Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice. By Jiri Benovsky.

Review of Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice (Springer, Synthese Library, 2016). By Jiri Benovsky

Single-Case Probabilities And The Case Of Monty Hall: Levy\u27s View

In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here

Warum die organische Synthetik mehr Aufmerksamkeit verdient : Stiftungsprofessur der Degussa AG markiert Umbruch im Fach Chemie

Die Organische Synthese – also die Kunst, aus einfachen Molekülen gezielt komplexe Moleküle herzustellen – war immer schon sowohl von akademischem als auch von industriellem Interesse, wie schon die Anfänge der Farbenindustrie beweisen. Ohne organische Synthese wäre eine Indigoproduktion oder die Herstellung von Anilinfarben aus Steinkohlenteer zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahrhunderts undenkbar gewesen. Die enge Verbindung zwischen Wissenschaft und Technologie auf dem Gebiet der organischen Synthese zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die Chemie bis hin zu den aktuellen biologischen oder materialwissenschaftlichen Fragestellungen. So ist die Entwicklung von Wirkstoffen – sei es für Arznei- oder Pflanzenschutzmittel – auch heute ohne organische Synthese undenkbar

Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen

In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails

On the Rationality of our Response to Testimony

The assumption that we largely lack reasons for accepting testimony has dominated its epistemology. Given the further assumption that whatever reasons we do have are insufficient to justify our testimonial beliefs, many conclude that any account of testimonial knowledge must allow credulity to be justified. In this paper I argue that both of these assumptions are false. Our responses to testimony are guided by our background beliefs as to the testimony as a type, the testimonial situation, the testifier''s character and the truth of the proposition testified to. These beliefs provide reasons for our responses. Thus, we usually do have reasons, in the sense of propositions believed, for accepting testimony and these reasons can provide evidence for the testimonial beliefs we form

A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief

In virtue of what are we responsible for our beliefs? I argue that doxastic responsibility has a crucial social component: part of being responsible for our beliefs is being responsible to others. I suggest that this responsibility is a form of answerability with two distinct dimensions: an individual and an interpersonal dimension. While most views hold that the individual dimension is grounded in some form of control that we can exercise over our beliefs, I contend that we are answerable for our beliefs as long as they reflect our evaluative commitments and dispositions, or are products of our reasoning, where this does not amount to a form of control. I next argue that answerability has a second, largely neglected dimension: the interpersonal dimension, which is grounded in what I call our relations of doxastic dependence. As social creatures, we depend on one another in our capacity as believers. We depend on one another as believers not only in epistemic ways, but also in practical ways, because our beliefs inform and motivate our actions, and allow us to participate in shared practical goals. Depending on one another in these ways is an unavoidable part of cooperating in the shared project of pursuing epistemic and practical success, and it makes us vulnerable to both epistemic and moral harm. It is because of this, I argue, that answerability has interpersonal normative force upon us: we are subject to legitimate expectations associated with participating in relations of doxastic dependence

Money and mental contents

It can be hard to see where money fits in the world. Money seems both real and imaginary, since it has obvious causal powers, but is also, just as obviously, something humans have just made up. Recent philosophical accounts of money have declared it to be real, but for very different reasons. John Searle and Francesco Guala disagree over whether money is just whatever acts like money, or just whatever people believe to be money. In developing their accounts of institutions as a part of social reality, each uses money as a paradigm institution, but they disagree on how institutions exist. Searle argues that the institution of money belongs to an ontological level separate from the physical world, held up by the collective intentions of a group, while Guala claims that money is a part of the ordinary physical world and is just whatever performs a “money-like function” in a group, regardless of what that group believes about it. Here, we argue that any purely functional account like Guala’s will be unable to capture the distinctive phenomenon of money, since monetary transactions are defined by the attitudes transactors hold toward them. Money will be obscured or misidentified if defined functionally. As we go on to show by examining recent work by Smit et al., belief in money does not require taking on all of Searle’s ontological commitments, but money and mental contents will stand or fall together

Synthese des 18F-markierten Coenzyms Uridindiphosphatglucose als Basis für die 18F-Glykosylierung von Glykoproteinen

