Multiple Sclerosis Decreases Explicit Counterfactual Processing and Risk Taking in Decision Making

Deficits in decision making (DM) are commonly associated with prefrontal cortical damage, but may occur with multiple sclerosis (MS). There are no data concerning the impact of MS on tasks evaluating DM under explicit risk, where different emotional and cognitive components can be distinguished.Methods: We assessed 72 relapsing-remitting MS (RRMS) patients with mild to moderate disease and 38 healthy controls in two DM tasks involving risk with explicit rules: (1) The Wheel of Fortune (WOF), which probes the anticipated affects of decisions outcomes on future choices; and (2) The Cambridge Gamble Task (CGT) which measures risk taking. Participants also underwent a neuropsychological and emotional assessment, and skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded.Results: In the WOF, RRMS patients showed deficits in integrating positive counterfactual information (p <0.005) and greater risk aversion (p <0.001). They reported less negative affect than controls (disappointment: p = 0.007; regret: p = 0.01), although their implicit emotional reactions as measured by post-choice SCRs did not differ. In the CGT, RRMS patients differed from controls in quality of DM (p = 0.01) and deliberation time (p = 0.0002), the latter difference being correlated with attention scores. Such changes did not result in overall decreases in performance (total gains).Conclusions: The quality of DM under risk was modified by MS in both tasks. The reduction in the expression of disappointment coexisted with an increased risk aversion in the WOF and alexithymia features. These concomitant emotional alterations may have implications for better understanding the components of explicit DM and for the clinical support of MS patients

The role of probabilistic reasoning abilities on adolescent risk taking

The aim of this work was to investigate the role of the cognitive system and the affective system on adolescents’ risk taking in gambling tasks characterized as different on the basis of information given to decision makers. In Study 1, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and sensation seeking on decision making in a non-risky context (Non-Gambling Task) and a risky context (Gambling Task) in which no preliminary information were given to participants. Results showed that adolescents referred to probabilistic reasoning only in the Non-Gambling Task. In Study 2, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and sensation seeking in risky situations with preliminary information given to participants. Specifically, we compared a risky context characterized by high-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task), in which a feedback after each decision was given, with one characterized by low-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task – Modified version), without feedback. Probabilistic reasoning characterized adolescents’ decision making regardless of feedback. Findings showed that adolescents’ decision making was solely linked to the cognitive system in the non-risky situation, and the affective system overcomes the cognitive system in situation of risk. Moreover, providing information about the task might interfere with the imbalance between the two systems

The Role of Probabilistic Reasoning Abilities on Adolescent Risk Taking

The aim of this work was to investigate the role of the cognitive system and the affective system on adolescents’ risk taking in gambling tasks characterized as different on the basis of information given to decision makers. In Study 1, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and sensation seeking on decision making in a non-risky context (Non-Gambling Task) and a risky context (Gambling Task) in which no preliminary information were given to participants. Results showed that adolescents referred to probabilistic reasoning only in the Non-Gambling Task. In Study 2, we explored the role of probabilistic reasoning and sensation seeking in risky situations with preliminary information given to participants. Specifically, we compared a risky context characterized by high-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task), in which a feedback after each decision was given, with one characterized by low-emotional arousal (Game of Dice Task – Modified version), without feedback. Probabilistic reasoning characterized adolescents’ decision making regardless of feedback. Findings showed that adolescents’ decision making was solely linked to the cognitive system in the non-risky situation, and the affective system overcomes the cognitive system in situation of risk. Moreover, providing information about the task might interfere with the imbalance between the two systems

The role of intuition and reasoning in driving aversion to risk and ambiguity

Using information on a large sample of retail investors and experimental data we find that risk aversion and risk ambiguity are correlated: individuals who dislike risk also dislike ambiguity. We show that what links these traits is the way people handle decisions. Intuitive thinkers are less averse to risk and less averse to ambiguity than individuals who base their decisions on effortful reasoning. We confirm this finding in a series of experiments. One interpretation of our results is that the high-speed of intuitive thinking puts intuitive thinkers at a comparative advantage in situations involving high risk and ambiguity, making them less averse to both. Consistent with this view we show evidence from the field and from the lab that intuitive thinkers perform better than deliberative thinkers when making decisions in highly ambiguous and risky environments. We also find that attitudes toward risk and ambiguity are related to different individual characteristics and wealth. While the wealthy are less averse to risk, they dislike ambiguity more, a finding that has implications for financial puzzles.Risk Aversion, Risk Ambiguity, Decision Theory, Dual Systems, Intuitive Thinking

An exploration of decision-making by individuals who have received specialized treatment for early psychosis

