In a recent exchange, Vaesen (Synthese 181: 515–529, 2011; Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) and Kelp (Erkenntnis 78:245–252, 2013a) have argued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a problem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’s (Erkenntnis 78:963–970, 2013) most recent contribution to this exchange. I argue that Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology I favour fails

Kelp, Christoph

Erkenntnis

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      Kelp, C. (2014) Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen. Erkenntnis, 79(3), pp. 729-732.     There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it.    http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/140955/            Deposited on: 16 May 2017                       Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk Extended Cognition and Robust VirtueEpistemology: Response to VaesenChristoph Kelp∗AbstractIn a recent exchange, Vaesen [2011, Forthcoming] and I [2013a] haveargued over whether cases of extended cognition pose (part of) a prob-lem for robust virtue epistemology. This paper responds to Vaesen’smost recent [i.e. Forthcoming] contribution to this exchange. I arguethat Vaesen latest argument against the kind of virtue epistemology Ifavour fails.In his [2011] Synthese paper, Krist Vaesen argues that certain cases of weaklyextended cognition (WEC) constitute a problem for robust virtue epistemol-ogy (RVE). Cases of WEC are cases in which cognition relies heavily onexternal resources such as thermometers, watches and the like [Vaesen 2011,521]. RVE is the view that knowledge is a kind of cognitive success (typi-cally: true belief) due to ability or competence. According to the version ofRVE Vaesen addresses, ‘due to’ is unpacked in terms of causal salience: cog-nitive success is due to competence if and only if competence is “the mostsalient part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to [one’s] believingthe truth that p” [Vaesen 2011, 518].In Vaesen’s WEC case (‘SISSICASE’), the protagonist, Sissi, comes toknow that there is a bomb in a suitcase via the use of a novel type of bag-gage scanner that allows operators to remain alert for longer periods of time.Vaesen construes the case in such a way that had Sissi been working withthe old type of scanner, she would now not be concentrated and hence wouldhave formed a false belief instead. In this situation, what’s most salient in theexplanation of Sissi’s cognitive success is not Sissi’s cognitive competence,but the fact that she is working with upgraded technology. Thus, Sissi knowseven though her cognitive success is not due to her cognitive competence[Vaesen 2011, §4].∗Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, BE–3000 Leuven, Email: christoph.kelp@hiw.kuleuven.be1In a response to Vaesen [Kelp 2013a], I argue that SISSICASE case doesnot pose a new problem for RVE. Rather, it instantiates the familiar problemfor RVE that salience is context-sensitive in a way in which attributions ofknowledge appear not to be, which can be generated with the help of non-WEC cases just as well. In that paper, I offer a non-WEC version of SISSI-CASE. However, Lackey [2007, 2009] and Pritchard [e.g. 2008] latched ontothis problem a while ago. It’s just that they developed it by means of casesof testimonial knowledge. Of course, even if Vaesen’s WEC case is not new,the question remains whether RVE can deal with it. In the last section of mypaper, I briefly review a couple of options on behalf of RVE, one for causalsalience versions of RVE [e.g. Greco 2003, 2010], the other for competencemanifestation versions of RVE [e.g. Sosa 2007, 2010, 2011 and Kelp 2011,2013b, Forthcoming].Now Vaesen has offered a rejoinder to my paper. He claims that I ammissing a core point of his argument, viz. that it does not aim to refute RVEby counterexample but to present its champions with a dilemma concerninghow to interpret RVE’s crucial ‘due to’: either they give ‘due to’ a stronginterpretation or a weak one. In the former case, RVE may get Gettier casesright but will fail to accommodate the intuition of knowledge in SISSICASE.In the latter case, RVE may get SISSICASE right but will fail to accommo-date the intuition of ignorance in Gettier cases. Vaesen goes on to argue thatthe account of SISSICASE I outline on behalf of competence manifestationversions of RVE succumbs to this dilemma [Vaesen Forthcoming, §2].While I do not share Vaesen’s assessment that I missed something im-portant about his argument, I am now convinced that it is best not to delveinto this issue here. What I am willing to concede to Vaesen is that I did notaddress the dilemma explicitly and that I may not have been as clear on mypreferred account of competence manifestation as I could have been. For thatreason, in what follows, I will catch up on both of these counts and argue thatRVE can escape Vaesen’s dilemma.Let me begin by saying a few words about how I understand competencesand competence manifestation. Following Sosa, I will assume that compe-tences are dispositions to perform well. More specifically, three elements ofcompetences can be discerned: constitutional (= CO), inner (= IN) and situ-ational (= SI). In the case of archery competence, the constitutional elementincludes the seat of the disposition within the agent, the inner being awakeand sober, and the situational there being enough light and normal winds[Sosa 2010, 465].Crucially, a success manifests competence only if the competence’s INand SI actually obtain [Sosa 2010, 470]. When an archer’s shot is blown offtarget by a gust of wind, the competence’s SI are not satisfied. As a result, hisshot won’t qualify as a success that manifests competence, not even if it does2after all hit the