Tensions in the practice of Marian Devotion between Clergy, Laity, and the Vatican: The maintenance of Catholic Social Structure in Gozo, Malta

In Gozo, Malta, tensions exist within the ritual system of Catholic Marian Devotion, observed through a disconnect between how laity practice Marian Devotion rituals and how the Vatican defines the practice of Marian Devotion. The local clergy, as intermediaries between the laity and the Vatican, negotiate between these groups to ensure the system's stability. In Gozo, this negotiation plays out through festa celebrations, devotional art, the dedication of ex-votos, and gendered distinctions. The clergy in Gozo mediate between the laity and the Vatican by tacitly accepting the laity's unsanctioned devotion practices while not actively participating, maintaining the balance of the social system of Catholic Marian Devotion in which they all operate.No embargoAcademic Major: Anthropological Science

Monitoring Subcontracting in a Suppliers' Hierarchy

In this paper we study the delegation of a production process in a three-tier hierarchy. The principal contracts directly only with the supplier that produces the ?rst input leaving him in charge of the contract for the production of the second input. We allow the principal to costlessly monitor the communication between the agents at the subcontracting stage in an attempt to save on informa- tional rents and improve productive e¢ ciency. We show that, if the contractor is free to choose the type of subcontract, he must be given additional incen- tives to acquire information about the subcontractor which will then be object of the monitoring. The monitoring is therefore much less e¤ective then when the principal can force the contractor into choosing her preferred subcontract.Adverse Selection, Hierarchies, Delegation, Monitoring.

A simple model for the evolution of a non-Abelian cosmic string network

In this paper we present the results of numerical simulations intended to study the behavior of non-Abelian cosmic strings networks. In particular we are interested in discussing the variations in the asymptotic behavior of the system as we variate the number of generators for the topological defects. A simple model which should generate cosmic strings is presented and its lattice discretization is discussed. The evolution of the generated cosmic string networks is then studied for different values for the number of generators for the topological defects. Scaling solution appears to be approached in most cases and we present an argument to justify the lack of scaling for the residual cases

EQUILIBRIUM PRINCIPAL-AGENT CONTRACTS Competition and R&D Incentives

We analyze competition between firms engaged in R&D activities in the choice of incentive contracts for managers with hidden productivities. The equilibrium screening contracts require extra effort/investment from the most productive managers compared to the first best contracts: under additional assumptions on the hazard rate of the distribution of types we obtain no- distortion in the middle rather than at the top. Moreover, the equilibrium contracts are characterized by effort differentials between (any) two types that are always increasing with the number of firms, suggesting a positive re- lation between competition and high-powered incentives. An inverted-U curve between competition and absolute investments can emerge for the most pro- ductive managers, especially when entry is endogenous. These results persist when contracts are not observable, when they include quantity precommit- ments, and when products are imperfect substitutes.Principal-agent contracts, asymmetric information, endogenous market structures

Hierarchical contracting in grant decisions: ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the context of the EURegional Policy

This paper applies incentive theory to the context of the European Union (EU) Regional Policy. The core instruments of the policy are the Structural Funds, capital grants that ?ow from the European Commission (EC) to Mem- ber States and regional authorities to promote investment and growth at local level. The EU grants need a co-payment by the regional government and do not cover in full the investment cost. We model this situation, similar to several other supra- national or federal contexts, as a simple principal-supervisor-agent model of the investment game between a supranational player (the principal), such as the EC, a non (fully) benevolent regional government (the supervisor), and a private ?rm (the executing agency). We show how the role of providers of additional information, the region (ex-ante) and an evaluator (ex-post) is crucial to reducing the optimal value of the grant and to improving the inef- ?ciencies caused by asymmetric information at the grant decision stage in a federal hierarchyHierarchical contracting, project evaluation, EU Regional Policy