Decision-making is a critical life skill, integral for guiding behaviour. Previous research has demonstrated that decision-making is frequently impaired across a range of psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia. Although a concerted research effort has recently been focused on understanding decision-making in chronic schizophrenia, the current study was conceived to provide an initial exploration into the decision-making process of individuals who received specialized treatment for early psychosis. We investigated the decision-making ability of 16 patients enrolled in an early psychosis (EP) program and 20 healthy controls based upon their performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and Game of Dice Task (GDT). Additional measures of neuropsychological functioning were also examined. Differences in ambiguous decision-making (IGT) were observed, with the EP group performing significantly worse than the healthy control group. Additionally, there were no differences between the two groups observed in risky decision-making (GDT). The only neuropsychological variable that correlated with decision-making performance across tasks was that of working memory. More specifically, measures of IGT ability significantly correlated with working memory performance for the EP group but not the healthy controls. As such, the current study illustrates an important role for working memory in making ambiguous decisions. It is possible that individuals with EP experience difficulty maintaining mental representations of expected value. Therefore, it is more difficult to utilize feedback from the previous trials to impact positively on future choices and rewards that are not immediately present in the environment. The clinical implications of these findings are discussed for understanding decision-making by individuals who experienced early psychosis, and how decision-making impairments could be accommodated for by treatment programs

On the role of executive subcomponents, goal mechanisms, and methods of measurement in decision making under risk conditions

In several scientific disciplines human decision-making behavior has gained rapidly growing interest in the last decades. Neuropsychological research made remarkable effort to investigate the cognitive and emotional processes involved during decision making in different types of decision situations, for example under ambiguity and under risk conditions. In decisions under risk conditions, explicit information about the rules for gains and losses is available to the decision maker (Brand, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Yates & Stone, 1992). In the wide research field on this type of decisions, there are still theoretical and methodological gaps. Three outstanding gaps are addressed in this thesis. First, a neuropsychological model that theoretically describes the processes involved in these decisions was proposed by Brand and colleagues (2006) but still waits to be specified. Particularly, the model suggests executive functions as the main director of decision-making behavior, but it is not described in detail which subcomponents of the central executive system contribute in which way to decision making. Second, the model does not incorporate one of the main moderators of human behavior and cognitive performance: explicit outcome goals. Third, a methodological gap in decision-making research is to be found in the measurement of decision-making competences. For the measurement several laboratory gambling tasks are used. The variety of existing tasks as well the tasks’ architectures severely restrict the theoretical and practical conclusions that can be drawn from the results they provide. The main problems of the tasks are that they differ with regard to several attributes, are often inflexible for experimental manipulation, and that their ecological validities are restricted due to their gambling orientation. The first two studies of this thesis aimed to fill the gaps in the theoretical model. Study 1 investigated the role of different executive subcomponents in decision-making performance. It was found that particularly strategy managing functions, such as planning and monitoring, predicted performance, while situation processing functions, such as attention/inhibition and coding of information, supported the strategy managing operations. Study 2 investigated the effects of explicit goals on performance in a decision situation that provides increased strategic control. Realistic and attainable goals were found to have a positive effect, improving decision-making performance. In contrast, if the goals were unrealistic and too high, performance decreased. Study 3 evaluated an innovative methodological framework for measuring decision-making performance. The new framework allows designing several decision-making problems within one real-world oriented and unitary story line. The attributes of three standard decision-making tasks were mapped to the new scenario and it was found that participants behaved similarly in the new scenario compared to the original tasks. This indicates that the new scenario measures decision-making performance accurately. The results of the three studies enhance the theoretical understanding of the neurocognitive processes involved in decision making under risk conditions and open new perspectives for the examination of decision-making competence. A specified theoretical model is suggested, which incorporates the executive sub-processes directing the decision-making process, as well as the role of explicit goal setting and other situational conditions. These adaptions are supposed to help to better explain variances in decision-making competence as they can be found in healthy persons as well as patients with neurological or psychiatric diseases

Stress and reflection effects on the IGT

Stressful situations hinder judgment. Effects of stress induced by anticipated public speaking on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) were examined. The Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) was used to examine the relationship between reflective thinking and IGT performance. The stress manipulation increased blood pressure and was associated with poorer IGT and CRT performance. Stressed participants were slower to avoid the disadvantageous decks. Moreover, CRT scores correlated with optimal deck selections indicating the importance of reflective thinking for good performance on the IGT. These correlations were observed in relatively early trials, which challenges the view that analytic thinking is not important when card contingencies are being learned. Data revealed that IGT performance in healthy individuals is not always optimal; stress levels impair performance. A mediation analysis was consistent with the proposal that the stress manipulation reduced IGT performance by impeding reflective thinking. Thus reflective processing is an important explanation of IGT performance in healthy populations. It was concluded that more reflective participants appear to learn from the outcomes of their decisions even when stressed

The Impact of Motivational Systems on Dynamic Inconsistency in Risk Taking

Every day we are confronted with risky decisions in which the rewards and the punishments are not always clear. We like to believe that logic is the primary force behind our decisions, but in reality, emotion plays a very important role. This study examines the impact of participants\u27 Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) on dynamic inconsistencies in a sequential gambling task. Contrary to the hypotheses, neither system predicted deviations following a win or and a loss. However, participants high in BAS were more likely to make negative deviation

The Impact of Motivational Systems on Dynamic Inconsistency in Risk Taking

Every day we are confronted with risky decisions in which the rewards and the punishments are not always clear. We like to believe that logic is the primary force behind our decisions, but in reality, emotion plays a very important role. This study examines the impact of participants\u27 Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) on dynamic inconsistencies in a sequential gambling task. Contrary to the hypotheses, neither system predicted deviations following a win or and a loss. However, participants high in BAS were more likely to make negative deviation