Using perspective to resolve reference: the impact of cognitive load and motivation

Research has demonstrated a link between perspective-taking and working memory. Here we used eye-tracking to examine the time course with which working memory load (WML) influences perspective-taking ability in a referential communication task, and how motivation to take another’s perspective modulates these effects.  In Experiment 1, where there was no reward or time-pressure, listeners only showed evidence of incorporating perspective knowledge during integration of the target object, but did not anticipate reference to this Common Ground object during the pre-target noun period. WML did not affect this perspective use. In Experiment 2 - where a reward for speed and accuracy was applied - listeners used perspective cues to disambiguate the target object from the competitor object from the earliest moments of processing (i.e. during the pre-target noun period)- but only under low load. Under high load, responses were comparable with the control condition, where both objects were in common ground. Furthermore, attempts to initiate perspective-relevant responses under high load led to impaired recall on the concurrent WML task, indicating that perspective-relevant responses were drawing on limited cognitive resources. These results show that when there is ambiguity, perspective cues guide rapid referential interpretation when there is sufficient motivation and sufficient cognitive resources

Eye tracking reveals the cost of switching between self and other perspectives in a visual perspective-taking task

Previous studies have shown that while people can rapidly and accurately compute their own and other people's visual perspectives, they experience difficulty ignoring the irrelevant perspective when the two perspectives differ. We used the "avatar" perspective-taking task to examine the mechanisms that underlie these egocentric (i.e., interference from their own perspective) and altercentric (i.e., interference from the other person's perspective) tendencies. Participants were eye-tracked as they verified the number of discs in a visual scene according to either their own or an on-screen avatar's perspective. Crucially in some trials the two perspectives were inconsistent (i.e., each saw a different number of discs), while in others they were consistent. To examine the effect of perspective switching, performance was compared for trials that were preceded with the same versus a different perspective cue. We found that altercentric interference can be reduced or eliminated when participants stick with their own perspective across consecutive trials. Our eye-tracking analyses revealed distinct fixation patterns for self and other perspective taking, suggesting that consistency effects in this paradigm are driven by implicit mentalizing of what others can see, and not automatic directional cues from the avatar.</p

Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind

Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution

Interacting with Fictions:The Role of Pretend Play in Theory of Mind Acquisition

Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagher’s account of social cognition development with Matravers’ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as interaction with fictions. I argue that my account offers a better explanation of existing empirical data on the development of children’s pretend play and Theory of Mind than the competing theories from Leslie, Perner and Harris

Social brain activation during mentalizing in a large autism cohort: the Longitudinal European Autism Project

Background: Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental condition with key deficits in social functioning. It is widely assumed that the biological underpinnings of social impairment are neurofunctional alterations in the “social brain,” a neural circuitry involved in inferring the mental state of a social partner. However, previous evidence comes from small-scale studies and findings have been mixed. We therefore carried out the to-date largest study on neural correlates of mentalizing in ASD. Methods: As part of the Longitudinal European Autism Project, we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging at six European sites in a large, well-powered, and deeply phenotyped sample of individuals with ASD (N = 205) and typically developing (TD) individuals (N = 189) aged 6 to 30 years. We presented an animated shapes task to assess and comprehensively characterize social brain activation during mentalizing. We tested for effects of age, diagnosis, and their association with symptom measures, including a continuous measure of autistic traits. Results: We observed robust effects of task. Within the ASD sample, autistic traits were moderately associated with functional activation in one of the key regions of the social brain, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. However, there were no significant effects of diagnosis on task performance and no effects of age and diagnosis on social brain responses. Besides a lack of mean group differences, our data provide no evidence for meaningful differences in the distribution of brain response measures. Extensive control analyses suggest that the lack of case-control differences was not due to a variety of potential confounders. Conclusions: Contrary to prior reports, this large-scale study does not support the assumption that altered social brain activation during mentalizing forms a common neural marker of ASD, at least with the paradigm we employed. Yet, autistic individuals show socio-behavioral deficits. Our work therefore highlights the need to interrogate social brain function with other brain measures, such as connectivity and network-based approaches, using other paradigms, or applying complementary analysis approaches to assess individual differences in this heterogeneous condition

Distinct Neurocognitive Strategies for Comprehensions of Human and Artificial Intelligence

Although humans have inevitably interacted with both human and artificial intelligence in real life situations, it is unknown whether the human brain engages homologous neurocognitive strategies to cope with both forms of intelligence. To investigate this, we scanned subjects, using functional MRI, while they inferred the reasoning processes conducted by human agents or by computers. We found that the inference of reasoning processes conducted by human agents but not by computers induced increased activity in the precuneus but decreased activity in the ventral medial prefrontal cortex and enhanced functional connectivity between the two brain areas. The findings provide evidence for distinct neurocognitive strategies of taking others' perspective and inhibiting the process referenced to the self that are specific to the comprehension of human intelligence

Tracking the impact of depression in a perspective-taking task

Research has identified impairments in Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in depressed patients, particularly in relation to tasks involving empathetic responses and belief reasoning. We aimed to build on this research by exploring the relationship between depressed mood and cognitive ToM, specifically visual perspective-taking ability. High and low depressed participants were eye-tracked as they completed a perspective-taking task, in which they followed the instructions of a ‘director’ to move target objects (e.g. a “teapot with spots on”) around a grid, in the presence of a temporarily-ambiguous competitor object (e.g. a “teapot with stars on”). Importantly, some of the objects in the grid were occluded from the director’s (but not the participant’s) view. Results revealed no group-based difference in participants’ ability to use perspective cues to identify the target object. All participants were faster to select the target object when the competitor was only available to the participant, compared to when the competitor was mutually available to the participant and director. Eye-tracking measures supported this pattern, revealing that perspective directed participants’ visual search immediately upon hearing the ambiguous object’s name (e.g. “teapot”). We discuss how these results fit with previous studies that have shown a negative relationship between depression and ToM

Deficit of social cognition in subjects with surgically treated frontal lobe lesions and in subjects affected by schizophrenia

The ability of humans to predict and explain other people’s behaviour by attributing independent mental states such as desires and beliefs to them, is considered to be due to our ability to construct a “Theory of Mind”. Recently, several neuroimaging studies have implicated the medial frontal lobes as playing a critical role in a dedicated “mentalizing” or “Theory of Mind” network in the human brain. In this study we compare the performance of patients with right and left medial prefrontal lobe lesions in theory of mind and in social cognition tasks, with the performance of people with schizophrenia. We report a similar social cognitive profile between patients with prefrontal lobe lesions and schizophrenic subjects in terms of understanding of false beliefs, in understanding social situations and in using tactical strategies. These findings are relevant for the functional anatomy of “Theory of Mind”