Seaman\u27s Manslaughter and Charter Boats - The Case of United States v. Richard Smith

Captain Richard Smith was sailing his charter vessel, Cimarron, along with a crew from Camden, Maine to St. John, U.S. Virgin Islands for the winter season. During the voyage, Smith stopped in Beaufort, North Carolina, and picked up David Pontious who would join the crew for the remainder of the journey. Shortly after joining the crew, Pontious began experiencing hallucinations and sickness, culminating in Pontious attacking Smith. After the altercation was broken up, Pontious jumped overboard and drowned. Smith never made an attempt to assist Pontious and waited until the next day to radio for assistance. Upon the Cimarron’s arrival in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Smith was arrested and charged under a rarely used statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1115, commonly known as Seaman’s Manslaughter. After a trial, Smith’s attorney filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on the ground that the statute only applies to commercial vessels. Over the Government’s objection, the motion was granted. Applying two cannons of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, Smith contended that in order to be convicted under § 1115, the vessel needed to be engaged in commercial activity. This includes carrying passengers or cargo for pay. Accordingly, because the Cimarron, was not being paid to transport any passengers or cargo, and no members of the crew were being paid, the Court accepted Smith’s argument that the Cimarron was not engaged in commercial activity and therefore § 1115 is inapplicable

Circuit Split on the Application of the Safety Valve Provision as Applied to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act - Alexander and Mosquera-Murillo

When the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided the case of United States v. Mosquera-Murillo, it created a circuit-split on whether individuals charged under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (codified as 46 U.S.C. § 705) are entitled to relief under the Safety Valve provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The Safety Valve allows individuals who meet certain criteria to be sentenced according to the sentencing guidelines, regardless of any mandatory minimum sentences. This case note compares the holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to the Eleventh Circuit\u27s holding in United States v. Alexander, which held that because the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act is not specifically listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), defendants charged under the Act are not entitled to relief. This Note analyzes the approaches taken by both courts and concludes that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia correctly decided the issue. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that because the elements for the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act are supplied by a statute specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act qualifies as an offense under the Safety Valve statute. Accordingly, this Note concludes that the consequences of the circuit split are potentially severe and that the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari and adopt the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia