Independence-friendly logic without Henkin quantification

We analyze the expressive resources of IF logic that do not stem from Henkin (partially-ordered) quantification. When one restricts attention to regular IF sentences, this amounts to the study of the fragment of IF logic which is individuated by the game-theoretical property of action recall (AR). We prove that the fragment of prenex AR sentences can express all existential second-order properties. We then show that the same can be achieved in the non-prenex fragment of AR, by using “signalling by disjunction” instead of Henkin or signalling patterns. We also study irregular IF logic (in which requantification of variables is allowed) and analyze its correspondence to regular IF logic. By using new methods, we prove that the game-theoretical property of knowledge memory is a first-order syntactical constraint also for irregular sentences, and we identify another new first-order fragment. Finally we discover that irregular prefixes behave quite differently in finite and infinite models. In particular, we show that, over infinite structures, every irregular prefix is equivalent to a regular one; and we present an irregular prefix which is second order on finite models but collapses to a first-order prefix on infinite models.Peer reviewe

Some observations about generalized quantifiers in logics of imperfect information

We analyse the two definitions of generalized quantifiers for logics of dependence and independence that have been proposed by F. Engstrom. comparing them with a more general, higher order definition of team quantifier. We show that Engstrom's definitions (and other quantifiers from the literature) can be identified, by means of appropriate lifts, with special classes of team quantifiers. We point out that the new team quantifiers express a quantitative and a qualitative component, while Engstrom's quantifiers only range over the latter. We further argue that Engstrom's definitions are just embeddings of the first-order generalized quantifiers into team semantics. and fail to capture an adequate notion of team-theoretical generalized quantifier, save for the special cases in which the quantifiers are applied to flat formulas. We also raise several doubts concerning the meaningfulness of the monotone/nonmonotone distinction in this context. In the appendix we develop some proof theory for Engstrom's quantifiers.Peer reviewe

Nominal Scope in Situation Semantics

This paper s introduces a semantical storage approach for representing nominal quantifi-cation in situation semantics. Quantificational determiners are treated as denoting binary relations, and their domains and ranges are defined. The linguistic meaning of an expression is given as a pair of its quantificational storage and basis. The storage contains the mean-ings of quantified NPs occurring in (/), while the basis represents the semantical structure of the result of the substitution of those NPs with parameters. Scope ambiguity is avail-able when more than one quantifier is in the storage. A generalized quantificational rule moves some of the quantifiers out of the storage into the basis. There is a restriction that prohibites relevant free parameters from being left out of the binding scope. The storage is empty when there are no quantified NPs occurring in 0, or when there is enough linguistic or extra-linguistic information for resolving scope ambiguities. 1 Some Situation Theoretical Notations A complete guide on the existing literature on situation theory and related topics is given by [Seligman and Moss 1997]. Quantification and anaphora in situation semantics are considered in great detail in [Gawron and Peters 1990]. The present approach differs from the later one in using the semantical storage and the lambda abstraction tools of situation theory to cope with the quantification in a computational mode. For another approach to compositional situation semantics that copes with quantification scope problems as well as with embedded beliefs, se

On existential declarations of independence in IF Logic

We analyze the behaviour of declarations of independence between existential quantifiers in quantifier prefixes of IF sentences; we give a syntactical criterion for deciding whether a sentence beginning with such prefix exists such that its truth values may be affected by removal of the declaration of independence. We extend the result also to equilibrium semantics values for undetermined IF sentences. The main theorem allows us to describe the behaviour of various particular classes of quantifier prefixes, and to prove as a remarkable corollary that all existential IF sentences are equivalent to first-order sentences. As a further consequence, we prove that the fragment of IF sentences with knowledge memory has only first-order expressive power (up to truth equivalence)

Hilbert's epsilon as an Operator of Indefinite Committed Choice

Paul Bernays and David Hilbert carefully avoided overspecification of Hilbert's epsilon-operator and axiomatized only what was relevant for their proof-theoretic investigations. Semantically, this left the epsilon-operator underspecified. In the meanwhile, there have been several suggestions for semantics of the epsilon as a choice operator. After reviewing the literature on semantics of Hilbert's epsilon operator, we propose a new semantics with the following features: We avoid overspecification (such as right-uniqueness), but admit indefinite choice, committed choice, and classical logics. Moreover, our semantics for the epsilon supports proof search optimally and is natural in the sense that it does not only mirror some cases of referential interpretation of indefinite articles in natural language, but may also contribute to philosophy of language. Finally, we ask the question whether our epsilon within our free-variable framework can serve as a paradigm useful in the specification and computation of semantics of discourses in natural language.Comment: ii + 73 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1104.244

Modulated logics and flexible reasoning

This paper studies a family of monotonic extensions of first-order logic which we call modulated logics, constructed by extending classical logic through generalized quantifiers called modulated quantifiers. This approach offers a new regard to what we call flexible reasoning. A uniform treatment of modulated logics is given here, obtaining some general results in model theory. Besides reviewing the “Logic of Ultrafilters”, which formalizes inductive assertions of the kind “almost all”, two new monotonic logical systems are proposed here, the “Logic of Many” and the “Logic of Plausibility”, that characterize assertions of the kind “many”, and “for a good number of”. Although the notion of simple majority (“more than half”) can be captured by means of a modulated quantifier semantically interpreted by cardinal measure on evidence sets, it is proven that this system, although sound, cannot be complete if checked against the intended model. This justifies the interest on a purely qualitative approach to this kind of quantification, what is guaranteed by interpreting the modulated quantifiers as notions of families of principal filters and reduced topologies, respectively. We prove that both systems are conservative extensions of classical logic that preserve important properties, such as soundness and completeness. Some additional perspectives connecting our approach to flexible reasoning through modulated logics to epistemology and social choice theory are also discussed