outcomes Framework permits practices to exempt patients from financially-incentivised performance targets. To better understand the determinants and consequences of being exempted from the framework, we investigated the associations between exception reporting, patient characteristics and mortality. We also quantified the proportion of exempted patients that met quality targets for a tracer condition (diabetes). DESIGN: Retrospective longitudinal study, using individual patient data from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink. SETTING: 644 general practices, 2006/7 to 2011/12. PARTICIPANTS: Patients registered with study practices for at least one year over the study period, with at least one condition of interest (2 460 341 in total). MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Exception reporting rates by reason (clinical contraindication, patient dissent); all-cause mortality in year following exemption. Analyses with logistic and Cox proportional-hazards regressions, respectively. RESULTS: The odds of being exempted increased with age, deprivation and multimorbidity. Men were more likely to be exempted but this was largely attributable to higher prevalence of conditions with high exemption rates. Modest associations remained, with women more likely to be exempted due to clinical contraindication (OR 0.90, 99% CI 0.88 to 0.92) and men more likely to be exempted due to informed dissent (OR 1.08, 99% CI 1.06 to 1.10). More deprived areas (both for practice location and patient residence) were non-linearly associated with higher exception rates, after controlling for comorbidities and other covariates, with stronger associations for clinical contraindication. Compared with patients with a single condition, odds ratios for patients with two, three, or four or more conditions were respectively 4.28 (99% CI 4.18 to 4.38), 16.32 (99% CI 15.82 to 16.83) and 68.69 (99% CI 66.12 to 71.37) for contraindication, and 2.68 (99% CI 2.63 to 2.74), 4.02 (99% CI 3.91 to 4.13) and 5.17 (99% CI 5.00 to 5.35) for informed dissent. Exempted patients had a higher adjusted risk of death in the following year than non-exempted patients, regardless of whether this exemption was for contraindication (hazard ratio 1.37, 99% CI 1.33 to 1.40) or for informed dissent (1.20, 99% CI 1.17 to 1.24). On average, quality standards were met for 48% of exempted patients in the diabetes domain, but there was wide variation across indicators (ranging from 8 to 80%). CONCLUSIONS: Older, multimorbid and more deprived patients are more likely to be exempted from the scheme. Exception reported patients are more likely to die in the following year, whether they are exempted by the practice for a contraindication or by themselves through informed dissent. Further research is needed to understand the relationship between exception reporting and patient outcomes.NIHR School for Primary Care Research (Project #141); Medical Research Council; Health eResearch Centre grant MR/K006665/1

Increase in computed tomography in Australia driven mainly by practice change: A decomposition analysis

Background: Publicly funded computed tomography (CT) procedure descriptions in Australia often specify the body site, rather than indication for use. This study aimed to evaluate the relative contribution of demographic versus non-demographic factors in driving the increase in CT services in Australia. Methods: A decomposition analysis was conducted to assess the proportion of additional CT attributable to changing population structure, CT use on a per capita basis (CPC, a proxy for change in practice) and/or cost of CT. Aggregated Medicare usage and billing data were obtained for selected years between 1993/4 and 2012/3. Results: The number of billed CT scans rose from 33 per annum per 1000 of population in 1993/94 (total 572,925) to 112 per 1000 by 2012/13 (total 2,540,546). The respective cost to Medicare rose from $145.7 million to$790.7 million. Change in CPC was the most important factor accounting for changes in CT services (88%) and cost (65%) over the study period. Conclusions: While this study cannot conclude if the increase is appropriate, it does represent a shift in how CT is used, relative to when many CT services were listed for public funding. This ‘scope shift’ poses questions as to need for and frequency of retrospective/ongoing review of publicly funded services, as medical advances and other demand- or supply-side factors change the way health services are used

Incentive payments are not related to expected health gain in the pay for performance scheme for UK primary care: cross-sectional analysis

Background: The General Medical Services primary care contract for the United Kingdom financially rewards performance in 19 clinical areas, through the Quality and Outcomes Framework. Little is known about how best to determine the size of financial incentives in pay for performance schemes. Our aim was to test the hypothesis that performance indicators with larger population health benefits receive larger financial incentives. Methods: We performed cross sectional analyses to quantify associations between the size of financial incentives and expected health gain in the 2004 and 2006 versions of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. We used non-parametric two-sided Spearman rank correlation tests. Health gain was measured in expected lives saved in one year and in quality adjusted life years. For each quality indicator in an average sized general practice we tested for associations first, between the marginal increase in payment and the health gain resulting from a one percent point improvement in performance and second, between total payment and the health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment. Results: Evidence for lives saved or quality adjusted life years gained was found for 28 indicators accounting for 41% of the total incentive payments. No statistically significant associations were found between the expected health gain and incentive gained from a marginal 1% increase in performance in either the 2004 or 2006 version of the Quality and Outcomes Framework. In addition no associations were found between the size of financial payment for achievement of an indicator and the expected health gain at the performance threshold for maximum payment measured in lives saved or quality adjusted life years. Conclusions: In this subgroup of indicators the financial incentives were not aligned to maximise health gain. This disconnection between incentive and expected health gain risks supporting clinical activities that are only marginally effective, at the expense of more effective activities receiving lower incentives. When designing pay for performance programmes decisions about the size of the financial incentive attached to an indicator should be informed by information on the health gain to be expected from that indicator

Outcome of illustrated information leaflet on correct usage of asthma-metered dose inhaler:

