Distortions in memory for visual displays

Systematic errors in perception and memory present a challenge to theories of perception and memory and to applied psychologists interested in overcoming them as well. A number of systematic errors in memory for maps and graphs are reviewed, and they are accounted for by an analysis of the perceptual processing presumed to occur in comprehension of maps and graphs. Visual stimuli, like verbal stimuli, are organized in comprehension and memory. For visual stimuli, the organization is a consequence of perceptual processing, which is bottom-up or data-driven in its earlier stages, but top-down and affected by conceptual knowledge later on. Segregation of figure from ground is an early process, and figure recognition later; for both, symmetry is a rapidly detected and ecologically valid cue. Once isolated, figures are organized relative to one another and relative to a frame of reference. Both perceptual (e.g., salience) and conceptual factors (e.g., significance) seem likely to affect selection of a reference frame. Consistent with the analysis, subjects perceived and remembered curves in graphs and rivers in maps as more symmetric than they actually were. Symmetry, useful for detecting and recognizing figures, distorts map and graph figures alike. Top-down processes also seem to operate in that calling attention to the symmetry vs. asymmetry of a slightly asymmetric curve yielded memory errors in the direction of the description. Conceptual frame of reference effects were demonstrated in memory for lines embedded in graphs. In earlier work, the orientation of map figures was distorted in memory toward horizontal or vertical. In recent work, graph lines, but not map lines, were remembered as closer to an imaginary 45 deg line than they had been. Reference frames are determined by both perceptual and conceptual factors, leading to selection of the canonical axes as a reference frame in maps, but selection of the imaginary 45 deg as a reference frame in graphs

Unpacking estimates of task duration: The role of typicality and temporality

Research in task duration judgment has shown that unpacking a multifaceted task into components prior to estimating its duration increases estimates. In three studies, we find that unpacking a complex task can increase, decrease, or leave unaffected task duration estimates depending on the typicality of the unpacked components and their temporal position in the task sequence. Unpacking atypical long components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical short components decreases estimates (Study 1). Unpacking atypical early components increases task duration estimates, while unpacking atypical late components decreases estimates (Study 2). Unpacking typical early or late components leaves estimates unaffected (Study 3). We explain these results based on the idea that task duration estimation involves a mental simulation process, and by drawing on theories of unpacking in probability judgment that emphasize the role of the typicality of the unpacked components. These findings hint at a deep conceptual link between probability judgment and task duration estimation but also show differences, such as the influence that temporality exerts on estimated duration. © 2013 Elsevier Inc

Probabilistic insurance

decision making;insurance;probability

Individual differences in causal learning and decision making

This is an accepted author manuscript of an article subsequently published by Elsevier. The final published version can be found here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.actpsy.2005.04.003In judgment and decision making tasks, people tend to neglect the overall frequency of base-rates when they estimate the probability of an event; this is known as the base-rate fallacy. In causal learning, despite people s accuracy at judging causal strength according to one or other normative model (i.e., Power PC, DP), they tend to misperceive base-rate information (e.g., the cause density effect). The present study investigates the relationship between causal learning and decision making by asking whether people weight base-rate information in the same way when estimating causal strength and when making judgments or inferences about the likelihood of an event. The results suggest that people differ according to the weight they place on base-rate information, but the way individuals do this is consistent across causal and decision making tasks. We interpret the results as reflecting a tendency to differentially weight base-rate information which generalizes to a variety of tasks. Additionally, this study provides evidence that causal learning and decision making share some component processes

Investing in Prevention or Paying for Recovery - Attitudes to Cyber Risk

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.Broadly speaking an individual can invest time and effort to avoid becoming victim to a cyber attack and/or they can invest resource in recovering from any attack. We introduce a new game called the pre-vention and recovery game to study this trade-off. We report results from the experimental lab that allow us to categorize different approaches to risk taking. We show that many individuals appear relatively risk loving in that they invest in recovery rather than prevention. We find little difference in behavior between a gain and loss framing

Are Individuals Fickle-Minded?

Game theory has been used to model large-scale social events — such as constitutional law, democratic stability, standard setting, gender roles, social movements, communication, markets, the selection of officials by means of elections, coalition formation, resource allocation, distribution of goods, and war — as the aggregate result of individual choices in interdependent decision-making. Game theory in this way assumes methodological individualism. The widespread observation that game theory predictions do not in general match observation has led to many attempts to repair game theory by creating behavioral game theory, which adds corrective terms to the game theoretic predictions in the hope of making predictions that better match observations. But for game theory to be useful in making predictions, we must be able to generalize from an individual’s behavior in one situation to that individual’s behavior in very closely similar situations. In other words, behavioral game theory needs individuals to be reasonably consistent in action if the theory is to have predictive power. We argue on the basis of experimental evidence that the assumption of such consistency is unwarranted. More realistic models of individual agents must be developed that acknowledge the variance in behavior for a given individual

Experimental Evidence for Quantum Structure in Cognition

We proof a theorem that shows that a collection of experimental data of membership weights of items with respect to a pair of concepts and its conjunction cannot be modeled within a classical measure theoretic weight structure in case the experimental data contain the effect called overextension. Since the effect of overextension, analogue to the well-known guppy effect for concept combinations, is abundant in all experiments testing weights of items with respect to pairs of concepts and their conjunctions, our theorem constitutes a no-go theorem for classical measure structure for common data of membership weights of items with respect to concepts and their combinations. We put forward a simple geometric criterion that reveals the non classicality of the membership weight structure and use experimentally measured membership weights estimated by subjects in experiments to illustrate our geometrical criterion. The violation of the classical weight structure is similar to the violation of the well-known Bell inequalities studied in quantum mechanics, and hence suggests that the quantum formalism and hence the modeling by quantum membership weights can accomplish what classical membership weights cannot do.Comment: 12 pages, 3 figure