2,121 research outputs found
Generosity as a central virtue in Nietzsche's ethics
Nietzsche's ethics is basically an ethics of virtue. In his own unique way, and in accordance with his extra-moral view of life, Nietzsche recovers and re-appropriates certain virtues – notably pagan, aristocratic virtues – as part
of his project to reconceptualise (‘rehabilitate’) the virtues in terms of virtù (virtuosity and vitality), to which he also refers as his ‘moraline-free’ conception
of the virtues. The virtue of generosity (in the sense of magnanimity) plays a central role in Nietzschean ethics. According to Nietzsche, the truly noble or virtuous person is one who lives beyond resentment and feelings of
remorse and guilt. He lives his life from the fullness and plenitude of his own being and what he is able to bestow on others. Nietzsche seeks to rekindle and rehabilitate the aristocratic ‘pathos of distance’ as the true origin of ethical life. This pathos of distance basically emanates from self-respect: ‘The noble soul has reverence for itself’ (1974b: §287). For Nietzsche, this means that one should realize the greatest multiplicity of drives and form-giving
forces in oneself, in the most tension-fraught but ‘controlled’ manner. This control, this imposing a form on oneself without neglecting the multiplicity in oneself, is a creative, artistic activity. Nietzsche also refers to this as a process of transforming the self into a work of art, of giving style to one's own existence. Thus we free ourselves from guilt, resentment and the rage against contingency. It is of the utmost importance for Nietzsche that one should attain satisfaction with oneself, for ‘only then is a human being at all tolerable to behold. Whoever is dissatisfied with himself is continually ready for revenge, and we others will be his victims, if only by having to endure his ugly
sight.’ (1974a: §290). To attain satisfaction with oneself ultimately means to affirm life in its totality. This implies a life beyond resentment, i.e. a life that is characterised by generosity or magnanimity (megalopsychia, magnanimitas), which is for Nietzsche the ‘crown’ of all the virtues
Truth, Art, and the New Sensuousness : Understanding Heidegger\u27s Metaphysical Reading of Nietzsche
This article takes a critical look into Heidegger’s reading of Nietzschean metaphysics in the context of art and finds certain discrepancies in Heidegger’s texts. Heidegger’s claim is that Nietzsche has had some difficulty in discussing the problem of truth, being, and becoming in terms of how the Western tradition of philosophy has understood it. In the context of art, Magrini traces the path that Heidegger took in understanding Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism and finds that Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche is actually an attempt to elevate the latter as a timely philosophical force whose thought moves away from the rote and dogmatic tradition of Western philosophy. Magrini is also able to point out that Heidegger’s reading moves through the usual rational and structured philosophy via a sensuous use of metaphors that is much closer to life, which is a noticeable change in the writing style of Heidegger from his Nachlass lectures and his posthumous work the Beiträge zur Philosophie. Despite some misgivings, Magrini lauds Heidegger’s work as a strict close reading of Nietzsche that brings out the best of the thinker’s radical thoughts
Persons, Virtual Persons, and Radical Interpretation
A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to make sense of. Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems to be ruling out the conditions of subjectivity required to keep the concept of the self. Eliminative materialism states this position explicitly. The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with the concept. That implication would require us to dispense with many of the most basic commitments of our manifest or common sense image of the world. And it would require us to abandon, to maintain as an act of bad faith, or radically to adjust, virtually every significant basic commitment underlying the variety of traditions that have evolved historically from the (natural) platform of common sense. Daniel Dennett’s sympathies seem to be divided over this issue. He is reluctant to eliminate the most fundamental linguistic-conceptual-institutional commitments that have evolved from common sense. Yet, I will argue, the basis of his support for these, beneath the surface of his rhetoric, is a mirage. His view of persons and related (intentional) concepts is a case in point. In place of the eliminative materialist position, Dennett recommends that we regard the self as a highly useful “theorist’s fiction.” He adopts a similar epistemic stance toward intention, belief, mind, and so on. In this paper I aim to show that Dennett’s recommendation is based on a subtle version of the dualism of subject and object (or scheme and content), which he seems to agree that we should transcend. Against Dennett’s view of the self as a “theorist’s fiction,” I argue in favour of a version of Donald Davidson’s realist thesis that, once we properly appreciate the significance of abandoning this pervasive dualism, we can maintain the self and associated intentional items – belief, mind, and so on – within a thoroughly realist ontology
Nietzsche on identity
I gather and constructively criticize Nietzsche’s writings on identity. Nietzsche treats identity as a logical fiction. He denies that there are any enduring things (no substances); he denies that there are any indiscernible things in any respect (no universals, no bare particulars). For Nietzsche, the world consists of durationless events bearing non-universal properties and standing to one another in non-universal relations. Events are bundles of tropes. Nietzsche even denies self-identity. His events are self-differing trope-bundles. I link Nietzsche’s denial of self-identity with modern treatments of paradox
Language, Subjectivity and the Agon: A Comparative Study of Nietzsche and Lyotard
Political Philosophy and Ethic
On Nietzsche’s Concept of ‘European Nihilism’
In Nietzsche, ‘European nihilism’ has at its core valuelessness, meaninglessness
and senselessness. This article argues that Nietzsche is not replacing God with the
nothing, but rather that he regards ‘European nihilism’ as an ‘in-between state’ that is
necessary for getting beyond Christian morality. An important characteristic of a
Nietzschean philosopher is his ‘will to responsibility’. One of his responsibilities
consists of the creation of the values and the concepts that are needed in order to
overcome the intermediate state of nihilism. For prevailing over nihilism in science,
Nietzsche suggests drawing on philosophy for the creation of values and drawing on
art in order to create beautiful surfaces that are based on these values. He regards
science as a cultural system that rests on contingent grounds. Therefore, his work is
concerned with the responsible construction of the narratives of science in such a way
that they enhance agency and promote a life-affirming future
Nietzsche’s polychrome exemplarism
In this paper, I develop an account of Nietzschean exemplarism. Drawing on my previous work, I argue that an agent’s instincts and other drives constitute her psychological type. In this framework, a drive counts as a virtue to the extent that it is well-calibrated with the rest of the agent’s psychic economy and meets with sentiments of approbation from the agent’s community. Different virtues are fitting for different types, and different types elicit different discrete emotions in people with fine-tuned affective sensitivity, making Nietzsche’s exemplarism doubly pluralistic. Exemplars show us how a type is expressed in different social and cultural contexts. Some live up to the full potential of their type, while others are stymied and demonstrate how pernicious influences can wreck a person’s psychology. While some exemplars inspire admiration that leads to emulation, others elicit a range of other emotions, such as envy, contempt, and disgust. If this is right, then Nietzschean exemplarism offers a richer, more evaluatively and motivationally nuanced moral psychology than the monochrome admire-and-emulate model currently popular
Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Mathematics
Nietzsche has a surprisingly significant and strikingly positive assessment of mathematics. I discuss Nietzsche's theory of the origin of mathematical practice in the division of the continuum of force, his theory of numbers, his conception of the finite and the infinite, and the relations between Nietzschean mathematics and formalism and intuitionism. I talk about the relations between math, illusion, life, and the will to truth. I distinguish life and world affirming mathematical practice from its ascetic perversion. For Nietzsche, math is an artistic and moral activity that has an essential role to play in the joyful wisdom
Civility, Enlightenment, and Society: Conceptual Confusions and Kantian Remedies
Originally published in American Political Science Review, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR. Copyright American Political Science Association
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