Research globally has shown that metered dose inhaler (MDI) technique is poor, with patient education and regular demonstration critical in maintaining correct use of inhalers. Patient information containing pictorial aids improves understanding of medicine usage; however, manufacturer leaflets illustrating MDI use may not be easily understood by low-literacy asthma patients. To develop and evaluate the outcome of a tailored, simplified leaflet on correct MDI technique in asthma patients with limited literacy skills

Design choices made by target users for a pay-for-performance program in primary care: an action research approach

Contains fulltext : 110832.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)BACKGROUND: International interest in pay-for-performance (P4P) initiatives to improve quality of health care is growing. Current programs vary in the methods of performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. One may assume that involvement of health care professionals in the goal setting and methods of quality measurement and subsequent payment schemes may enhance their commitment to and motivation for P4P programs and therefore the impact of these programs. We developed a P4P program in which the target users were involved in decisions about the P4P methods. METHODS: For the development of the P4P program a framework was used which distinguished three main components: performance measurement, appraisal and reimbursement. Based on this framework design choices were discussed in two panels of target users using an adapted Delphi procedure. The target users were 65 general practices and two health insurance companies in the South of the Netherlands. RESULTS: Performance measurement was linked to the Dutch accreditation program based on three domains (clinical care, practice management and patient experience). The general practice was chosen as unit of assessment. Relative standards were set at the 25th percentile of group performance. The incentive for clinical care was set twice as high as the one for practice management and patient experience. Quality scores were to be calculated separately for all three domains, and for both the quality level and the improvement of performance. The incentive for quality level was set thrice as high as the one for the improvement of performance. For reimbursement, quality scores were divided into seven levels. A practice with a quality score in the lowest group was not supposed to receive a bonus. The additional payment grew proportionally for each extra group. The bonus aimed at was on average 5% to 10% of the practice income. CONCLUSIONS: Designing a P4P program for primary care with involvement of the target users gave us an insight into their motives, which can help others who need to discuss similar programs. The resulting program is in line with target users' views and assessments of relevance and applicability. This may enhance their commitment to the program as was indicated by the growing number of voluntary participants after a successfully performed field test during the procedure. The elements of our framework can be very helpful for others who are developing or evaluating a P4P program

Primary care nurses: effects on secondary care referrals for diabetes

Background: Primary care nurses play an important role in diabetes care, and were introduced in GP-practice partly to shift care from hospital to primary care. The aim of this study was to assess whether the referral rate for hospital treatment for diabetes type II (T2DM) patients has changed with the introduction of primary care nurses, and whether these changes were related to the number of diabetes-related contacts in a general practice. Methods: Healthcare utilisation was assessed for a period of 365 days for 301 newly diagnosed and 2124 known T2DM patients in 2004 and 450 and 3226 patients in 2006 from general practices that participated in the Netherlands Information Network of General Practice (LINH). Multilevel logistic and linear regression analyses were used to analyse the effect of the introduction of primary care nurses on referrals to internists, ophthalmologists and cardiologists and diabetes-related contact rate. Separate analyses were conducted for newly diagnosed and known T2DM patients. Results: Referrals to internists for newly diagnosed T2DM patients decreased between 2004 and 2006 (OR:0.44; 95%CI:0.22-0.87) in all practices. For known T2DM patients no overall decrease in referrals to internists was found, but practices with a primary care nurse had a lower trend (OR:0.59). The number of diabetes-related contacts did not differ between practices with and without primary care nurses. Cardiologists’ and ophthalmologists’ referral rate did not change. Conclusions: The introduction of primary care nurses seems to have led to a shift of care from internists to primary care for known diabetes patients, while the diabetes-related contact rate seem to have remained unchanged.

Incentive payments to general practitioners aimed at increasing opportunistic testing of young women for chlamydia: a pilot cluster randomised controlled trial

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Financial incentives have been used for many years internationally to improve quality of care in general practice. The aim of this pilot study was to determine if offering general practitioners (GP) a small incentive payment per test would increase chlamydia testing in women aged 16 to 24 years, attending general practice.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>General practice clinics (n = 12) across Victoria, Australia, were cluster randomized to receive either a $AUD5 payment per chlamydia test or no payment for testing 16 to 24 year old women for chlamydia. Data were collected on the number of chlamydia tests and patient consultations undertaken by each GP over two time periods: 12 month pre-trial and 6 month trial period. The impact of the intervention was assessed using a mixed effects logistic regression model, accommodating for clustering at GP level.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Testing increased from 6.2% (95% CI: 4.2, 8.4) to 8.8% (95% CI: 4.8, 13.0) (p = 0.1) in the control group and from 11.5% (95% CI: 4.6, 18.5) to 13.4% (95% CI: 9.5, 17.5) (p = 0.4) in the intervention group. Overall, the intervention did not result in a significant increase in chlamydia testing in general practice. The odds ratio for an increase in testing in the intervention group compared to the control group was 0.9 (95% CI: 0.6, 1.2). Major barriers to increased chlamydia testing reported by GPs included a lack of time, difficulty in remembering to offer testing and a lack of patient awareness around testing.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>A small financial incentive alone did not increase chlamydia testing among young women attending general practice. It is possible small incentive payments in conjunction with reminder and feedback systems may be effective, as may higher financial incentive payments. Further research is required to determine if financial incentives can increase testing in Australian general practice, the type and level of financial scheme required and whether incentives needs to be part of a multi-faceted package.</p> <p>Trial Registration</p> <p>Australian New Zealand Clinical Trial Registry ACTRN12608000499381.</p