396 research outputs found
The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each playerâs behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize
A Continuation Method for Nash Equilibria in Structured Games
Structured game representations have recently attracted interest as models
for multi-agent artificial intelligence scenarios, with rational behavior most
commonly characterized by Nash equilibria. This paper presents efficient, exact
algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in structured game representations,
including both graphical games and multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs). The
algorithms are derived from a continuation method for normal-form and
extensive-form games due to Govindan and Wilson; they follow a trajectory
through a space of perturbed games and their equilibria, exploiting game
structure through fast computation of the Jacobian of the payoff function. They
are theoretically guaranteed to find at least one equilibrium of the game, and
may find more. Our approach provides the first efficient algorithm for
computing exact equilibria in graphical games with arbitrary topology, and the
first algorithm to exploit fine-grained structural properties of MAIDs.
Experimental results are presented demonstrating the effectiveness of the
algorithms and comparing them to predecessors. The running time of the
graphical game algorithm is similar to, and often better than, the running time
of previous approximate algorithms. The algorithm for MAIDs can effectively
solve games that are much larger than those solvable by previous methods
Collective states in social systems with interacting learning agents
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning
abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field
corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price,
agents decide repeatedly whether to buy or not a unit of a good, so as to
maximize their expected utilities. We show that the equilibrium reached by the
system depends on the nature of the information agents use to estimate their
expected utilities.Comment: 18 pages, 26 figure
Testing the quantal response hypothesis
We develop a non-parametric test for consistency of player behavior with the Quantal Re- sponse Equilibrium (QRE). The test exploits a characterization of the equilibrium choice prob- abilities in any structural QRE as the gradient of a convex function; thereby QRE-consistent choices satisfy the cyclic monotonicity inequalities. Our testing procedure utilizes recent econo- metric results for moment inequality models. We assess our test using lab experimental data from a series of generalized matching pennies games. We reject the QRE hypothesis in the pooled data but cannot reject individual-level quantal response behavior for over half of the subjects
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