Miguel A. Costa-Gomes

Nagore Iriberri

Vincent P. Crawford

English

Research Papers in Economics

A Comment on ‘Can Relaxation of Beliefs Rationalize the Winner’s Curse? An Experimental Study’”. In progress.

A Dinner in Ukraine Made for Agatha

A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.

A Quantal Response Equilibrium Model of Order-Statistic

A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk.”

Adaptive Dynamics in

Are Two Heads Better Than One? Team versus Individual Play in

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance,

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction.

Behaviorally Optimal Auction Design: An Example and Some Observations.”

Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Entry.”

Cognitive Hierarchy: A Limited Thinking Theory in Games.”

Comparing Models of Strategic Thinking in

Depth of Reasoning and Higher-Order Beliefs.” Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper Number 2184. http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2010/HIER2184.pdf 96 Summers,

Do Security Analysts Speak in Two Tongues?” http://www.people.hbs.edu/dshanthikumar/DoSecurityAnalystsSpeakInTwoTongues.pdf Manski, Charles F.

Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in

Equilibrium Refinement vs. Level-k Analysis: An Experimental

Equilibrium Selection in

Evidence for Optimistic and Pessimistic Behavior in

Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-Class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device.”

Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective.”

Explaining Focal Points: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus

Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek

Focality, Tasks, and the Beginning of Level-k Reasoning.”

Folk Game Theory: Strategic Analysis in Austen, Hammerstein, and African American Folktales.

Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An

Groucho and Me.

Guest Column: Will Bin Laden Strike Again?,”

Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies.”

Hierarchical Reasoning versus Iterated Reasoning in p-Beauty Contest Guessing Games.”

Identification in Models of Oligopoly Entry.”

Ignoring the Rationality of Others: Evidence from

Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information

Infinity…: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest

Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental ‘p-Beauty

Knowledge and Equilibrium in

Let’s Talk It Over: Coordination via Preplay Communication with Level-k Thinking.” Presented at the Arne Ryde

Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?”

Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search

Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational

Meaning and Credibility in

Minimum-Effort Coordination Games: Stochastic Potential and Logit Equilibrium.”

Naive Traders and Mispricing

Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory.”

Nash-Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing.” In

Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s New Approach to Static

Nonmetric Test of the Minimax Theory of Two-Person Zerosum Games.”

Pinocchio’s Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation To Understand Truth–telling and Deception in

Prices and the Winner’s Curse.”

Quantal Response Equilibria for

Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions.”

Security Analysis: Principles and Technique, 1 st edition.

Self-serving Cheap Talk and Credibility:

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria.

Step-Level Reasoning and Bidding in

Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection Principles,

Strength of Dominance and Depths of Reasoning—An Experimental

Studying Cognition via Information Search in Two-Person Guessing Game Experiments.” In progress.

Testing Models with Multiple Equilibria by Quantile Methods.”

The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under

The Far Pavilions,

The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.

The Identiﬁcation Power of Equilibrium in

The Idyll of Miss Sarah Brown” In Guys and Dolls: The Stories of Damon Runyon.

The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.”

The One Percent Doctrine.

The Power of Focal Points is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry May Yield Large Coordination Failures.”

The Strategy of Conflict. Oxford:

Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction.”

To Review or Not To Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office.” http://econweb.tamu.edu/abrown/cold.pdf .

Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency

Unraveling in Guessing Games:

When Are Nash Equilibria SelfEnforcing? An Experimental Analysis.”

Who thinks about the competition?

Wobegon Boy.

Strategic Thinking

http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4661465000000001148.pdf

Strategic Thinking

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Research Papers in Economics