The Unsolvability of the Gödel Class with Identity

Philosoph

Gap-minimal systems of notations and the constructible hierarchy

If a constructibly countable ordinal alpha is a gap ordinal, then the order type of the set of index ordinals smaller than alpha is exactly alpha. The gap ordinals are the only points of discontinuity of a certain ordinal-valued function. The notion of gap minimality for well ordered systems of notations is defined, and the existence of gap-minimal systems of notations of arbitrarily large constructibly countable length is established

Myhill's work in recursion theory

AbstractIn this paper we discuss the following contributions to recursion theory made by John Myhill: (1) two sets are recursively isomorphic iff they are one-one equivalent; (2) two sets are recursively isomorphic iff they are recursively equivalent and their complements are also recursively equivalent; (3) every two creative sets are recursively isomorphic; (4) the recursive analogue of the Cantor–Bernstein theorem; (5) the notion of a combinatorial function and its use in the theory of recursive equivalence types

Realizability and recursive mathematics

Section 1: Philosophy, logic and constructivityPhilosophy, formal logic and the theory of computation all bear on problems in the foundations of constructive mathematics. There are few places where these, often competing, disciplines converge more neatly than in the theory of realizability structures. Uealizability applies recursion-theoretic concepts to give interpretations of constructivism along lines suggested originally by Heyting and Kleene. The research reported in the dissertation revives the original insights of Kleene—by which realizability structures are viewed as models rather than proof-theoretic interpretations—to solve a major problem of classification and to draw mathematical consequences from its solution.Section 2: Intuitionism and recursion: the problem of classificationThe internal structure of constructivism presents an interesting problem. Mathematically, it is a problem of classification; for philosophy, it is one of conceptual organization. Within the past seventy years, constructive mathematics has grown into a jungle of fullydeveloped "constructivities," approaches to the mathematics of the calculable which range from strict finitism through hyperarithmetic model theory. The problem we address is taxonomic: to sort through the jungle, set standards for classification and determine those features which run through everything that is properly "constructive."There are two notable approaches to constructivity; these must appear prominently in any proposed classification. The most famous is Brouwer's intuitioniam. Intuitionism relies on a complete constructivization of the basic mathematical objects and logical operations. The other is classical recursive mathematics, as represented by the work of Dekker, Myhill, and Nerode. Classical constructivists use standard logic in a mathematical universe restricted to coded objects and recursive operations.The theorems of the dissertation give a precise answer to the classification problem for intuitionism and classical constructivism. Between these realms arc connected semantically through a model of intuitionistic set theory. The intuitionistic set theory IZF encompasses all of the intuitionistic mathematics that does not involve choice sequences. (This includes all the work of the Bishop school.) IZF has as a model a recursion-theoretic structure, V(A7), based on Kleene realizability. Since realizability takes set variables to range over "effective" objects, large parts of classical constructivism appear over the model as inter¬ preted subsystems of intuitionistic set theory. For example, the entire first-order classical theory of recursive cardinals and ordinals comes out as an intuitionistic theory of cardinals and ordinals under realizability. In brief, we prove that a satisfactory partial solution to the classification problem exists; theories in classical recursive constructivism are identical, under a natural interpretation, to intuitionistic theories. The interpretation is especially satisfactory because it is not a Godel-style translation; the interpretation can be developed so that it leaves the classical logical forms unchanged.Section 3: Mathematical applications of the translation:The solution to the classification problem is a bridge capable of carrying two-way mathematical traffic. In one direction, an identification of classical constructivism with intuitionism yields a certain elimination of recursion theory from the standard mathematical theory of effective structures, leaving pure set theory and a bit of model theory. Not only are the theorems of classical effective mathematics faithfully represented in intuitionistic set theory, but also the arguments that provide proofs of those theorems. Via realizability, one can find set-theoretic proofs of many effective results, and the set-theoretic proofs are often more straightforward than their recursion-theoretic counterparts. The new proofs are also more transparent, because they involve, rather than recursion theory plus set theory, at most the set-theoretic "axioms" of effective mathematics.Working the other way, many of the negative ("cannot be obtained recursively") results of classical constructivism carry over immediately into strong independence results from intuitionism. The theorems of Kalantari and Retzlaff on effective topology, for instance, turn into independence proofs concerning the structure of the usual topology on the intuitionistic reals.The realizability methods that shed so much light over recursive set theory can be applied to "recursive theories" generally. We devote a chapter to verifying that the realizability techniques can be used to good effect in the semantical foundations of computer science. The classical theory of effectively given computational domains a la Scott can be subsumed into the Kleene realizability universe as a species of countable noneffective domains. In this way, the theory of effective domains becomes a chapter (under interpre¬ tation) in an intuitionistic study of denotational semantics. We then show how the "extra information" captured in the logical signs under realizability can be used to give proofs of classical theorems about effective domains.Section 4: Solutions to metamathematical problems:The realizability model for set theory is very tractible; in many ways, it resembles a Boolean-valued universe. The tractibility is apparent in the solutions it offers to a number of open problems in the metamathematics of constructivity. First, there is the perennial problem of finding and delimiting in the wide constructive universe those features that correspond to structures familiar from classical mathematics. In the realizability model, it is easy to locate the collection of classical ordinals and to show that they form, intuitionistically, a set rather than a proper class. Also, one interprets an argument of Dekker and Myhill to prove that the classical powerset of the natural numbers contains at least continuum-many distinct cardinals.Second, a major tenet of Bishop's program for constructivity has been that constructive mathematics is "numerical:" all the properties of constructive objects, including the real numbers, can be represented as properties of the natural numbers. The realizability model shows that Bishop's numericalization of mathematics can, in principle, be accomplished. Every set over the model with decidable equality and every metric space is enumerated by a collection of natural numbers

Visual imagery and the limits of comprehension

I examined the proposition that there are psychological limits on what scientific problems can be solved, and that these limits may be based on a failure to be able to produce imagable, observation-based models for any possible solution, a position suggested by philosopher Colin McGinn in an argument attempting to prove that the mind-body problem is unsolvable. I examined another likely candidate for an unsolvable problem -- the ultimate origin of the universe (i.e., what might have preceded the Big Bang or any other starting point; why there should be something rather than nothing) -- by exploring the reasoning of physicists about this problem and measuring visual imagery frequency and vividness, with the expectation that those who most believed the problem unsolvable would be more frequent/vivid imagers and therefore more affected by the apparent impossibility of producing an imagable solution. Eight physicists were interviewed and imagery frequency and vividness measurements performed using Cohen & Saslona's IDQ-IHS and Marks's VVIQ, respectively. All subjects considered the problem unsolvable within today's physics and all but one thought the problem still meaningful, though none were optimistic about a solution. The one subject who dismissed the problem had the lowest imagery frequency score, and there was also a significant rank order correlation (r = 0.83, p \u3c .02) between degree of belief in problem unsolvability (extended to include viewing the problem as meaningful and not already solved) and a composite imagery frequency/vividness score, though the sample was too small to control for some possible confounding factors

Simulation of arithmetic and Boolean functions on Turing machines

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1962 C4