target, say because a second gust of wind brings it back ontarget. The same is true of the cognitive competences required for knowing.This serves to explain why beliefs of agents in standard Gettier cases do notqualify as knowledge.1 Here, too, the belief is brought off target, as it were,e.g. by the agent’s looking at a non-sheep that looks just like a sheep, atfootprints that are not the murderer’s, etc. The relevant SI for the cognitivecompetences are not in place. For that reason, the belief does not count astrue because competent even when, as in any proper Gettier case, it turns outto be true after all.It is now fairly straightforward to show that this account of Gettier casesis compatible with the account of SISSICASE I suggested in the earlier paper.To see this, notice that competences’ SI may (and often do) involve suitableequipment. Most archers have the competence to hit the target only with suf-ficiently well crafted bows and arrows. They tend not to have the competenceto hit the target when the arrow-tips are fitted with heavy weights. What’smore, the quality of one’s equipment may affect the time during which INcontinue to be satisfied. When a set of bow and arrows, BA, are so heavythat after fifteen minutes of continued use even the strongest archers are fa-tigued to the point of insufficient reliability, even skilled archers only havethe competence to hit the target with BA for at most some fifteen minutes.In contrast, a lighter set of bow and arrows, BA∗, may allow even weakerarchers to maintain IN for a longer period of time. Many skilled archers,even weaker ones, may have the competence to hit the target with BA∗ forhours on end. The same holds for Sissi’s competence in Vaesen’s case. Sissihas the competence to detect bombs with the old scanner for a limited periodof time. After that period of time, the quality of the equipment causes Sissi’sconcentration (∈ IN) to be degraded to the point of insufficient reliability. Atthe same time, she has the competence to detect bombs with the new scannerfor a much longer period of time. The improved quality of the equipmentallows Sissi to retain the IN relative to which she has the competence to de-tect bombs over this longer period of time. In SISSICASE, when, with thehelp of the new scanner, Sissi forms the true belief that the suitcase containsa bomb, the relevant IN (concentration, etc.) and SI (new scanner, etc.) of hercompetence to detect bombs are in place. Hence, by the above account, hercognitive success may manifest this competence.21 Standard Gettier cases are Gettier cases involving what Pritchard [2009, 591] calls‘intervening luck’, such as the sheep case Vaesen also discusses. Notice that the presentaccount does not claim to deal with non-standard Gettier cases, i.e. Gettier cases involvingwhat Pritchard [2009, 591] calls ‘environmental luck’, such as the fake barn case. Notice,however, that Sosa [2010] offers one account of these cases and, in [Kelp 2011, 2013b,Forthcoming], I consider three alternatives that are compatible with the present account ofcompetence manifestation.2 Note that it is compatible with this Sissi’s cognitive competence is not what’s most3It thus comes to light that in SISSICASE but not in Gettier cases therelevant cognitive competence’s SI are satisfied. Since competence manifes-tation requires that SI be in place, Sissi’s success may manifest competence,while Gettiered agents’ successes won’t. Competence manifestation versionsof RVE can thus escape Vaesen’s dilemma.3ReferencesGreco, J. 2003. Knowledge as credit for true belief. In DePaul, M. andZagzebski, L., editors, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics andEpistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Greco, J. 2010. Achieving Knowledge. Cambridge University Press, Cam-bridge.Kelp, C. 2011. In defence of virtue epistemology. Synthese, 179:409-33.Kelp, C. 2013a. Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology. Erken-ntnis, 78:245-52.Kelp, C. 2013b. Knowledge: The safe-apt view. Australasian Journal of Phi-losophy, 91:265-78.Kelp, C. Forthcoming. Knowledge, understanding and virtue. In Fairweather,A., editor, Virtue Scientia. Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Sci-ence. Springer, Dordrecht.Lackey, J. 2007. Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know. Syn-these, 158:345-61.Lackey, J. 2009. Knowledge and credit. Philosophical Studies, 142:27-42.Pritchard, D. 2008. Greco on knowledge: Virtues, contexts, achievements.The Philosophical Quarterly, 58:437-47.salient in the causal explanation of her cognitive success. In fact, this is plausibly whathappens in SISSICASE: the case is set up in such a way that causal salience lies with theupgraded technology, not with her competence. This is how competence manifestation andcausal salience differ (as Sosa already notes in his earlier work [Sosa 2007, 86-7]).3 For further discussion of the dilemma, including an argument that the above accountof competence manifestation can accommodate Pritchard and Lackey’s cases of testimonialknowledge, see [Kelp 2011, 2013b].4Pritchard, D. 2009. Knowledge and virtue: response to Kelp. InternationalJournal of Philosophical Studies, 17:589-96.Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge,volume 1. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Sosa, E. 2010. How competence matters in epistemology. Philosophical Per-spectives, 24:465-75.Sosa, E. 2011. Knowing Full-Well. Princeton University Press, Princeton/NJ.Vaesen, K. 2011. Knowledge without credit, exhibit 4: extended cognition.Synthese, 181:515-29.Vaesen, K. Forthcoming. Virtue epistemology and extended cognition: areply to Kelp and Greco. Erkenntnis.5

Extended cognition and robust virtue epistemology: response to Vaesen

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