The chemo-enzymatic radiosynthesis of no carrier added (n.c.a.) uridine diphospho-2-deoxy- 2-[$^{18}$F]fluoro-$\alpha$-D-glucose (UDP-[$^{18}$F]FGlc) was developed. In order to overcome the problem of poor regioselectivity when using the commonly strategy to label proteins via $^{18}$F-labelled prosthetic groups, the use of enzyme systems in addition to the corresponding $^{18}$F-labelled coenzymes was shown to be a reliable, regioselective and mild labelling method. With regard to the comparison and evaluation of the stereoselectivity of the phosphorylating agents used in the chemical synthesis of cold uridine diphospho-2-deoxy-2-fluoro-$\alpha$-Dglucose, $^{31}$P-decoupled and $^{1}$H-NMR-studies were successfully realized. Uridine diphospho- 2-deoxy-2-fluoro-$\alpha$-D-glucose was obtained in a 7 step synthesis. Tetrabenzylpyrophosphate was shown to be a highly stereoselective phosphorylating agent for FDG ($\alpha /\beta$=3:1). Moreover, a multienzymatic pathway for the synthesis of uridine diphospho-2-deoxy-2-fluoro-$\alpha$- D-glucose was adopted starting from FDG and four commercially available enzymes. This strategy was adjusted to a mg-scale synthesis providing 35% chemical yield. Within the scope of this procedure, a comparison of the natural substrate $\alpha$-D-glucose-1-phosphate with 2-fluoro-2-deoxy-$\alpha$-D-glucose-1-phosphate indicated that the enzyme activity of UDP-glucose pyrophosphorylase (UDP-Glc PPase) was decreased by a factor of 30. With regard to the adaptability of the multiple enzyme system for the radiosynthesis of n.c.a. uridine diphospho-2-deoxy-2-[$^{18}$F]fluoro-$\alpha$-D-glucose a rapid hexokinase-mediated phosphorylation of [$^{18}$F]FDG utilizing ATP or UTP as phosphate donor was performed. A further enzymatic isomerization of n.c.a [$^{18}$F]FDG-6-phosphate to n.c.a. [$^{18}$F]FDG-1-phosphate was limited due to the formation of [$^{18}$F]FDG-1.6-diphosphate as main product. Experiments using a multiple enzyme system to develop a fully enzymatic synthetic route to UDP-[$^{18}$F]FGlc turned out to be less efficient due to the necessity of carrier added conditions. Thus, a chemo-enzymatic synthesis of n.c.a. UDP-[$^{18}$8F]FGlc has been developed, starting from 1.3.4.6-tetra-O-acetyl-2-[$^{18}$F]fluoro-2-deoxy-D-glucose, which occurs as an intermediate in the [$^{18}$F]FDG synthesis. The chemical phosphorylation via MacDonald reaction and subsequent deprotection led to a radiochemical yield of 55% of [$^{18}$F]FDG-1-phosphate. UDP- [$^{18}$F]FGlc was synthesized enzymatically by condensation of [$^{18}$F]FDG-1-phosphate with UTP in presence of UDP-Glc PPase. In order to overcome the problem of decreased enzyme acitivty the reaction was performed in a minimized reaction volume and optimized UTP-concentration of 0.5 mmol/l leading to an overall radiochemical yield of 20% of UDP-[$^{18}$F]FGlc within 110 min. The $^{18}$F-labelled coenzyme UDP-[$^{18}$F]FGlc was used as a tool for $^{18}$F-glycosylation of N-acetylglucosamine mediated by $\beta$-1.4-galactosyltransferase. The $^{18}$F-glycosylated product was obtained in a radiochemical yield of 56% and was easily isolated by solid phase extraction. In addition to the general availability of [$^{18}$F]FDG worldwide, this new strategy for enzymatic transfer of "activated [$^{18}$F]FDG" has demonstrated its potential as a highly selective and mild $^{18}$F-labelling method of glycosylated biopolymers to study their pharmacokinetics using positron-emission-tomography

Meaning Relativism and Subjective Idealism

The paper discusses an objection, put forward by - among others - John McDowell, to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s non-factualist and relativist view of semantic discourse. The objection goes roughly as follows: while it is usually possible to be a relativist about a given domain of discourse without being a relativist about anything else, relativism about semantic discourse entails global relativism, which in turn entails subjective idealism, which we can reasonably assume to be false. The paper’s first section sketches Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s ideas about semantic discourse and gives a fully explicit formulation of the objection. The second section describes and briefly discusses the formal apparatus needed to evaluate the objection - which is basically equivalent to John MacFarlane’s recent development of David Kaplan’s classic semantic framework. Finally, the third section explains in detail why the objection fails. I show that even though relativism about semantic discourse does entail a form of global relativism, the relativism in question does not entail anything like Berkeleyan or Fichtean idealism. This particular kind of relativism holds that which character (in Kaplan’s sense) is associated to a given utterance depends on what MacFarlane calls “the context of assessment”